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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three essays on exchange rate policies and international capital
flows in emerging markets.
The first chapter examines the theoretical foundations of the "fear of floating" that has
been observed to characterize many emerging market exchange rate regimes. Building on a
model that derives "fear of floating" from a desire to prevent non-fundamental shocks in foreign
exchange markets affecting the real economy, the chapter shows that floating exchange rates can
still be optimal in such an environment. It further argues that floating exchange rates should
become more prevalent as emerging markets integrate more fully into the world economy.
The second chapter investigates the empirical evidence on "fear of floating" with a view to
determining whether the phenomenon is the optimal response of emerging markets to a volatile
external environment, as supposed in the first chapter, or whether more emerging markets would
optimally employ floating exchange rates. The chapter finds evidence that "fear of floating"
has a dual aspect; that it might indeed be optimal during less severe external volatility, but
during severe external shocks, fear of floating can lead to underinsurance against sudden stops
in capital inflows. Such "fear of floating" is associated with a lack of credibility in monetary
policymaking and the chapter argues that the evidence suggests that a credible commitment
to floating exchange rates during severe external shocks would help insure emerging markets
against sudden stops.
The third chapter evaluates the link between foreign investment and corruption in emerg-
ing markets. A model is developed of the link between FDI and corruption and the model
is evaluated with data from the World Bank's Business Environment and Enterprise Perfor-
mance Survey. It is found that corruption reduces aggregate FDI flows, but also distorts the
composition of FDI towards firms more willing to engage in certain forms of corruption. FDI
does not necessarily import better standards of governance. The chapter concludes with policy
recommendation -for addressing the corruption in emerging markets.
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Introduction
The three chapters of this dissertation address issues related to exchange rate policies and
international capital flows in emerging markets.
The first chapter addresses the theoretical foundations of the "fear of floating" which has
been observed to characterize many emerging market exchange rate regimes. The literature has
identified circumstances under which optimal monetary policy limits exchange rate volatility.
One argument proposed is that there exists a "microstructure channel" through which the
participation of noise traders in foreign exchange markets is reduced if exchange rate volatility
is limited. This chapter extends the argument to model explicit government interventions in
foreign exchange markets. It is found that taking this into account, the case for floating exchange
rates is strengthened. The efficacy of intervention is reduced in low volatility environments
since noise traders trade more aggressively, despite lower participation. This negative effect
of reducing exchange rate volatility on the intensive margin of noise trader activity offsets the
positive effect on the extensive margin of noise trader entry and floating exchange rates can
still be optimal despite noise trading. Which effect dominates depends on the elasticity of
noise trader entry with respect to exchange rate volatility. As this elasticity decreases, floating
exchange rates become optimal. An underlying determinant of the entry elasticity is the depth
of financial markets. As financial markets deepen, the entry elasticity declines, suggesting that,
at least regarding this channel, emerging markets should ultimately overcome their "fear of
floating."
The second chapter, joint work with Francisco Gallego, examines the empirical evidence
on "fear of floating", attempting to characterize "fear of floating" under different external
shocks and to distinguish between the theoretical explanations that have been proposed in the
literature. "Fear of floating" is one of the central empirical characteristics of exchange rate
regimes in emerging markets. However, while, as in the first chapter, "fear of floating" has
often been described in terms of the optimal ex post monetary response to external shocks,
protecting balance sheets and avoiding inflation, others have argued that from an ex ante
perspective such a policy leads to private sector under-insurance against sudden stops in capital
9
inflows. The central assumption of this chapter is that during less severe external shocks, "fear
of floating" might indeed be the optimal monetary policy, as in the first chapter, but during
severe external shocks, when a sudden stop threatens, a commitment to floating would would
increase the incentives of the private sector to conserve international liquidity. This chapter
develops a model of the optimal exchange rate regime when both ex ante and ex post concerns
are present. The goal of this chapter is to evaluate the extent of this underinsurance. Since it is
only "fear of floating" during potential sudden stops which undermines insurance, the chapter
reexamines the data on exchange rate regimes for evidence that exchange rate flexibility is state-
contingent. It is found most emerging markets exhibit non-contingent policies with a uniformly
low level of flexibility, which together with an absence of substitute insurance policies supports
the claim that greater exchange rate flexibility during sudden stops would be desirable for such
countries. However, more recent floats with intermediate levels of credibility exhibit little state
contingency because of a uniformly high degree of flexibility. More established floats with high
credibility exhibit state-contingent regimes, retaining a capacity for discretionary intervention,
but floating during potential crises. Exchange rate flexibility is associated with increased private
sector hoarding of dollar assets and reduced incidence of sudden stops. Together the evidence
suggests that the insurance benefits to floating for emerging markets can be substantial and
that the credibility of the monetary policy framework is central to successful implementation
of this policy.
The final chapter, joint work with Joel Hellman and Daniel Kaufmann, examines the de-
termines and foreign direct investment in emerging markets, and the role of FDI in corruption.
The chapter proposes a model of the link between corruption and FDI, which is examined with
data from the World Bank's (1999) Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
(BEEPS), of firms in transition economies. The survey unbundles corruption to measure dif-
ferent types of corrupt transactions and provide detailed information on the characteristics and
performance of firms and their interaction with the state. The chapter examines in particular
state capture and public procurement kickbacks. It is found that corruption reduces aggregate
FDI inflows and, consistent with the model, FDI is in some cases actively attracted to oppor-
tunities for corruption, challenging the premise that firms are coerced. In misgoverned settings
FDI firms undertake the form of corruption that best suits their comparative advantage, gen-
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erating in some cases substantial gains for the firm. Transnational legal restrictions to prevent
bribery have not led to higher standards of corporate conduct among foreign investors based on
the data in this sample, although such legislation might have a greater impact on the investment
decision itself than the conduct of firms that have invested. Rather than making a case against
foreign investment, the chapter argues that state capture is created and maintained through
restrictions on competition and entry in strategic sectors. Thus, enhancing competition by
attracting a wider, more diverse set of FDI firms is critical to the broader strategic framework
of fighting state capture and corruption.
11

Chapter 1
Prevention or Cure? Exchange
Rate Regimes and Noise Traders
11.1 Introduction
What is the optimal exchange rate regime for emerging markets? Since it was documented by
Hausmann et al (2001) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002), "fear of floating" has assumed a central
place in this debate. The general thrust of this literature is that whatever the de jure exchange
rate regime, if capital markets are open, the de facto goal of monetary policy in emerging
markets is exchange rate stability. Several explanations have been proposed for the observed
reluctance of central banks to allow exchange rate flexibility in the face of external shocks. Calvo
and Reinhart (ibid) focused on the pass through of external shocks to inflation with exchange
rate flexibility depending on the commitment to the inflation target and provided evidence that
"fear of floating" is associated with the weight placed on inflation in policy objectives. Aghion
et al (2000) presented a model in which external shocks are amplified through dollarized balance
sheets and Hauismann et al (ibid) found that the empirical evidence suggests that exchange rate
rigidity is associated with dollarized balance sheets. Most closely related to this paper, Jeanne
and Rose (2002) argued that a managed exchange rate with a commitment to low exchange rate
volatility reduces non-fundamental shocks, through an effect on the entry of noise traders which
they call the "rnicrostructure channel". They presented evidence that noise trader participation
is positively correlated with exchange rate flexibility. Although the channels differ these papers
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share a common view that "fear of floating" is pervasive, and given the economic environment
of emerging markets, reducing exchange rate volatility is the correct goal of monetary policy.
Recently this benign view of "fear of floating" has come to be challenged. On the theoretical
side it has been argued by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003, 2004a, 2004b) that currency
mismatches in the balance sheet are a consequence, not a cause of "fear of floating". In
this view flexible exchanges rates are optimal, since they encourage firms to conserve dollar
resources, but time inconsistent. Lacking commitment to floating, "fear of floating" emerges
in equilibrium. Cespedes et al (2004) present a model in which the contractionary effects
through the liability side of the balance sheet can be outweighed by expansionary effects on the
asset side. In their model floating exchange rates can still be optimal despite balance sheet
effects. On the empirical side, Shambaugh (2004) has argued that the crude version of "fear
of floating" which paints policy choices as a dilemma (contrasting the more familiar trilemma)
of open capital markets or independent monetary policy is not supported by the data. He
finds that countries which float do exhibit greater monetary policy independence, suggesting
that emerging markets with open capital markets do have some genuine freedom in the choice
of monetary policy framework and are not simply condemned to de facto fixed exchange rates.
Broda (2001) finds that flexible exchange rates do provide stabilization against external shocks
in emerging markets, along the lines of the classic Mundell-Fleming analysis. Finally, more
recent empirical evidence questions the universality of "fear of floating" (IMF 2004, Gallego
and Jones 2004). Increasing numbers of emerging markets are moving towards more flexible
exchange rate regimes.1 Although the ultimate determinants of these changes are debated, the
evidence suggests that it is not impossible that the economic environment permit floating in
emerging markets. This paper contributes to this debate on the origins and policy implications
of "fear of floating", by reexamining the theoretical arguments of Jeanne and Rose (2002) on
the consequences of noise trading for the optimal exchange rate regime. A central finding is
that the optimality of a commitment to exchange rate rigidity derives from the assumption that
the government does not intervene directly in foreign exchange markets. When this assumption
is relaxed, despite the presence of a microstructure channel, it is frequently optimal to allow a
14
1See Appendix G, Section 1.6.7.
floating exchange rate, in the sense that a commitment to exchange rate stability should not
be a goal of monetary policy.
To understand the argument, it is useful to outline the logic of the Jeanne and Rose (2002)
model on which this paper builds. A small open economy is subject to real exchange rate shocks
and non-fundamental financial shocks (noise trading). The economy has flexible prices so the
costs of exchange rate flexibility are assumed to derive from the pass-through of real exchange
rate shocks into inflation. Non-fundamental shocks are costly since in addition to the exchange
rate they affect the country risk premium which, although not modeled, is assumed to affect
investment. The policy maker faces a tradeoff. A floating exchange rate optimally insures the
economy against real shocks by insulating the price level against real exchange rate volatility,
while leaving it vulnerable to financial shocks. A managed exchange rate operates through
the "microstructure channel": a commitment to reducing exchange rate volatility reduces the
entry of noise traders since the gains to entering a particular market increase with volatility. 2
In general, where the policy maker chooses to be along this spectrum of policies will depend on
the objective function. However, Jeanne and Rose (2002) prove the powerful result that the
policy maker never wants to be at the fully flexible corner. The reason is as follows: evaluated
at the flexible exchange rate, the marginal welfare loss associated with reducing exchange rate
flexibility has only a second order effect arising from the distortion of optimal macroeconomic
pc)licies,3 while the gain in welfare through the reduced entry of noise traders is first order,
leading immediately to the conclusion that flexible exchange rates can never be optimal in such
an environment. 4 It is always optimal to make the reduction of exchange rate volatility a goal
of macroeconomic policy.
This paper extends the Jeanne and Rose (2002) model, to demonstrate that the sub-
optimality of flexible exchange rates under noise trading, rests on an assumption about the
2 Such a regime can be thought of concretely as a target zone, although in the limit as the commitment to
exchange rate volatility tends to zero, the regime becomes literally a fixed exchange rate.
3A constraint is added to the optimization problem whose Lagrange multiplier is zero at the flexible exchange
rate, since ex-post the unconstrained policy maker would always choose a flexible exchange rate.
4 Jeanne and Rose (2002) made also made a second argument for fixed exchange rates, that they can eliminate
multiple equilibria with high levels of non-fundamental volatility. For tractability the model presented here
is a simplification that does not exhibit multiple equilibria and so this argument is not addressed. Further,
this equilibrium selection argument is of a qualitatively different character, since only allows the government to
choose the floating exchange rates with the lowest volatility.
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policy options of the government that will be relaxed here. Since noise traders affect the
exchange rate through their demand for domestically denominated assets, a portfolio balance
effect, the natural policy instrument is sterilized intervention. This additional policy instru-
ment substitutes for the exchange rate commitment and makes exchange rate flexibility more
desirable. If this were the only effect the first-order versus second order argument would still
be qualitatively valid5, and exchange rate flexibility would still be suboptimal. However, it is
shown that there is also an additional perverse effect of exchange rate rigidity in this environ-
ment. For a given intervention and a given non-fundamental shock, the stabilizing effect of the
intervention is increasing in exchange rate flexibility, since noise traders trade more aggressively
on their beliefs in low volatility environments. A commitment to low exchange rate volatility
can undermine the efficacy of stabilizing foreign exchange interventions, and hence increase the
burden of maintaining that commitment. This is a first order effect which can dominate the
effect of reduced noise trader participation. The model builds on the central idea of Jeanne
and Rose (2002), that the behavior of noise traders can be modified endogenously by exchange
rate policies and incorporates a tradeoff between the macroeconomic effects of exchange rate
policies and the effect on the microstructure of foreign exchange markets. However, while
Jeanne and Rose derived a benefit of exchange rate rigidity on the extensive margin of noise
trader activity, this paper demonstrates the existence of a countervailing effect on the intensive
margin that can lead once again to the optimality of flexible exchange rates.
The optimal policy will depend on the details of the environment, and in particular the
relative magnitudes of effects on these margins. It is shown that the appropriate measures
of these effects are the entry effect which measures the elasticity of noise trader entry with
respect to exchange rate volatility, and the intervention capacity, which is a measure of the
impact government interventions can have on the foreign exchange market. If the entry effect
is greater than one in magnitude then the government optimally takes into account noise trader
participation in monetary policy. A floating exchange rate is sub-optimal and a commitment
to exchange rate volatility is a central goal of monetary policy. If the entry effect is less than
one, the optimal policy depends on a tradeoff between the entry effect and the intervention
5Although the optimal reduction in exchange rate volatility would be smaller.
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capacity. There is a cutoff, and if the entry effect is small enough it is optimal to let the
exchange rate float in the sense that monetary policy should be freed of a commitment to
manage exchange rate volatility and devoted solely to domestic objectives. In both cases the
government intervenes, to the extent possible, in the foreign exchange market to neutralize the
impact of noise traders, so that equilibrium exchange rates are never excessively volatile under
the optimal monetary policy. However, the regimes differ in the extent to which fundamental
volatility affects the exchange rate. Under floating all fundamental volatility is reflected in
the exchange rate. With an exchange rate commitment the government makes exchange rate
stability an explicit goal of monetary policy and commits to reduce exchange volatility below
that of the fundamental shocks. The scope of floating exchange rates is extended further
through the concept of "almost floating" regimes. It is shown that even in the case in which
the entry effect is greater than one, so that a floating exchange rate is not optimal, the optimal
regime rapidly becomes "almost floating" in the sense that the deviation from the floating
exchange rate becomes vanishingly small as the intervention capacity increases. Finally, since
the entry effect and intervention capacity are endogenous, their fundamental determinants are
investigated. It is shown that the entry effect naturally decreases as the number of entrants
increases. However, whether it decreases to below one depends on assumptions about the entry
process. If it is assumed that the number of potential entrants is limited then the entry effect
falls below one, and a floating exchange rate becomes optimal, if not then the entry elasticity
remains greater than one, and floating is never optimal. Since the former case seems more
plausible, this rationalizes an increase in the prevalence of floating exchange rates as financial
markets deepen and emerging markets become more integrated into the world economy.
What evidence is there that noise trading is central to exchange rate volatility? There is
now a large literature in behavioral finance documenting the phenomenon of "excess volatility"
across a range of financial markets as described in Shiller (1989). Specific investigation of this
phenomenon in foreign exchange markets has focused on the forward discount bias, which has
been widely interpreted as deriving from expectational errors of traders. Frankel and Froot
(1989, 1990, 1993) use survey data to measure market expectations and relate these measures
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to the forward discount.6 Ito, Lyons and Melvin (1998) document that foreign exchange rate
volatility is positively related to participation of traders in the market. 7 Hau (1998) provides
evidence that trading profits in foreign exchange markets are positively related to exchange
rate volatility, lending support to the link between exchange rate volatility and noise trader
participation that is exploited in this paper.8 Jeanne and Rose (2002) provide several tests of
the proposition that noise trading differs significantly across exchange rate regimes, examining
the dispersion of market forecasts, violations of uncovered interest parity and trading volumes.
Finally, suggestive in this regard is the study of Mussa (1986) which found significant differences
in real exchange rate volatility across nominal exchange rate regimes.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes a macroeconomic model that
incorporates noise traders in exchange rate determination, and describes the microstructure
channel which links the exchange rate regime and noise trading. Section ?? describes the
objectives of the government and defines a floating exchange rate benchmark against which
policy choices will be compared. Section 1.4 solves the model for the optimal policy and
determines when fixed exchange rates are optimal. Section 1.5 concludes and an Appendix,
(Section 1.6) contain proofs of the results discussed in the text and discussing some empirical
evidence on noise-trading.
1.2 An Exchange Rate Model with Noise Traders
This section describes a model of the exchange rate with noise traders. The model builds on that
of Jeanne and Rose (2002) with whose results it will be contrasted. The central ingredients are a
standard flexible price monetary model of the exchange rate augmented to include noise traders
that introduce non-fundamental shocks. The size of these shocks will be shown to depend
endogenously on the equilibrium exchange rate volatility. This "microstructure channel" sets
up a tradeoff in the choice of the optimal policy. Taking the distribution of the shocks as
6The alternative explanation interprets the phenomenon as a risk premium. See Engel (1996) for a summary
of empirical work on the forward discount bias.
7 They identify the effect with a change in lunchtime trading rules in Tokyo.
8 See Figure 1-7 for details.
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exogenous the optimal policy in this environment would be a floating exchange rate. However
the exchange rate plays a dual role in this economy as it also signals to noise traders the benefits
of entering this market. If exchange rate volatility is reduced the entry of noise traders is also
reduced.
1.2.1 Macroeconomic Ingredients
The economy is a monetary model of a small open economy subject to real exchange rate shocks
and non-fundamental shocks deriving from noise traders, as described below. Each period the
government supplies money and bonds denominated in the local currency. Variables relating to
the rest of the world will be denoted by an asterisk and are assumed constant unless otherwise
stated. The local currency will be referred to as the peso and the foreign currency of the
dc)llar.
Money Market
Money demand has a constant interest elasticity cz with respect to the nominal interest rate
it, which defines money market equilibrium at home and abroad in terms of the (log of) the
nominal money supply mt and the (log of) the price level Pt. The first instrument of monetary
policy that we consider is unsterilized liquidity injections into the home economy, which in
equilibrium affects prices and interest rates.
t -Pt = -it(1.1)
m*-p -ci* (1.2)
The exchange rate is determined by purchasing power parity, up to a log-normal multiplica-
tive real exchange rate shock so that PPP holds on average. The (log of) the nominal exchange
rate is et, where the exchange rate is measured in units of peso per dollar.
et = Pt - P* + t (1.3)
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Et is a fundamental shock to the real exchange rate distributed N(O, a2) and is included in
the model so that there is a well-defined notion of whether the exchange rate is floating or not,
absent noise traders. When t > 0 there is a real depreciation of the peso. Substituting for
prices the exchange rate is determined in terms of monetary policy, which is under control of
the government, and interest rates which will be determined below.
et = Mt-M* + oa(it-i*) + t (1.4)
Bond Market
The interest rate is determined in the bond market and it is here that noise traders are intro-
duced. The bond market consists of n noise traders and N rational traders. In what follows
N will be taken as exogenous while n will be endogenized, but will be constant in steady state.
In other respects the model will resemble that of De Long et al (1990).9 For convenience the
traders i = 1, ...N + n are ordered so that the first N traders are rational. Traders live for
2 periods in overlapping generations, receive an endowment wt of dollars in the first period
which must be invested and consume only in the second period. Agents are assumed to be
concerned with the real (dollar) return on their portfolio which without loss of generality we
can identify with the dollar return by assuming that the foreign (log) price level p* is zero.10
Agents have a choice between two investments - a dollar bond which is assumed to be risk-free
and a peso bond on which the real return is risky due to the exchange rate volatility (both real
and noise). Agents have CARA-preferences which lead to a linear demand schedule for the
9The De Long et al (1990) model has been criticised by Loewenstein and Willard (2003) because the equi-
librium asset price is normally distributed, implying that negative prices are possible, something which is both
counterfactual and inconsistent with limited liability. They show that this is of more than aesthetic significance
since if the asset price were bounded below then the De Long et al equilibrium admits an arbitrage. Unbound-
edly negative prices are necessary for noise traders to affect equilibrium asset prices, which implies the model's
results derive more from this idiosyncracy than from noise traders. The model presented here avoids this critique
because it is written in logs, and so the non-negativity constraint on the exchange rate is consistent with an
unboundedly negative log-exchange rate.
l 0Since there are real exchange rate shocks, the implicit assumption is that the traders are foreign so that the
dollar return measures their real consumption.
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peso asset parametrized by coefficient of absolute risk aversion y.11 The problem of trader is
to choose the investment in the peso bond b to maximize the expected utility of second period
wealth, wt+1
max -Et (e-2'-t±1) (1.5)
wZ+1 ( + *)w + b7t+l (1.6)
7Tt+1 - it -i* et-et+l (1.7)
where 7rt+, is the (log-linear) realized real excess return on the peso bond and to take the
expectation, the distribution of wt+1will depend on the equilibrium distribution of the exchange
rate et+1. E denotes the expectation of agent i taken with respect to that agents' subjective
probability distribution of 7t+1 and the notation emphasizes the fact that different traders hold
different expectations over the distributions of equilibrium variables. Under the assumption
that 7t+1 is normally distributed in equilibrium we can derive the standard linear demand
curves for the peso bonds in terms of expectations of the mean and variance of the distribution
of the exchange rate.
= EKt+1 (1.8a)
2-yVar'rt+l
The demand for peso bonds, and hence the peso interest rate depends on the subjective
expectations of the mean and variance of the excess return on these assets.12 As in De Long
et al (1990) we assume that expectations of second moments are rational for all agents. How-
ever, following Jeanne and Rose (2002), we simplify the assumptions concerning first moments.
lThe assumption is convenient provided that asset returns are normally distributed. It will be demonstrated
below that in equilibrium this will indeed be so, even though the capacity of the government to intervene might
be limited.
12 It is not necessary to characterize the demand for dollar bonds since the risk-free dollar interest rate is
exogenous, but the demand is determined as the residual of wealth once the demand for the risky peso assets is
satisfied.
21
Noise traders form subjective expectations based on the steady state expectations T which are
incorrect up to a stochastic iid shock Ot with mean .13 Rational traders have fully rational
expectations of all equilibrium variables.
Ett+l i= r + Ot fori>N (1.9)
Ett+l =- Et7rt+l for i < N (1.10)
Var'Trt+l = v for Vi < nt + N (1.11)
Equations (1.9) to (1.11) define the expectations of the mean and variance of the realized
excess return 7rt+l for noise traders and rational traders. Ot - N(0, a2), is the non-fundamental
shock to the return on peso assets. If Ot > 0 noise traders are more optimistic than expected
about the return on peso assets. ar is determined endogenously in a manner that will be
specified later. 14 Et7Tt+l is the correct rational expectations under the model and depends
on it and et, which are observable at time t, and the expectation Etet+i. Furthermore the
volatility of 7t+l only depends on, and is identical to that of et+l which in steady state is equal
constant at v.15
The supply of peso denominated bonds, bt derives from two sources. An exogenously given
quantity b > 0 and an endogenous quantity bt which the government determines optimally as
part of a policy of sterilized interventions. 1 6 It is this active market for peso bonds which com-
prises the main difference with Jeanne and Rose (2002). As discussed above, foreign exchange is
not traded explicitly in this model. The exchange rate is determined through a PPP-equation
(1.4) which depends ultimately on conditions in the money and bond markets. Implicitly
l3 This assumption is made to allow a closed form solution to the entry decision of noise traders described
below.
14 De Long et al (1990) allow for the possibility that noise traders are also systematically biased in the sense
that E (t) O. This possibility is not required here.
t5 To maintain comparability with the results in Jeanne and Rose (2002), var (0t) = Co is not a free parameter,
but is assumed to be related to the endogenous exchange rate volatility and in steady state, a2 = kvt,t+l for
some constant k.
16This b can derive from an unmodeled private sector that finances its investment projects with such bonds.
It is assumed that b 0 so that the entry decision is non-trivial.
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money is held by domestic residents for transaction purposes thus the only international finan-
cial market which affects the exchange rate is the market for peso bonds. Interventions in this
market, sterilized interventions or equivalently forward transactions, will be described loosely
as foreign exchange interventions in this paper.
In what follows it will frequently prove interesting to examine situations in which the gov-
ernment's capacity to intervene is limited. To study this situation we will take the simple
2 (O, E) -2
approach of assuming an exogenously given bound b (Ot, ct) < b on the size of interventions
each period. This assumption will be discussed more fully in section 4.4. If b = 0 the model
reduces to that analyzed by Jeanne and Rose.
Equilibrium in the peso bond market is determined by the intersection of supply and demand
so that
bt +  = ff + NEtTrt+l + not (1.12)bt +_b = 2(1.12)
27yv
Taking expectations we find that the ex-ante excess return on peso bonds is:
_ 2yvb (1.13)
n+N
1.2.2 Endogenous Noise - The "Microstructure Channel"
In equilibrium the entry of noise traders is endogenous. The "microstructure channel" links
the endogenous entry of noise traders to exchange rate volatility such that n depends positively
on v. For the traders active at time t, and which enter at time t- 1, the volatility which affects
their actions is the anticipated volatility at time t when their trading decisions are made, of the
exchange rate in period t + 1 when consumption takes place.
Assume that noise trader i pays a fixed cost c to enter the peso bond market. If they do
not enter this market they simply invest their endowments in the risk free dollar bonds. The
entry cost is paid in the period before the trading decisions take place. We can solve the entry
problem in two stages. Compute the expected utility of a noise trader conditional on having
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entered the peso bond market and trading at time t. In particular this will depend on the
realized value of the noise shock Ot. Then calculate the expected utility from the perspective of
period t - 1 before this information is known. The calculations are presented in the Appendix
B, Section 1.6.2. The noise trader enters if and only if:
1(27b) 2 v •0
29y (1 + i*) c - log (k + 1)-N) 2 (1.14)
2 2 (k + 1) ( + N)-
where k is the constant of proportionality which links noise trader beliefs and realized
exchange rate volatility, r2 = kv, b is the size of the market for peso bonds and N is the
number of rational traders. Note that in this expression the benefits of entry for a noise trader
depend on:
(2y7b) 2 v 1 2
2y(k + 1) (n + N)2 (k + 1) 2yv (1.1)
This expression can be understood intuitively as deriving from the product of the average
excess return r and the average investment that the trader will make, which by equation (1.8a)
is equal to 2yv
In equilibrium, the entry decision of agent i is made non-cooperatively, taking the number
of other entrants n as given. Thus for each n equation(1.16) defines the entry cost c of the
marginal agent. All agents with ci < c will enter and c is decreasing in n so that the larger
the number of entrants in the market the smaller the fixed cost of entry has to be to induce
another agent to enter.
1 i1 (29,_b)2 v
c = L 2 log (k + 1) + 2 + l) + 2 } (1.16)
=27y(1 +i,) 2Io 2 + (k +1) (n +N)2
Conversely for each marginal entry cost c the number of entrants n is given by the exogenous
distribution of entry costs, G.
n = G (c) = # {potential entrants with c < c} (1.17)
By definition n is increasing in c so that there is a unique equilibrium of the entry process.
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This equilibrium is a function of the equilibrium only endogenous exchange rate volatility v.
Figure 1-1 illustrates the construction. The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.1: Noise Trader Entry
Equilibrium number of steady state noise trader entrants, n* and the entry cost of the
marginal entrant c* are jointly determined by the intersection of two schedules:
1.
c* - 11 (2_yb)2 v
= 2(1+i*) { log(k + 1)( )} (1.18)
2 (+i* 21gk+ 2 (k + l) (n + N) 2
2.
n* = G(c*) (1.19)
3. Increasing v shifts the c (n) schedule outwards and so weakly increases both c* and n*.
Higher exchange rate volatility increases the benefits of entry for a noise trader and in
equilibrium the number of noise traders (and a fortiori the entry cost of the marginal
trader) increases. This defines a unique upwardly sloping entry schedule which we can
write as n* (v).
1.2.3 Equilibrium
Definitions
Putting these ingredients together we can define the equilibrium of the model. For the purpose
of defining the equilibrium, the policy rules mt and bt will be treated as exogenous. Later,
when the objectives of the government and constraints its choices have been introduced, these
rules will be chosen optimally. The steady state rational expectations equilibrium of the model
is defined as follows:
Definition: Steady State Equilibrium
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1. Stationary policy rules mt and bt as a function of n and the current shocks {Ot, Et}.
2. Constant entry n (v) as a function of exchange rate volatility v.
3. Markets for money and bonds clear at each t.
4. Exchange rate volatility v = v (n) is constant.
Equilibrium
Eliminating the endogenous variables pt and it through (1.1), (1.2), (1.3) and (1.12) and writing
= Et-1 (et), the steady state equilibrium exchange rate and the endogenous price level, interest
rate and risk premium are:
et -
Pt -
it - Z
Et7wt+l -
= 1 (mt- + (2-yvbt- nt) + t)
- 1 (mt-m-+ (2-yvbt- nt) -cut)1 e(( N.\1l
- + (--m +- t)nt)-Et
= N (2-yvbt - nt)N
(1.20a)
(1.20b)
(1.20c)
(1.20d)
In (1.20a) et is a function of n, mt, bt, Ot, t. mt and bt are functions of n (v), t, t so in
reduced form, et is a function only of n (v), Ot, t and we can write the exchange rate volatility
as a function of n, v (n). Combining with the entry equation n (v), the endogenous variables
n and v are determined.
In equilibrium, the exchange rate depends on the irrational beliefs of noise traders, Ot, despite
the presence of rational traders. Arbitrage is limited in this model through the risk aversion of
rational traders, as in De Long et al (1990).17 Risk aversion of rational traders combined with
1'7There is a slight difference compared with the equilibrium in De Long et al. In that model arbitrage is
limited because short-lived rational traders need to resell the asset for consumption in the second period and
the price at which it can be sold depends on the demand of future noise traders. In this model the assets are
two-period bonds rather than equities. Traders do not need to resell the asset to consume, since they receive all
proceeds from the issuer when the bond matures. However the second period (real) payoff is still risky despite
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short horizons, is sufficient for an equilibrium in which noise affects asset prices. In particular, no
restrictions have been placed on the resources available to rational traders in taking positions,
but risk aversion causes rational traders to limit their positions endogenously. It has been
assumed that markets are competitive and that all traders are price-takers. However the
equilibrium is noisy despite rather than because of this assumption. Adding a large trader
that takes into account the price impact of trading would not lead to the elimination of the
price effects of noise traders, since such a trader would only profit from noise traders to the
extent that the equilibrium asset price deviates from fundamentals. Since this trader's activity
always tends to stabilize prices towards their fundamental value, such a trader would trade less
aggressively than a competitive trader (this result is demonstrated formally in the Appendix
A, Section 1.6.1). Thus, without loss of generality, analysis is confined to the competitive
case. The fact that under conditions of limited arbitrage noise traders affect equilibrium asset
prices, and the exchange rate in particular, creates a potential role for government intervention
which will be explored fully below. Since the objectives of the government differ from those of
rational expected utility maximizing traders, the private sector is not a perfect substitute for
government policy.
1.3 Objectives and Regimes
1.3.1 Government Objectives
The equilibrium found above depends on the policy choices of the government and in this section
we examine how those choices are made. To determine the policy choices of the government it
is necessary to specify objectives. In keeping with the focus on macroeconomic aggregates we
will specify the loss function of the government directly in terms of these aggregates. This is a
flexible price economy, and we take government objectives to trade off the domestic objectives
not having to resell the asset to noise traders because the real exchange rate has fundamental volatility - the real
return to the asset which pays off in nominal pesos is thus risky. Due to this fundamental risk, rational traders
do not take unbounded positions against noise traders when their demand shocks disturb the asset price.
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of price stability and financial stability. The latter we measure as the volatility of the risk
premium, and the unmodeled assumption is that risk premium shocks, by affecting the cost of
capital for the economy affect investment and hence output. 18
The per-period loss function is given by
It = w(pt - Et-ipt) 2 + (1 - w)(EtrTt+l - Et_1rt+1)2 (1.21)
The government loss has two components with relative weights, w and 1 - W. The first
term represents the cost of inflation, and the government desires to stabilize the realized price
level in period t which depends on the shocks t and t around the unconditional level Et-1pt.
The second term represents the desire of the government to ensure a stable stream of external
financing and the loss is increasing in the deviation of the realized risk premium at time t with
that which was anticipated before the realization of the shocks. The interpretation of this term
is slightly more complicated because the ex-post excess return, lrt+l, on a peso investment at
time t is a forward-looking variable which depends on outcomes in period t + 1 through et+1.
For that reason the information that investors have at time t is Et-rt+l. It is these expectations
of future returns that the current shocks t and Ot impact, and so the desire of the government
is to stabilize these actual expectations which are the foundation of the investment decision
around their unconditional expectation Et_1irt+l. The interpretation of these terms in Et-1
as unconditional expectations (as of time 0) will be true in steady state, on which our analysis
will focus.
We assume the objective of the government is to minimize L, the expected discounted loss,
with respect to the policy rule {mt (nt, ht), bt (nt, ht): t = 0, ...oo}.
"
8Jeanne and Rose (2002) took the domestic interest rate it as the measure of financial stability. This has
the drawback that it has a "natural" volatility due to the real exchange rate shocks. Even if there were no
noise traders and the government was completely passive, through the international arbitrage condition the peso
interest rate falls after a real depreciation since it is expected to appreciate. To avoid confusing risk premium
shocks which are genuinely non-fundamental with expected appreciations and depreciations the risk premium is
taken as the objective of stabilization.
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oo00
L = (1 -3) Eo E3s (1.22)
s=o
This can be written in steady state as:
L = o {w(pt _p) 2 + (1 -)(Et-t+l )2} (1.23)
This problem is solved under the assumption of full commitment. A commitment problem
arises because the entry decisions of noise traders take place in period t - 1, before trading and
policy decisions take place in period t. However, entry is based on expectations of exchange
rate volatility. In equilibrium, expectations are rational, so to consider the full range of policies,
we assume that the government can commit to its policy rule at time 0. Figure 1-2 illustrates
the time line for traders that will be active in period t.
:1.4 The Optimal Exchange Rate Regime
1.4.1 Floating Exchange Rate Benchmark
As a benchmark, the policy choices of the government will be contrasted with the situation of
exogenous noise trading, in which the number of noise traders is taken as given. The equilibrium
exchange rate volatility under this assumption will be defined as the floating exchange rate
volatility. For simplicity we will assume that the government does not intervene in the foreign
exchange market so that b = 0 although as demonstrated in Appendix C, Section 1.6.3, the
equilibrium exchange rate volatility is independent of b, so this assumption is made without
loss of generality.
Proposition 1.2: Floating Exchange Rate Benchmark
1. The optimal policies are:
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oz
mt = m+ ast + -n 0 tN
bt = 0
2. The equilibrium macroeconomic variables are:
et e t
Pt = P
it n oit = Z-Et- tN
n
Et7rt+l = -- OtN
3. The economy has a unique equilibrium exchange rate with volatility v =U2 and noise
trader entry n = n* ()
Proof: See Appendix C, Section 1.6.3.E
The price level is stabilized completely against both noise and fundamental shocks and the
shocks to the real exchange rate are allowed to affect the nominal exchange rate. Taking noise
trading as given, the optimal policy is to intervene in foreign exchange markets to stabilize the
non-fundamental shocks, up to the maximum intervention size b. To the extent that the noise
shock cannot be offset completely, monetary policy is chosen so that the residual noise appears
in the domestic interest rate t. The domestic interest rate is also affected by the real exchange
rate shocks. The reason is that when t < 0 and there is a real appreciation of the peso, the
nominal exchange rate is expected to depreciate, and so through uncovered interest parity, the
equilibrium domestic interest rate is higher by the amount -st. Although uncovered interest
parity does not hold exactly, its violation is only related to the noise shocks. This "natural"
volatility of the domestic interest rate is the reason that the risk premium in dollars was taken
as the measure of financial stability. Note that were the floating exchange rate benchmark
defined more strictly as the case in which intervention is completely excluded, so that b = 0,
the equilibrium would differ only in that the residual risk premium shock deriving from noise
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traders would be greater, and so domestic interest rates would be more volatile. In particular
the floating exchange rate volatility would still be r, which can therefore unambiguously be
defined as the floating exchange rate volatility.
It should be noted that in contrast to Jeanne and Rose (2002) this economy exhibits a
unique discretionary equilibrium even when b = 0. This difference can be entirely attributed
to the modification of the loss function which takes risk premium volatility rather than domestic
interest rate volatility as its objective. In terms of the structure of the model, equations (1.16)
define a positively sloped schedule n (v), and (1.3) illustrates that in principle the equilibrium
exchange rate volatility after endogenizing the optimal policies is also a function of n which
is taken as given when the policies are chosen, so we derive a schedule v (n). The multiple
equilibria arise in their model because v () is also positively sloped, while here the equilib-
rium exchange rate volatility is constant despite noise traders, since the government optimally
allocates the noise to the domestic interest rate. Although the model in this paper does not
generate multiple equilibria this should be regarded as a strength rather than a weakness. First
it demonstrates that the multiple equilibria property is not robust to small changes in assump-
tions and allows us to focus on the other component of the argument for fixed exchange rates.
Second, the multiple equilibria in the Jeanne and Rose paper arise partly by construction. They
build a positive feedback into the model with their assumption that the variance of noise, or,
is proportional to the equilibrium exchange rate volatility. This amplifies the effect of entry
on exchange rate volatility. It is undesirable that an assumption made solely for analytically
tractability play such a large role in key results. The results in this paper are independent of
this assumption, the effect of which is only to simplify the expression of the entry condition.
1.4.2 Regimes with Commitment
Definition: Exchange Rate Regime with Eo (et - )2 < v
1. The government commits to policy rules m (t, Et), b (t, Et) which solve
{min E {(pt _ p)2 + (1 - )(Etirt+l -)2 }
{bt,mtr
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s.t. b < b2 and n (v)
2. The chosen policies m(Ot, et) , b (t, et) define an equilibrium exchange rate et which in
turn defines the exchange rate with volatility < v.
3. Entry is determined by the n* (v) schedule defined in Proposition 1.1.
Under commitment, the government optimizes ex-ante taking into account the endogenous
entry schedule n(v). There is a single fully optimal policy m(Ot, Et), b (t, t). As discussed
above, the optimal policy with commitment might differ from the floating exchange rate. There
is potentially a tradeoff between the macroeconomic effects of the optimal policy ex-post and the
preventive effects of committing to lower exchange rate volatility on the entry of noise traders
ex-ante. Jeanne and Rose (2002) found that taking into account this tradeoff the government
always sacrifices some exchange rate flexibility in favor of preventing the entry of noise traders,
and thus the optimal exchange rate regime was never a floating exchange rate. In this sense
their model gives a normative justification to "fear of floating". In what follows we investigate
the extent to which flexible exchange rates can be optimal when the government can undertake
direct interventions in the foreign exchange market.
The problem of the government can be written as above:
min E {w(pt - )2 + (1 - w)(Et rt+I - f)2 }
{bt,mrt}
s.t. b2<b 2 and n (v)
Since the government must take into account the entry schedule, n (v) this is a non-linear
problem, which is significantly more complicated than the linear-quadratic problem which had
to be solved to derive the discretionary policy. However, since n is a function of v, we can
break the optimization into two stages. In the second (chronological) stage, holding v fixed we
can first find the optimal policy, amongst the set of all policies which will lead to an endogenous
volatility v. For each v, n is also fixed, and so the problem becomes linear-quadratic again.
The first stage requires us to choose the optimal v, which is equivalent to selecting amongst the
subset of policies that are optimal for each v.
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Defintion: The Loss Function
The loss function is defined as:
I (, v) = min E {w(pt - P)2 + (1 - w)(Et7rt+l - )2 }
{bt, nt}
s.t. b2<b 2andE0 (et- _)2 < v
Then we can write the government's problem as minv (, v). We
induction, starting with the second stage.
Proposition 1.3: Optimal Fixed Exchange Rates with Eo (et
Stage)
solve by backwards
_ T)2 < v (Second
1. For every exchange rate volatility v < 2 and upper bound on intervention b > 0 there ex-
ist policies mt and bt such that the steady state equilibrium satisfies Et-1 (et - Etlet) 2 <
v (which binds) and b2 < b2 (which binds depending on Ot). Furthermore among the set
of policies satisfying these constraints there is a unique optimal policy given explicitly by:
ow -A-
Wm + A
0 (net + 2vb)
0
-0 (nOt - 2y~vL)
not < -2yvb,
2-yvb< not < 2vb
not > 2yvb
bt 
-b
n O2-yt
2L s
not < -2^,vb,
2yvb < nt < 2yvb
not > 2vb
where A is defined by v = and noise trader entry n = n* (v).
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(1.24)
(1.25)
The equilibrium variables under the optimal policy are given by:
w
et = w+ Xit
+ A
A
Pt = P- - Et
+ A
_ w 1
It = A c tNo +\ N\c
Etr+1 _ 1i|--- 7I- --
I
not + 2-yvb
0
not - 2yvb
(2-yvb + not)
0
(niot - 2-yvb)
not < -2yvb,
2-yvb < not < 2yvb
not > 2vb
The realized loss associated with the optimal policy is:
= ( - A-) 2 2( - a)
(- )+ 2 (1)
= w~u~-V) 2 2(1-w)
2yvb - not dF (t)
N2
\f__O (2'ybv
n
(nluo 2-yv _ Yt dF (yt)
nna0no 0)nu
(1.26)
Otwhereyt = -t N (O,1)
(0
1. For exchange rate volatility v > ae, the constraint on exchange rate volatility does not
bind and the government implements the discretionary policy described in Proposition
1.2 and I (b, v) := 1 (b, (72). Noise trader entry is given by n (2) .
Proof: See Appendix C, Section 1.6.3.E
Proposition 1.3 establishes the characterization of the discretionary policy as the floating
exchange rate. The constraint Eo0 (et - )2 < v does not bind for any v > /2, which is the
equilibrium exchange rate volatility under the optimal discretionary policy. Thus any policy
with commitment that differs from the discretionary policy does so by deliberately reducing
exchange rate volatility.
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not <-2yvb,
2'yvb < not < 2yvb
not > 2-yvb
1Q5,v)
Ib,v)
1.4.3 When is a Commitment to Exchange Rate Volatility Optimal?
2 Benchmarks
The first stage of the optimization problem concerns the optimal choice of v. When would the
government prefer to commit to reduce exchange rate volatility as an explicit goal of monetary
policy? Although this non-linear problem does not have an explicit solution, properties of the
solution sufficient to answer the question of interest can be characterized. In particular we
examine the first order conditions of the problem when exchange rate volatility is reduced from
the floating volatility aE. We first consider two benchmark cases that will build intuition.
If b = 0 the government has no capacity to intervene in the foreign exchange market. This
is the case analyzed by Jeanne and Rose (2002). Although we do not find explicitly the optimal
v we can establish that the loss is minimized at a v < a2by evaluating the derivative of the loss
function (b, v) with respect to v. If this is positive when evaluated at v = 2 then wherever
the global minimum occurs it certainly does not occur at v = 2 because the loss is locally
decreasing as v is reduced below the floating exchange rate volatility.
At the other extreme, letting b - oc we can evaluate the loss function explicitly. This is
a globally convex function which is decreasing at v = 2 which implies that reducing exchange
rate volatility is strictly worse than letting the exchange rate float since the global minimum
loss occurs at v = o2 Proposition 1.4 establishes these results.
Proposition 1.4: Fixed and Floating Exchange Rates (First Stage)
1. If the upper bound on intervention, b = 0, the optimal exchange rate regime is a commit-
ment to reduce exchange rate volatility v < 2.
2. As the upper bound on intervention,b -. o, the optimal exchange rate regime is a floating
exchange rate with volatility v = a .
Proof: Setting b= 0 in (1.26) we derive:
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1 (0,v) = (o- V_ )( + (1W) a()
dv =
d d 22 +(_ (n dn d 2
- > 0 since erO > 0 and-> 0 -n > 0dv 2 dv dv dv
Letting b - o in (1.26) we derive:
lim l(b, v) = w (, - x) 2b-oo
d lirm (b, v) = 1- < if v < rc2dv b-o - -
.
Further intuition for these results can be obtained by considering the optimization problem
of the government. In the case b= 0 the term w (I - i in the derivative corresponds to
the Lagrange multiplier A on the constraint Eo (et -1)2 < v19. By the envelope theorem the
partial derivative = A at V = 0 v . The effect of the reducing exchange rate volatility on
the optimal ex-post macroeconomic policy has only a second order effect at v = -2. The other
terms in the derivative, which represent the effects through the microstructure channel, have
a first order effect which always dominate locally. This argument was presented by Jeanne
and Rose (2002) as a general result on the sub-optimality of floating exchange rates with noise
traders.
However as b oo the argument breaks down for the following reason. While the distortion
of the optimal macroeconomic policy remains second order, as the capacity of the government
to intervene in the foreign exchange market increases, the effect of noise traders on asset prices
diminishes. In the limit the loss function becomes independent of n. The first order benefit of
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19See Appendix for explicit calculations.
reducing the entry of noise traders declines to zero, and the second order terms determine the
sign of the derivative. However as the loss function becomes independent of n the second order
benefit of reducing n also tends to zero, while the second order macroeconomic cost remains
positive. The argument of Jeanne and Rose is reversed and the commitment to a fixed exchange
2rate comes to be dominated by a floating exchange rate with volatility v = r.
The General Case
The above results apply in the limits b = 0 and b - oo, when the government does not make
any interventions at all, and when the capacity to intervene is unlimited respectively. However
this does not allow any assertions to be made about the intermediate cases. What happens
if the government can make interventions, but its capacity to do so is limited to some finite
0 < b < oo? It is possible that the optimal exchange rate regime would remain a fixed exchange
rate for all these cases, even if in the limit floating becomes optimal. To answer this question
it is necessary to characterize the properties of the loss function. The strategy will be to
examine its derivative with respect to exchange rate volatility v at the floating exchange rate.
Depending on whether this is positive or negative the optimal regime can be characterized.
Figure 1-3 illustrates these two cases.
The following proposition establishes general conditions under which fixed or floating ex-
change rates are optimal. The optimal regime can be characterized in terms of the magnitude
of the effects operating through the microstructure channel and the intervention channel.
Definition: The entry effect is defined as the elasticity = nv d (nro).
Definition: The intervention capacity is defined as = 2oyvbnoO
Both these variables are endogenous. 20 After demonstrating the role they play in the deter-
rnination of optimal exchange rates we will examine the factors which underlie these variables.
20Recall that the microstructure channel acts through two effects. n is determined endogenously as a function
of v through entry. Also for tractability, the volatility of the noise shocks, is also proportional to v, with a2 = kv.
For this reason the elasticity of entry is defined in terms of both n and 0a.
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Proposition 1.5: The Optimal Exchange Rate Regime (First Stage)
The optimal exchange rate regime can be characterized in terms of the entry effect E and the
intervention capacity a-. A function min () can be defined with the property that a floating
exchange rate is optimal if and only if E < min (K) and a fixed exchange rate is optimal if and
only if E > 5 min () . Two cases can be distinguished.
1. if E > 1 then dl U=2 > and a commitment to exchange rate volatility v < 2 is optimal
V' > 0.
2. if E < 1 then v=02 < 0 for VK large enough and a floating exchange rate with v =- a2 is
optimal.
These two results are summarized in the statement Emin (/) < 1 VK.
Proof: See Appendix D, Section 1.6.4.0
This proposition states that the optimal exchange rate regime depends on two factors, the
magnitude of the entry effect e, and the intervention capacity a. When E > 1 the microstructure
channel always dominates and a fixed exchange rate is optimal. When < 1 the optimal
exchange rate regime trades off the intervention capacity and the microstructure channel. The
characterization of optimal exchange rate regimes is graphed in Figure 1-4.
Although this result is instructive in isolating the forces that determine the optimal exchange
rate regime it is not a genuine comparative static since both the variables which determine the
optimal regime are endogenous. Nevertheless the result is useful as it simplifies the structure
of the problem and isolates the equilibrium variables through which the tradeoff between the
various policy objectives operates. Returning to the loss function (1.26) it is clear that the loss
has two components. The term in w (e - /)2 derives from the distortion in macroeconomic
policy away from a floating exchange that results in exchange rate volatility being passed
through into domestic prices. This term reaches its global minimum at the floating exchange
rate v = a. The second term 2(1-w) u (~)2 f \(g Yt dF(yt) derives from the
presence of noise traders and there are two additional channels through which a fixed exchange
rate affects outcomes.
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The first channel is the "microstructure channel" or, the effect of the entry of noise traders.
This effect is most clearly isolated by considering the case in which b = 0, so that the government
does not intervene in the foreign exchange market. In this case there is a loss associated with
the volatility created by noise traders given by 2 () 2. This term is decreasing in exchange
rate volatility v since both n and u0 are decreasing in v. As demonstrated in Proposition 1.4,
the first order effect of reducing v derives only from its effect on the non-fundamental volatility
when evaluated at the floating exchange rate v = or2 and it is not optimal to let the exchange
rate float.
However when b > 0, so that the government has some resources with which to intervene
in foreign exchange markets, there is a third effect which derives from the effectiveness of
intervention. The effect of noise traders depends on the extent to which the government can
offset their impact on asset prices. The integral in the loss function corresponds to the tails of
the distribution of noise trader beliefs. For small disturbances the government has sufficient
resources to offset the shock Ot. However, when Ot > 2 the capacity to intervene is
exhausted. Crucially, intervention capacity is endogenous and is determined by the expression
2v = b. It is through this term that the elasticity of the entry effect becomes crucial. The
partial effect of reducing exchange rate volatility, holding n and a9 constant, is to reduce the
intervention capacity. For a given shock, noise traders take larger positions when exchange rate
volatility is lower, since the risk of doing so falls. Given the resources devoted to intervention
there are more states of the world in which such resources are exhausted. In fact n and ro
are endogenous tend to offset the partial effect through the microstructure channel. However,
the net effect depends on the elasticity , and for low values of s the overall effect of a fixed
exchange rate is also to reduce the effectiveness of intervention. This effect reduces the benefits
of reducing exchange rate volatility and depending on parameters, flexible exchange rates can
remain optimal. Proposition 1.5 outlines the circumstances in which the microstructure channel
or the effectiveness of intervention determines the optimal exchange rate regime.
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A General Formulation
It is instructive to reformulate the argument in terms of the envelope theorem since this allows
us to see more clearly the source of the failure of the Jeanne and Rose argument. If b = 0 then
we can write the effect of the exchange rate regime on the loss function dl as follows:
dl __X+ Al dnao (1.27)
dv Onu dv
where A is the multiplier on the constraint Et-1 (et- )2 < v.21 The second term is the
"microstructure channel". The Jeanne and Rose argument for a fixed exchange rate relied on
the fact that at the floating exchange rate the envelope theorem implies that A = 0 while the
microstructure term is strictly positive. However for b > 0 this first order condition contains
an additional term corresponding to the intervention effect identified above.
Proposition 1.6: The FOC for the Optimal Policy
The first order condition can be written in the following general form:
d - al dno a 2dv (b, v) =- + d + (-1-w) Eo- (Et+i- ) (1.28)dv ancro dv V +
Proof: See Appendix E, Section 1.6.5.1
This demonstrates clearly the fact that the optimality of floating depends crucially on the
intervention effect as represented by the final term. As b increases the effect of noise traders on
the loss function declines and so (b, v) 0 and (, v) -+ 0. In this sense interventions
substitute for the fixed exchange rate, and since the slope of the loss function declines, so does
the optimal degree of exchange rate rigidity. Nevertheless, in this case the first-order versus
second-order argument is still valid for all finite b. To reverse this conclusion an additional
first order effect is necessary, and this is precisely what occurs through intervention effect.
21 The analogue of this equation that appeared in Jeanne and Rose (2002) omitted to include the endogeneity
of o, but since this is a further positive first order effect this only strengthens their argument.
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Since this term is of opposite sign and strictly negative It cannot be asserted in general that
the microstructure channel leads to the optimality of fixed exchange rates and under certain
circumstances the negative effects of exchange rate rigidity though the intervention channel
dominate the positive effects through the microstructure channel.
To what extent are these results specific to particular functional form assumptions? It is
clear that certain of these assumptions could not be relaxed. For example without the CARA-
normal combination the model would be completely intractable. Furthermore it is clear that
the specific policies must depend on the form of the loss function. However, rewriting the
first order conditions in section 1.4.3 should make it clear that first order effect through the
intervention channel is general and not a result of functional form assumptions.
1.4.4 "Almnost Floating" Exchange Rates
The above Propositions suggest that the key variable in determining the optimal exchange rate
regime is the elasticity of the entry effect, since if this is large enough (i.e. greater than unity),
floating can never be optimal. However, a drawback of the analysis is that it dichotomizes
exchange rate regimes into fixed and floating categories, without taking into account how rigid
the optimal fixed regime is. This can be misleading since it potentially gives undue weight
to qualitatively "fixed" regimes which are quantitatively "almost floating". In this section
we attempt to characterize these "almost floating" regimes and demonstrate the fact that
when augmented to encompass these cases the case for floating is significantly strengthened.
Furthermore the central role played by the entry elasticity is diminished. Regimes arbitrarily
close to floating are shown to be optimal provided the intervention capacity is large enough,
independent of the entry elasticity.
Definition: The degree of exchange rate rigidity in a fixed exchange rate is defined as
Under this measure floating exchange rates have unit rigidity while every fixed exchange
rate has rigidity p > 1. p - 1 is the proportional reduction in exchange rate volatility below
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the floating exchange rate.2 2
Proposition 1.7: "Almost Floating" Exchange Rates
1. For every p > 1 there exists a schedule c () which determines when exchange rate of
rigidity p is optimal and such that c1 () _ mrnin (). For > P () a fixed exchange rate
with rigidity greater than p is optimal. For £ < c () an "almost floating" exchange rate
with rigidity less than p is optimal.
2. The schedule P () -- oo as - oc so that for every entry effect there always exists an
intervention capacity such that an "almost floating" exchange rate is optimal.
Proof: See Appendix F, Section 1.6.6.
Figure 1-5 illustrates the optimal "almost floating" exchange rates. For two different
values of p with P < P2 the P () schedule is sketched. Below c (c) the exchange rate
regime with rigidity p is too rigid and a more flexible exchange rate is optimal. Thus the
optimal exchange rate regime is "almost floating" with rigidity less than p. Conversely above
&P () an exchange rate of rigidity p or greater is optimal and thus in this region it is optimal to
commit monetary policy to the objective of exchange rate stability. As p increases the schedules
shift upwards so that defining the "almost floating" boundary more widely, "almost floating"
exchange rates become optimal for lower levels of . As p decreases towards 1 the schedule
Ep __+ min However, in the limit p - 1 there is a discontinuity in the qualitative behavior of
these schedules. Whatever the entry effect , if p > 1, but arbitrarily close, there exists an
intervention capacity K, such that an "almost floating" exchange rate, i.e. one less rigid than
p, becomes optimal. At p = 1 this can only be achieved for E < 1 and if the microstructure
effect E > 1 a commitment to reduce exchange rate volatility is always optimal. In other words
£ = 1 is an asymptote for the emin () schedule, but none of the EP () schedules for p > 1 have
asymptotes.
2 2Strictly, the proportional change in exchange rate volatility is defined as - 1 = -1. For p > 1 this is
always n s p nP
always negative so the proportional decrease is £2c7!1 For p close to 1 this is, to first order, equal to p - 1.P
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1.4.5 Comparative Statics
It remains to investigate how the exogenous parameters of the environment affect the magnitude
of the microstructure effect and the intervention effect identified above. Mapping the effects
through these channels, in combination with the preceding analysis, allows us to determine the
model's comparative statics:
Proposition 1.8: Comparative Statics
1. > 0but = 0.h O b0
2. -O > 0 since '-y < 0 but O' is ambiguous.ON ON ON
3. ab < 0 since Ob > 0 but is ambiguous.
ab a27 b and-b 
Proof: K= 2vb and E = d (noo)
nuo~~ no v (eO
__ o,~ 27yv > 0 and
Entry effects are independent of b so that = 0, d which implies 2v > anddb dA =0wih- n
_aE = 0
Ob
An exogenous increase in N, the number of rational traders, reduces entry since it reduces
the gains to participation per noise trader. This reduces the intervention capacity K. At the
same time the effect on the entry elasticity is ambiguous since it depends on the distribution
of entry costs G. Different shapes of this distribution can be consistent with any positive
elasticity. This elasticity will tend to decrease the greater the proportion of potential entrants
that have already entered.
Likewise an exogenous increase in b, the size of the market for peso bonds, increases noise
trader entry since the benefits to entry increase, but again the effect on the entry elasticity is
ambiguous for the same reason as above. 
Although in principle these comparative statics give some guidance on the parameter con-
figurations that are likely to favor fixed or floating exchange rates, the crucial elasticity of entry
variable, a, depends on the underlying distribution of entry costs and is indeterminate. Nev-
ertheless the examples below illustrate circumstances in which the elasticity can be evaluated
explicitly.
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Example 1.1: Constant entry cost
We can evaluate the elasticity of entry explicitly in the simplest case in which all noise
traders have the same cost of entry. The total entry is determined by equation (1.16)( ~ ~~~(2_y~b)212
4 y ( + i*) c (k + 1)-(k + 1) log (k + 1) v -N (1.29)
___=_______________ +2 > 1 (1.30)
- -y(l+i*)c(k+1)-(k+1) log(k+1) 
With constant entry costs, the entry elasticity is always above 1 despite the fact that is
declining in n. The results of Proposition 5 imply that a commitment to limit exchange rate
volatility will always be optimal. The comparative statics can be signed as follows:
AN > 0 ,-- > 0 (1.31)ON ( 
,OE < 0, oi < 0 (1.32)
a-b Ob
Example 1.2: General Entry Costs
In general suppose that the distribution of entry costs is c (n). In contrast to the first
example, suppose that c' (n) -- oo as n - nmax so that the potential entry of noise traders is
bounded above by nmax .
c (n) = 1 +) {2log (k + 1) + 27 l) (+ N)2 } (1.33)
c2n)=2(1 +i,') 21o2+)+ (k +1) (n +N)2
Differentiating
2-y I +t'* c'(n fI (2rnh)2v ( n dv 2n27?(1+i*)cI(r) = {2 (k + 1)(n + N)2 n v dn (n + N))
1 _ 4y(1+i*)c'(n)(k+1)(n+N)2 n + 2n
- 2 -(2yb) 2v (n+ N)
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As n -- nmax
1 l 1 (1.34)
2 2
and
max 2-yvbGsK -4 = 2 v(1.35)
?maxdr0
These two examples are illustrated in Figure 1-6. When the number of potential entrants
is unlimited, the entry effect is always greater than 1 and it is optimal to restrict exchange rate
volatility. Conversely when the number of potential entrants is limited floating can be optimal.
In particular as b, the size of the market for peso bonds, increases, the number of entrants
increases, but the elasticity of entry at the margin falls until a floating exchange rate becomes
optimal. The schedule relating the equilibrium E and is illustrated in Figure 1-6. This
schedule is drawn holding all the other parameters constant. Increasing b, the upper bound on
government intervention in the foreign exchange market will increase the intervention capacity
Ji without affecting the entry effect , and hence shift the schedule outwards, making a floating
exchange rate more likely to be optimal.
1.5 Conclusions
This paper has presented an analysis of the optimal exchange rate regime when the presence of
noise traders adds non-fundamental volatility to foreign exchange markets, which complicates
macroeconomic management. The model incorporates a "microstructure channel" through
which the participation of noise traders is reduced if exchange rate volatility is reduced, which
creates a prima facie case for making a commitment to low exchange rate volatility a central
goal of monetary policy, as was argued by Jeanne and Rose (2002). However, the model ex-
pands the policy options of the government to include discretionary interventions in foreign
exchange markets and shows that such "fixed" exchange rates create a perverse effect. The
aggressiveness with which noise traders pursue their beliefs increases in low volatility environ-
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ments, since exchange rate risk is what limits agent's desire to trade in the foreign exchange
market. Reducing this risk therefore has two opposite effects. On the extensive margin of
noise trader entry, it reduces the overall benefit to participating in the market, and so limits
the effects of noise traders. On the intensive margin of noise trader activity, each agent trades
more aggressively since they are willing to take larger positions in less volatile environments.
This expands the states of world in which intervention is not effective in offsetting the actions
of noise traders.
Which of these effects dominates depends on parameters, however it is shown that the crucial
variables are the entry effect, which measures the elasticity with which noise trader participation
depends on the exchange rate volatility and intervention capacity which is a normalized measure
of the resources per noise trader that the government can commit to intervention. If the
elasticity of noise trader entry with respect to the exchange rate volatility is greater than
unity, then it is always optimal to commit monetary policy to reducing exchange rate volatility.
In terms of the "microstructure channel", entry is reduced, and in terms of the effectiveness
of intervention, the reduction of noise trader entry is large enough to dominate the negative
effect on the aggressiveness of trading. If the elasticity of entry is smaller, it can be that the
effectiveness of intervention is the dominant concern, in which case a floating exchange rate
is optimal. The concept of "almost floating" exchange rates extends the scope of floating
further. Even if the entry effect is greater than one, so that the optimal exchange rate regime
is qualitatively a "fixed" exchange rate, the optimal reduction in exchange rate volatility is
often quantitatively insignificant. Including such "almost floating" cases in the category of
floating exchange rates, increases the range of situations in which a floating exchange rate is
optimal. Under what circumstances is the elasticity of entry likely to be small? In terms of
the model of entry used in this paper, the elasticity of entry naturally declines as the entry of
noise traders increases, although whether it declines to a number above or below one depends
crucially on assumptions made about the entry of noise traders. If it is assumed that the
number of potential entrants is unlimited, which can be modeled by assuming a constant entry
cost for each potential entrant, then the entry elasticity never declines below unity and floating
is never optimal. Conversely, if it is assumed that the potential number of entrants is limited,
modeled with an increasing fixed cost of entry as the number of entrants increases towards its
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maximum, the entry elasticity declines below unity and a floating exchange rate is optimal.
Such a case arises naturally as the size of the foreign exchange market increases, providing
a rationale for the transition to a floating exchange rate as financial markets deepen and the
emerging market becomes more integrated into the world economy.
Finally some limits of this analysis should be stressed. The purpose of this paper has been
to reexamine the argument that noise trading creates a straightforward presumption in favor of
"fixed" exchange rates. It has been found that there exist plausible circumstances in which it
is optimal to float despite the effect that a reduction of exchange rate volatility would have on
the entry of noise traders. This weakens one argument that has been proposed to justify "fear
of floating". Nevertheless, as was discussed previously, there are various other reasons why it
might be optimal to limit exchange rate flexibility, in particular exchange rate pass through,
and balance sheet effects. The argument presented here does not refute these arguments, but
delineates the circumstances under which noise trading is an additional argument that needs
to be taken into account. Nevertheless, to the extent that balance sheet mismatches can be re-
duced exogenously through better financial regulation, or endogenously through a commitment
to floating, and exchange rate pass through can be reduced with more credible macroeconomic
policy frameworks, the economic environment of emerging markets can be made more hospitable
to floating exchange rates. The analysis presented here is suggests that as the financial markets
of the economy deepen, the sensitivity of noise trader participation to the exchange rate regime
is likely to attenuate, and a floating exchange rate becomes more appropriate. Together these
considerations suggest that emerging markets should focus on addressing the underlying obsta-
cles to floating, which conventional Mundell-Fleming considerations suggest would be optimal.
The recent trend in emerging markets (See Figure 1-8) towards floating exchange rate suggests
this may already be taking place.
1.6 Appendix
This appendix contains proofs of the various propositions that were not fully proved in the text
and discussing some empirical evidence on noise-trading in foreign exchange markets.
47
1.6.1 Appendix A: Equilibrium with a large trader
The only difference derives from the demand curve of the rational trader. In particular, the
equilibrium exchange rate is given by:
et =mt - m* + a(it - *) + Et
and the noise trader demands are given by:
b Etrt+l + Ot2t yvfor i =-- 1, ..., n
The risk premium on the peso bond is:
t+i = it - i* + et -et+
and market clearing in the bond market implies
bt + b nEt-lit+l + nOt +
2yv
where bL is the demand from a large trader. To close the model that demand needs to be
determined. The problem of the rational trader is:
max-Et (e-2 ywt+l)
bt
t+ = (1 + i*)wtL + b7rt+1
which can be written, since by CARA, the demand is independent of wealth wtL :
max _Ete-22bLt l = max Ete-2bL (it-i* +et-et+l )
bL bL
From the point of view of this trader, only et+1 is unknown and independent of actions in
period t, so can be taken as given. The large trader assumption is relevant since bL affects the
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equilibrium variables it and et.
: e-2ybt (it-i* +et) Ete2-ybLet+l
= e-2 b(it-i*+et)e22v(bt) +27bt
e27 2 v(bL ) 2 +2ybL-2ybtL(it-i*+et)
Taking the derivative, the demand curve is obtained:
o = 27vbL_(it-i*+et-e)-b L d
2-yv
-dbL (it-i + et))bL = (it-i* + et--)
But from the bond market clearing equation
d
dbL
(it - i* + et) 2-yv
n
< 0
which implies
btL
n (it - i* + et -- )
n + 1 2"yv
n b1bcn+l
where b is the demand of a competitive trader. Clearly a large trader always trades less
aggressively than an otherwise identical competitive trader. The large trader makes trades
with the same sign, but strictly smaller magnitude. Solving for the full equilibrium it is found
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Taking the expectation:
2-YbL (it -i* +et-et+, )
Ete- t
nEt-l7rt+l + not
2-yv
72 Et - t+1
+1 2yv
n + I 2?yv
not (it -i* + et - e)
_ ±o2yv
Eliminating it -i*
mt - rm* a n+1 a n+1
et -T + =~ F 2-yvbt - -- not +1+ 1 +a n 1 +a n
The competitive equilibrium with N = is:
et - t- a 2vbt
t 1+ ta - not + t1+a 1+a
Since n+1 > 1 the large trader makes the equilibrium exchange rate more responsive to the
shock Ot. Clearly the result can be generalized to the case of N > 1 large traders, or N rational
traders, some of which are large and some of which not.
1.6.2 Appendix B: Derivation of the entry equation (1.16)
The conditional distribution of 7t+l from the subjective perspective of the noise trader at time
t is
The portfolio decision maximizes utility:
50
that:
bt + b
2yv n+1)
1
1+ at
et - 1 - (Mt - 7jT) - Ettt - i =
7t+1 -N (-ff + Ot, V)
_Etie-2vwt+l . _E¢-2v(l+i*) (wt -c4 ) e-2ybtwrt+l
-e-2y(1+i*)(wt-c) e2y2vbt2 - 2 bt(7+0t )
The optimal b maximizes this expression giving the linear demand schedule derived above
~+Otb* -0bt- 2yv
Thus the expected utility of trader i at time t, conditional on entry is given by:
EU = _- 2-y( l~i* ) (wt-c ) e2y2v ( 4iOt ) -2-y ( f+t ) (+Ot) -e- )( t-oi'e (W+0t)-
-- e-2(1+i*)(wt-ci)e- (+) 2
while if the trader does not enter,
EU -e- 2 (l+ i*)wt
Since entry occurs before the noise trader knows Ot, and we take the expectation over the
noise shock: 23 :,24
2 3This equation is valid under two assumptions: that Et- (rt+l) is independent of 7rt+1 and vt,t+l is inde-
pendent of t. The first is a consequence of assuming expectations of noise traders are lagged. A sufficient
condition for the second is vt,t+1 = v is constant Vv which is true in the steady state on which we will later
focus. Out of steady state it is possible that t is correlated with vt,t+1, but to the extent that non-steady states
are contemplated in the general definition of equilibrium, we will implicitly restrict attention to those for which
vt,t+l and Ot are independent so that the entry equation can be derived explicitly.
24 n ge er2(1±i)(wt-c2 =( L ++l) but we have used the assumption ag -
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EU =_e2(1+i*)(wt-c,) 1 (l+k)
7kA
Taking the expectation of (1.12), assuming (which will be derived below) E (bt) = 0 and
writing b as the unconditional supply of peso bonds independent of the government's monetary
policy, we find:
_ 2yvb
71+--n+N
Substituting in for W,the agent i enters if and only if
I I~~ (2'yb) 22y (1 + i*) ci-2 log (k + 1)-2 (( + l) ( )2 < 02lg 2(k+l) (n+N)2
1.6.3 Appendix C: Derivation of the Optimal Policies
Although conceptually distinct, the optimal policies in Propositions 2 and 3 are both derived
from the solution to the following general problem:
ram(int) w(pt - Etlpt) 2 + (1 - w) (Ett+1 - Et_17rt+1)2 (1.36)
min ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(1.36){bt(Et0t),t( It) +A{(et-Etlet) 2 -v}+ (Et,Ot) [b2 _ b2] }
Specifically the relationship between these problems is that the first order condition to
equation (1.36) is a necessary condition for the solutions to both proposition 1.2 and 1.3. Since
these first order conditions will have a unique solution, it in fact characterizes the solutions.
First we demonstrate that both problems are equivalent to equation (1.36) and then we proceed
to solve explicitly for the optimum.
Lemma: The optimal policy with exogenous noise trading solves
min W(pt- p)2 + (1- w) (E tx t+ l - 2 (1.37){fIt( t,,m,(),mt)}ile w c o2 +fo (st, O) m62 - - A2 ]
for some constant r/(st, Ot) multiplier which is a special case of (1.36) with A = 0
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Proof: Trivial application of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem. The necessary conditions for the
discretionary problem are:
W {w(Pt _p)2 + (1 -W) (Ett+l- )2 + 7 (t, t) [bt ]} = 0
- {w(Pt -p) 2 + (1-W) (Et )t+l-a)2 (tOt) [bt- ]} = O19btI I 
The second order conditions are satisfied so these first order conditions characterize the
global solution to the problem (1.37) U
Lemma: The optimal policy rule {bt (Et, Ot), mt (Et, Ot) that implements the fixed ex-
change rate volatility v satisfies the first order conditions of the following problem:
rain { w(pt -p)2 + (1 - ) (Et7t+l - )2 }
{bt (t,Ot),M (t,°t)}l +A {e-)2 - V + e (t, t) [b2 _ b ]2
for constants (t, Ot) and A which is equation (1.36) above.
Proof: It is necessary to prove that the optimal policy rule in proposition 1.2, which mini-
mnizes the expected loss ex-ante, and is a function {bt (t, Ot), mt (t, Ot)} over the realizations of
the shocks, can be determined by solving an ex-post problem treating the realization (t, Ot) as
constant. The two approaches would be trivially equivalent, since the maximand is an expecta-
tion over a non-negative function, were it not for the fact that the constraint Et- 1 (et - )2 < v
is applied across realizations of (t, Ot) .25 There is thus a single constraint that ties together
what would otherwise be completely separable problems.
The full ex-ante problem is:
in Eo {W(pt _ p)2 + (1-wC) (Et7t+l -)2}
2 bThis issue does not arise with t e other constraint b since this constraint is applied pointwise.
2This issue does not arise with the other constraint bt2 < since this constraint is applied pointwise.
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s.t. b < b and Eo (et _)2 v
Standard results in optimal control imply that necessary conditions for an optimum in the
presence of the first constraint are obtained simply by adding a multiplier Tq (Et, Ot) to the
objective function. Thus the problem can be restated immediately as
mi~n Co {aJ(t- p)2 + (1-) (Et7rt+l-a) _ T] (5t, )t) 2-2)}
s.t. Eo (et - )2 < v
It is the second constraint which is non-standard. However, we can derive necessary con-
ditions for the optimum in the same manner as they are derived in optimal control. Consider
a potential optimum (b*, m*) and perturb it with arbitrary functions 3 (Et, Ot) and (t, Ot) to
form:
mt = r + 613 (Et, t)
bt = bt + 621~ (Et, Ot)
Since (bt, m*) is the optimum the family we have constructed must consist of sub-optimal
functions for (61, 62) # (0, 0). Consider the problem and the constraints as functions of (61, 62)
instead of (bt(st, Ot),mt(st, Ot)). As 6 1,62 0 (mt, bt) - (m',b*) and we can derive a
necessary condition since we know that this family of functions achieves the minimum loss at
(61, 62) = (0, 0). Since the constraint b2 < b2 is to be applied pointwise we can assume that it
is satisfied by each member of the family of functions by requiring q (Et, Ot) = 0 when b* = ±b.
The problem is a constrained problem in 2 variables.
Define
L =- Eo {W(pt _p)2 + (1 - W) (Et71rt+l- )2 +q (Et, t) (bt2 2)}
E = Eo(et-) 2
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Necessary conditions for an optimum are, as (61, 62) -* (0, 0), applying the standard result
for constrained optimization of a function of two variables.
DL DLA / AL
019 62
OE E
=9J O& 02
Writing this out in full
Eo,3 { W (pt - p)
2
+ (1 -ac) ha (Ettrt+l -Et-7rt+l )2 }
E0o 
E a (et-
Eo/3at (et - )2et
}
(1.38)
However, since the functions : and are arbitrary equation (1.38) can only be satisfied if
there exists a constant A such that
0 (Pt)2 + ( 9
w (pt -_p)2 + (1 -_w) (Et7rt+l _)2
+? (t, t) (b2-b )
a~~~= -A 0 (e )2 (1.39)
m (et -
}
a
- -A-a (et -)
Dbt
(1.40)
Crucially, these equations have to hold pointwise. But this demonstrates that a necessary
condition for the optimum of the ex-ante problem is given by the first order conditions to the
ex-post problem:
min
jbt (t ,Ot) ,-rt(Et ,t) } {
w(pt_ p)2 + (1 -W) (Ett+l -)2
\ (et ) 2 V I + 77 (t, t )2 b2) }
Lemma: The solution to problem (1.36) is
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{
.
W I (Pt _ p) I + ( _ W) (Et 7t+ 1 -
abt Ob, _ F) 2
+,q (Et, Ot) a b2
abt ( t
(a (2 v-rv)Ot not < -2-yvb,
a - A
mt= + + Et + 0 2-yvb< nt < 2vb
w +AA
a (nOt-2av) nOt > 2yvb
-b not <-2yvb,
bt = t 2-yvb < nt < 2yvb
b not > 27yvb
Proof:
m { w((Pt-p)2 + (1-w) (Etirt+- )2 
{btmrnl +A {(et )2 - v} + (Et, Ot) (b2- ) f
Solving for the macroeconomic equilibrium under the assumption of stationary policies and
assuming Etbt+l = 0, which implies the government does not issue peso bonds except for the
purposes of stabilizing the exchange rate, and Etmt+ = i for all t:26
a
-e = m* + N 2-yvb
nA-N
-i * + 27vb
n+
p- -2yvbX= -*+--_n + nN2-vb
n+N
The equilibrium exchange rate, and the other endogenous variables are therefore given by
26Equivalently we can assume that even if the fiscal authority also issues peso bonds it does so for reasons
orthogonal to the determinants of the exchange rate.
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et - e
Pt -
t- 
mt - u a 2-v
=~~~ b~+ ~ V n1+a 1+oe N I+aN- ' 1+a- '
mt-i a 2yv a n o1 1+ - O bt N t- I +a 1+c N I+aN +-a
mt-m 27yv 1
1+ a N 1+(
2?yvbt n 0
EtT+l =7 _i ft
The Lagrangian then becomes:
The Lagrangian then becomes:
I
1 +Cn t1 +-Ot - I Etl+cN 1+-a
W(Mt -+ + a 2Ybt - + n Ot _- a t)21~ q- 1+-- N l c N 1-¥-e
+(1-o:) N
+ ( + "V+ ig +bt _ nt + 1 t)2 - V
1+a I+ N t +c- bN + 
+r/ (b 2- b) I
Taking first order condltions with respect to mt and bt and simplifying we obtain two
equations:
0 (w + A) (mt - 4) + a (w + A) (2vbt - not) + ( - aw) EtN
0 = (w + A) a(mt-i) + (1-w w 2+ Ac + 2)(2YVbt-nOt)
+rbt (1 + ()2 + (A - w) act
2-yv
(1.42)
(1.43)
We solve separately for the cases 77 r 0 and r] = O. In the case r7/ 0, the constraint on the
sterilization policy binds and bt2 = b2. We can derive mt immediately from (1.42) while (1.43)
determines 7r. The Lagrange multiplier rt depends on Et and Ot. Whenever the constraint binds
971 > 0.
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I
- -O, --  E+
A (Et, Ot; b, v) =:
2-yvb-Ot)
=_- a  b
=_ -a(-2a-yv t)
--= -t N
gw -A
+ ctw+A'
oaw -- A
++A
bt = -b
In the case 7- 0 the constraint on intervention does not bind, b2 < 2 and we find the
following solution:
aw - A
mt m+ - t
wAAw + A 
bt = -ot
2/yv
= 0
Thus for any v the following policy rules optimally (ex-post) implement an equilibrium
exchange volatility v:
N' (not + 2-yvb)
0
-(t -2-yvb)
not < -2yvb,
2yvb < not < 2vb
not > 2yvb
-b not <-2yvb,
bt= n2LvOt2 v 2-yvb < not < 2yvb
not > 2-yvb
We can solve for the endogenous variables e, p, i and Et7rt+l in each of the ranges implied
by the above rules.
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Tit - Tm
mt --m T
aw - A
_woA-AMt = mf+ ~Et
+ A
+I
bt
et = e + Et
+ ALw+Ae
A
t = P- -t
w + A
(2,yvb + not)
W 1
w(nOtt-N2vb)
not + 27vb not < -
+1 = X- - 0 2-yvb < nO
nOt - 2yvb not >
not <-2yvb,
2yvb < not < 2yvb
nOt > 2-yvb
-2yvb,
t < 2vb
2-vb
Note that the conditional distribution of the exchange rate is normal despite the limited
interventions. This is what allows us to use the CARA-normal model of investor behavior to
derive the asset demands.
Finally we need to verify that the policy rule can actually implement the assumed exchange
rate volatility v, which will determine the value of the multiplier A.
(1.44)
2a2
vw = 2(wa + ) 2
Thus any equilibrium exchange rate volatility v < r2 can be implemented by some monetary
policy. Of course, the government could voluntarily choose a higher volatility but this would
never occur if monetary policy is being set optimally.
Setting A -= 0 the floating exchange rate of Proposition 1.2 is derived. It is clear that the
equilibrium exchange rate volatility in this case is v = K2 independently of b, but the particular
policies and equilibrium given in Proposition 1.2 are derived by setting b = 0.1
1.6.4 Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 1.5
In proving Propositions 1.5 and 1.7 we will make use of the following lemma:
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Lemma: Bounds on the tails of the normal distribution
x x
3 +5x < eX 2 /2 o e-Y2 /2dy +2 < 1
-e2 I e -Y/ d < XX3-25 l+x2 3+6x2+x4 -- x 3 3 x
Proof: These inequalities can be proved by integrating by parts the inequality, for n =
(y - x)n ey 2/2dy 0
They are in fact the nth convergent in Laplace's (1805) continued fraction approximation
to the normal tail:
eX2 /2 e 2/2dy 1fr e-Y /2 dy g-- ]-IX + 2
X+x+ + 3-~.
See Patel and Read (1996), Proposition 3.6.1.0
Propositions 1.5 seeks to characterize the optimal exchange rate regime. The method will
be to investigate the derivative of the loss function with respect to v at the exchange rate
boundary v = a 2. This is therefore strictly only a local analysis. The implications of this
and the assumptions required to draw global conclusions will be discussed more fully below.
Evaluating the derivative explicitly we find that
4 (1 -w) (ao) d (n
N 2 d
4(1-w) (nTo) 2 c f
N2 v
7
f,12T~b (^o - Yt) dF
O neo+ vo)- )RYX+ V d (o- ) J 2bnuo naof no ( , -A 2 dF (t)
nao
+ (1 -) 2asb ? (7eV6 -Yt) dF (t)fle
Note that f2b h -Yt dF (t) > 0 and 2yvb (__ - Yt) dF (t) < . Thus the
n6 0 nao
sign of the derivative depends crucially on the elasticity E - v (noo) There are several cases
~~~~~to analyze.~n 0
to analyze.
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dl ( o,v)
dv =a
YO
(1.4
- Yt) dF (yt)
1. >1
-1 < 0 so that both terms are positive and dv ) > 0
2. s<1
The first term is positive while the second term is negative. The net effect depends on the
relative magnitudes of the two terms.
WibWriting 2= nb we can define D, where y is a standard normal.no
D =X (y - )2 dF (y)- 1 K (y - K) dF (y) (1.46)
Evaluating D we find
K) 2 e-y 2 /2dy - j -) K (y - ) e - y2/2dy
= Ke - 'K2 /2 + e-Y2/2dy - 2Ke- 2/2 + K2 e-y2/2dy
- ) {2 i e 2/2dy -e/ 2}
JeY 2/2dy + q{K;2 e-Y2/2dy_
E I C 
The floating exchange rate boundary is defined by the equation D = 0.
defines a function:
Rearranging, this
Emin (K) = . e /2 e - 2J7',' e 112/ 2 dy - K (1.47)
in (0) oc, -y2 I~~~~~~~~~~ e--n2/2It is immediate that min (0) 0- and applying lemma 4, f, e-Y /2dy < 1e /2 
-e 2/2 > K2 for K > 0 so that Cmin (K) > 0. To demonstrate that Emin () has an asymptoteJne-y2/2dy
at = 1, the following rational bounds are used.
Corollary: Upper and Lower bounds on D
1. <i£<min ( < ( 21. D < 0 if < T - w (K) E < ' ,) = --T--
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Proof: We want to know when we can bound D from above by a negative quantity and
from below by a positive quantity.
K2 +2 _2/2
< 3/4 d- e /2±
3 r, + Oi
K_ -2/2 (1 - 1)
3K + K
1 1 2 2 _2 2/2
£ 3--- eIt 3K + Ki
K2 (1-1 ) +2 < 
£
K2
,-f-- e < + 2/+ 2
K3 + 5K 1 2 K3 + 5-I
> + E2 + K;4 £ - 3 +62 + 4EC3 +5Es 1 -3-C 5/
= +- 6K E 3+6
- 3 + 6 2 + ,4 3 + 6K2 + K4
K2 (11 ) + (5 - 3)
= 3 +-a4 +- 3 - q-
3 + 6K2 + K 4
K -± ( £ )
K2 + 3
,,--> -> 5/4+5
.
Given the rational bounds it is immediate that gmin (/) < () < 1.
Remark: It should be noted that the above argument has relied on the examination of local
conditions at the floating exchange rate v = 2. While finding > 0 is sufficient to establish
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2-DeK 2 /2
- K}
D> if
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that the floating exchange rate is not optimal, the converse is not true. d < 0 establishes only
that locally the optimal exchange rate regime occurs at the floating exchange rate corner, but
does not rule out that there is a global interior optimum where the loss function is minimized
at; some fixed exchange rate. A sufficient condition for the local analysis to be valid is the
convexity of the loss function, as a function of v. Examination of the loss function when b = 0
provides some intuition:
1(0,V) = w(O>-)2+(1_ )u2Q?)2
d_ (i~z> 2(l-w) dd = I a, +2 -2 W) d nuodv -w iT +dN2v
d21 1 a_- 2 (1- -- 2 ( d 2
dv 2 2 VVA 3 N 2 ri2o d+
This expression illustrates that if the loss function is not convex in v this effect derives
from the term in no. Although this is a theoretical possibility we will assume that the
parameters are such that it does not occur.
1.6.5 Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 1.6
Proof: We can express the first order properties of the model in terms of the Lagrange multi-
pliers introduced above as follows:
dl (b, v) = d min E {w (Pt )2 (1-)(Ett+l )2i  TW E~~ 
dv dv {bt,mt} 
d
= vEo min {W (t _ p)2 + (1-w) (Et7rt+l-A) 2 }dv {bt,mt }Ed d f- -Pt )2 1-)(t~tr-2 + &1(b, v)duxo
= Eo dv {bin} Ta (P-p ( ) (Et~t+l-_~)2 } 1f02 ao d
EO 1dv bt,mnt 0 a~ uo dv
The expectation can be commuted with the minimization by Lemma 2 above. The differ-
entiation can be commuted with the expectation provided that the distributions of st and Ot are
independent of v. In general this is not true, so we consider the differentiation to be carried
out for constant u2 and add the final term to extend to the case where A = kv. Writing
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the minimization in terms of the optimal policies m* and bh, and where p* indicates that the
expression is evaluated at the optimum
dv b )=E dv w (P _p) +1-)(t*+_ 7 + ( v)drd (b, v) = Eo {w (P - - 2 + (1-bw) (Et- } i (bv) dudv ~ +Et d { (P*-+ + 1wO(ur* dv
+-Eo0&b: {w (*-p) + (1 -w) (Et Trt*+ - ) 2} dmt
+Eo+ {w (P *)2+(1-w) (Etr*+1 _)2} ddv-~01 (b, v) (E(v)t~ ~~~~~+ 0dv On t t+I ~dv
O1 (b, v) duro
O9ro dv
Applying the necessary first order conditions in terms of A, equations (1.39) and (1.40)
derived in Lemma 2 we can write
0m_ {w _Pt-) + (1- w) (Et7 1 +- )2}
_ a~~~~ 
amt
= th {e c(eo-d)2-i}-r (atd rt)e(b2-b2)}
'9 { (P*t-p) 2+ (1-_w) (Et7r*+-r 2}
=e- - -*) -v (Et, Ot) (b -b
Substituting in these conditions and rearranging
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We can simplify:
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Rewriting the derivatives we derive the form presented in the proposition:
dn 01 (b, v) d 2d- 1 (b,v) + 0o2 dvdv,9 On d
01 (b, v) dna0 + (
Onco dv
01 (b, v) dnco
Dnuo dv
- 0) Eo a (Et7*+ 1_ )2
We can sign the terms in this first order condition as follows:
-l (b, v)
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2 (-2-yvT-nOt) ( ) > 
0
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2 (-2vb-nOt) () < 
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U1.6.6 Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 1.7
Proof: By equation (1.45) we can write the derivative of the loss function as
d+v) W ( ) 4(1-w) (nao)2 ·12'Y ( na -y,) dF (yt) +-O -/nag O
( _ 1) f 2yb (2n'y - Yt) dF (t)
nvo
The first two terms are negative, while the second two terms are weakly positive. However,
while the first term is independent of b, all three other terms tend to zero as b -- oo. This
implies that for any v < cT2 we can always find a b such that for b > b d (, v) < 0 and so a
more flexible exchange rate would be desirable. We now make this argument more precise.
First we rewrite the expression for the derivative so that the only endogenous variables are
K and E as above:
d~ (bv) = (1-p)+4 (1 - A) Ddv  w{1p N22 p2
= w {(1-p)±c-¶ . 2-7rD}
where D is defined in equation (1.46) and p = ok/v/- and c = 4 (1-w)2 > 0 is a constant
wN2 U2v/--7
which only depends on exogenous parameters.
For each p > we can define the schedule eP () such that an exchange rate with rigidity p
is optimal. d-l (b, v) = 0 if and only if (1- p) + cV27/D = 0 which simplifies to
(p- 1) p2
EP () = C ' e-Y2/2dy
(p- ) p2
c JX° ey 2/2dy
e-K2/2+ 
+ f e- 2/2dy
+ 5min ()
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}
It is immediate that P (0) > 0 and s () > 0 for Vi > 0.
and (p-1)p 2 -4- 0oo so that e () -- oo. The following analytical bounds are useful in
c fh e- 2/2dyhe oo tis seul
characterizing the behavior of this schedule:
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= (i-p)+
< (i-p)+
4 ( )E D
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-K2/2 K 2 + 2
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A sufficient condition for d (, v) < 0 is
< ( p - 1) p 2 eK2/ 2 K3 + 3- 2
C K;2 2 'K2 + 2
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4 W)(E £_D
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( e-y2/2dy + 1- { K 2 e Y2/2dy
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= (1i-P) + C e- K2 /2 K3 5K3 + 6K2 + K4 {-2/2 -3 -K3}+ e_2/23 +6K2 + K4
A sufficient condition for dl (, v) > 0 is
(p 1) p2 e 2 /2 3 + 6K2 + K4
c K K 2 +5
K2 +3
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Thus
(p () 1) p2 eK/2 3 6 4 2 + 3C K; /< 2+ 5 +K2 - 5
For each p these bounds define the sufficient conditions for which the fixed exchange rate
with rigidity p is too rigid and not rigid enough respectively. As p -4 1 the bounds tend
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towards the bounds derived in Proposition 5. However the case p= 1 is qualitatively different
from any p 1 since the asymptotic behavior changes. As - o, for p > 1 every fixed
exchange rate ultimately becomes dominated independent of the entry elasticity . However
as -4 o, for p = 1 this statement can only be made for < 1.1
1.6.7 Appendix G - Empirical Evidence
Figure 1-7, reproduced from Hau (1998) provides some empirical evidence of the positive corre-
]ation between exchange rate volatility and the incentives to enter the foreign exchange market.
The figure plots the aggregate foreign exchange trading profits of the twenty largest US banks
together with an index of global foreign exchange rate volatility. Figure 1-8 illustrates the
recent increase in the exchange rate flexibility in emerging markets, plotting the proportion of
emerging markets in each exchange rate regime category for the years 1991-2003. The figure
is taken from IMF (2004). Emerging markets are defined as those countries in the Morgan
Stanley Capital International Index. Exchange rate regimes are classified according to the
IMF de facto classification, but similar results are obtained using the Reinhart and Rogoff
(20304) classification. The "fear of floating" characterization is an increasingly inappropriate
description of emerging market exchange rate regimes.
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Figure 1.7: Exchange Rate Volatility and Trading
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Chapter 2
Exchange Rate Interventions and
Insurance: Is "Fear of Floating a
Cause for Concern?
(joint work with Francisco Gallego)
2.1 Introduction
"Fear of floating" has recently come to be seen as one of the central de facto characteristics
of exchange rate regimes in emerging markets since it was first identified by Calvo and Rein-
hart (2002). However the interpretation of this phenomenon is still open to question. Is it
the case that the optimal monetary regime for emerging markets with open capital markets
entails limited exchange rate flexibility? In the formulation of Shambaugh (2004), is the fa-
mnous open economy trilemma really a dilemma for emerging markets, a choice between open
capital markets or monetary freedom with no separate choice of exchange rate policy? Or is
the trilemma alive and well? Does the pervasive "fear of floating" indicate instead that many
emerging markets inadvisably choose to limit exchange rate flexibility when a genuine floating
regime would be preferable?
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Although the literature on this topic could be classified along many dimensions this paper
focuses on the extent to which "fear of floating" is the optimal policy for emerging markets.
The literature can be divided into those that focus on deriving "fear of floating" as the optimal
ex post monetary policy, taking into account the particular economic environment and shocks
faced by emerging markets, and those that focus on the ex ante effects of monetary policy,
where anticipations of exchange rate policy can drive inefficient private sector decisions. The
main factors that have been claimed to support "fear of floating" ex post are the pass through of
(excessive) exchange rate volatility into domestic inflation, the costs to inflation credibility this
might entail, and the contractionary effects of a devaluation on an economy with a high level of
dollarized liabilities. Contrasting this, Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) have argued that
although limited exchange rate flexibility is often the optimal discretionary policy ex-post, it
distorts the incentives of the private sector to insure itself ex-ante against sudden stops in capital
inflows. If the private sector anticipates that the exchange rate will be defended during a crisis,
its own incentives to hoard international liquidity are weakened, and such anticipations can be
the ex ante cause of the excessive dollarization which supposedly validates "fear of floating" ex
post. "Fear of floating" is not optimal, but without a commitment to floating during crises, it
is the equilibrium policy. Countries can improve their insurance against sudden stops by giving
the private sector the right incentives, either through a commitment to a floating exchange rate,
or various substitute policies that will be discussed more fully later.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the tension between these approaches and its impli-
cations for exchange rate policy in emerging markets. We attempt to shed light on the question
of whether "fear of floating" is simply the optimal policy choice in a difficult environment or
a suboptimal equilibrium with too little exchange rate flexibility during external crises. We
take the view that these explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, allowing "fear
of floating" to have different aspects under different circumstances. In the face of less severe
external shocks, when the supply of international liquidity is not exhausted, countries will op-
timally stress the ex-post considerations preferring to avoid the inflationary effects of exchange
rate instability. This does not preclude that during severe crises, when international liquidity
shortages are binding, the exchange rate be allowed to float, the commitment to which ex ante
provides maximal insurance against such events. In this view, while floating exchange rates
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can have important incentive effects, it is not necessary that the exchange rate float freely
under all circumstances for these effects to obtain. This leads naturally to the concept of
state-contingency. It is impossible to evaluate the consequences of "fear of floating" without
understanding the circumstances under which such exchange rate rigidity occurred. Perhaps the
significant unconditional "fear of floating" which the literature has identified masks conditional
flexibility during external crises.
With this in mind, we develop a simple model that captures a trade off between ex ante and
ex post considerations. The are two states of nature, a "good" state, during which international
liquidity is sufficient, and a "bad", or crisis, state during which constraints on the supply
of international liquidity are binding. The optimal policy with commitment is indeed state-
contingent along the lines described above, intervening to stabilize the exchange rate, and
prevent inflation pass-through', when there is no crisis, but allowing the exchange rate to float
if a potential crisis occurs, for its effect on expectations. However we also consider two second
best policy regimes. We contrast the discretionary policy, which is determined ex post with no
commitment. As in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) such a policy will exhibit inefficient
"fear of floating" during crises and forego the insurance benefits of the floating exchange rate,
but it does not compromise the benefits of exchange rate stability during normal times. Finally
we also consider the non-contingent policy with commitment. This regime is viewed as a proxy
for the process of building commitment to floating, during which it might be necessary to avoid
intervention altogether. Although this brings the benefits of improved ex ante insurance against
external shocks, there are short term costs in the form of the greater inflation pass-through that
floating entails.
To identify state-contingency empirically the paper develops an indicator of potential sudden
stops as a proxy for the bad state of nature described above. The indicator is derived from the
spread on a broad index of high yield debt. A rise in high-yield spreads is treated as a (common)
exogenous negative shock to external financing conditions for emerging markets and as such
a potential sudden stop. By comparing the behavior of the exchange rate regime in periods
1As discussed above this is one ex post channel through which "fear of floating" can be justified, but not the
only one. We focus on one channel to keep the modeling streamlined.
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with and without external pressure we classify the state-contingent exchange rate regime. It
is important to emphasize that we evaluate state contingency with respect to potential sudden
stops. This allows us to address the question of whether the exchange rate regime has an effect
on the likelihood of actual sudden stops, which are treated as endogenous, and hence evaluate
the insurance provided by floating exchange rates.
Classifying exchange rate regimes according to their behavior during potential sudden stops,
we find that for many countries there is little difference between the degree of exchange rate
flexibility during potential crises and other times, and exchange rate flexibility is uniformly low.
These emerging markets are viewed as operating under a discretionary exchange regime. There
is another group of emerging markets that does not exhibit state contingency because the6ir
exchange rates flexibility is uniformly high. These countries cannot be described as exhibiting
"fear of floating" and we interpret these countries as non-contingent regimes committed to
floating. Finally a few countries do exhibit fully state-contingent exchange rate flexibility.
Having characterized the exchange rate behavior in the face of potential crises, the paper
proceeds to investigate the extent to which the choice of regime can be given a normative
interpretation. In particular, is it possible to conclude from widespread "fear of floating"
during potential crises that a commitment to floating would be beneficial? In order to answer
this question it is important to consider insurance substitutes. In particular, as discussed
in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004), sterilization of capital inflows and direct financial
regulation can substitute for the incentives provided by a commitment to floating. We examine
the data, but find little evidence of such substitute policies. The model suggests that "fear of
floating" should therefore be associated with under-insurance against liquidity crises. We test
this hypothesis by examining two outcomes, the likelihood of suffering a sudden stop and the
link between the exchange rate regime and the self-insurance of the private sector. In both
cases we find evidence that "fear of floating" matters. Less flexibility during potential crises is
associated with a greater probability of an actual sudden stop and more flexible regimes lead to
greater hoarding of foreign exchange reserves by the private sector.2 Finally we investigate the
2It is important to emphasize that this result is not by construction. Exchange rate regimes are characterized
in relation to potential crises, while the measure of sudden stops is an actual outcome.
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determinants of exchange rate regime choices. A key ingredient in the analysis is the credibility
of monetary policymaking. The model suggests that state contingent regimes require most
credibility, non-contingent floating an intermediate level of credibility and discretionary policy
the lowest level of credibility. The data give some support to this hypothesis showing an
association between floating exchange rates and the overall credibility of the monetary policy
framework, as measured by the commitment to inflation targeting.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 describes the theoretical framework we
use to approach the data. Section 2.3 describes the data and methodology and provides an
outline of the empirical facts. Section 2.4 provides a more formal analysis of the time series
measures of exchange rate flexibility. Section 2.5 examines the consequences of the choice of
exchange rate regime. Section 2.6 analyzes the determinants of exchange rate flexibility and
Section 2.7 concludes. Tables and Figures appear at the end of the chapter
2.2 Fear of Floating: Theoretical Discussion
2.2.1 Existing Literature
As stated above, various models have been proposed in the literature to explain "fear of float-
ing". Calvo and Reinhart (2002) suggest that "fear of floating" can be explained by a monetary
policy dilemma trading off seigniorage benefits of inflation against cost of deviating from an
inflation target in an environment with risk premium shocks and a high pass through of the
exchange rate into the national price level. In their model fear of floating is increasing in
the size of the risk premium shocks and the extent to which inflation targeting is valued over
seigniorage. Other authors, such as Aghion et al (2003) emphasize the balance sheet channel.
Typically it is taken as given that there are substantial dollar liabilities which risk bankruptcies
in the event of a devaluation. However, C6spedes et al (2004) present a model in which the
balance sheet effects of dollarized liabilities do not necessarily overturn the standard Mundell-
Fleming analysis that floating rates are better in the presence of external real shocks since there
are also effects on the asset side. Lahiri and Vegh (2001) rationalize "fear of floating" as the
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optimal policy in an environment with an output cost of nominal exchange rate fluctuations,
an output cost of higher interest rates to defend the currency, and a fixed cost of intervention.
The fixed cost generates a non-linearity in which "fear of floating" only arises for large shocks.
Despite deriving "fear of floating from different imperfections, for our purpose the important
feature these models have in common is that "fear of floating" emerges as a characteristic of
the optimal, ex-post monetary policy.
A different view is offered by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004). Fear of floating arises
in their model out of a time-consistency problem. Although it is optimal to tighten monetary
policy ex-post, taking as given that the country is suffering an international liquidity crisis,
such a policy increases the extent to which firms fail to conserve international liquidity ex-
ante. The central monetary policy issue for a country facing such sudden stops is to make
sure that the private sector takes enough precaution to insure itself against such crises. A
floating exchange rate is the optimal policy from an ex-ante perspective as it raises the return
to holding international liquidity, leads to greater hoarding of dollar liquidity, and helps to
ameliorate the under-insurance of the private sector. The difficulty in implementing this policy
is that once a crisis occurs, the floating exchange rate is no longer optimal, since an exchange
rate depreciation leads to inflation, and so the time-consistent equilibrium entails "fear of
floating". In developing our theoretical model, the central insight we take from this analysis is
the existence of a commitment problem with respect to floating.
The framework that we outline below combines elements from both approaches to exchange
rate flexibility and we assume that "fear of floating" can have a different aspect under different
circumstances. In particular we assume that there are two states of the world. In the "good"
state, there is no shortage of international liquidity, and hence no issues of insurance, and
the government optimally focuses on the ex post issues. In particular, since foreign exchange
markets exhibit "excess" volatility there will be incentives to limit exchange rate volatility and
prevent its pass-through into domestic inflation. 3 In the "bad" state, a shortage of international
liquidity is binding. The focus of policy should be on the prevention of, or insurance against,
such crises. In this case "fear of floating" is not the optimal response taking into account the
3The forward discount bias is often attributed to noise traders. See Frankel and Froot (1989).
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ex-ante effects on the incentives of the private sector to insure itself. We will examine the
choice of exchange rate flexibility under three different assumptions about the government, and
its ability to commit.
The discretionary regime is the optimal policy assuming the government cannot commit to
floating during sudden stops and so the policy is determined ex-post. Such a policy will be
optimal in the "good" state, but will contribute to under-insurance during sudden stops in the
"bad" state. The state-contingent regime assumes that the government can commit to floating
during sudden stops but is also free to intervene in the good state without compromising that
commitment. Finally we consider the non-contingent regime in which the government can
commit to its exchange rate regime, but the private sector does not observe the state of the
world. As a result the government must choose the same exchange rate flexibility at all times,
since intervention during normal times can compromise the commitment to floating during
crises.
The restriction on feasible policies in the non-contingent regime might appear ad hoc as it
is not derived endogenously within the model but simply imposed as an assumption. In defense
we consider this regime for several reasons. First we think of it as a useful approximation to
the feasible floating policy for a country that needs to build credibility for its commitment to
floating. A similar situation has been modeled formally in the context of building a reputation
for inflation credibility by Barro (1986). In that model the private sector is uncertain about
the preferences of the policymaker and the policymaker takes into account the fact that the
private sector learns about these preferences through his actions. The equilibrium exhibits
periods in which policymakers that are tough on inflation drive inflation to a very low level
to demonstrate this fact until a reputation is established. We conjecture that a policy of non-
contingent floating can operate in a similar manner when a reputation for floating during crises
has not been established. Furthermore this policy regime appears to describe the behavior of
some countries in our empirical investigation so we are compelled to consider it as a theoretical
possibility.
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2.2.2 A Model
The model will draw heavily on the framework of Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004), postu-
lating an over-investment problem in the "bad" state, which is the mirror image of the failure to
optimally hoard sufficient international liquidity as insurance against sudden stops. Crucially
the extent of over-investment depends on anticipations of exchange rate policy. The framework
is extended by postulating a desire to limit exchange rate flexibility in the "good" state, when
there are no insurance issues, but the pass-through of exchange rate volatility into the price level
is still a cause for concern. There is a tension between these goals, and the optimal policy will
resolve this, under different constraints on commitment to which the policy maker is subject.
We present the model in reduced form without explicitly considering the micro-foundations of
the mechanisms through which exchange rate policy acts, to simplify the exposition.
Consider a three period economy. At time 0 firms makes investment decisions. At time
1 a crisis may or may not occur which requires firms to make some reinvestment to maintain
the productivity of their asset. At time 2 the economy consumes its output, which depends
on both the investment at time 0 and the reinvestment at time 1. If a crisis occurs in period
1 the government faces ex-post incentives to tighten monetary policy, as in the literature in
which fear of floating is optimal, to protect itself against inflation, since the insurance aspects
of exchange rate policy are already sunk, but ex ante insurance concerns are foremost. If no
crisis occurs, excess exchange rate volatility is still undesirable through its effect on prices and
"fear of floating" is optimal.
The insurance aspect of monetary policy is that from the point of view of time 0 the
investment decisions of firms depend on expectations of the exchange rate during the crisis.
In particular, the country is assumed to hold a fixed amount of international collateral that
it can choose to use to finance investment at time 0 or hoard as insurance against a crisis at
time 1. The exchange rate determines the price at which international collateral can be traded
in the domestic market at time 1, and so provides incentives for its accumulation or usage.
There is a pecuniary externality that leads to an undervaluing (relative to the price which
maximizes time 2 output) of international collateral, and hence firms over-invest at time 0 and
88
conserve too little international collateral for the possible crisis at time 1. Monetary policy
affects the exchange rate and hence has the power to correct this mis-pricing, but to do so
the government has to commit to allow the exchange rate to depreciate during the crisis. This
raises the return to holding international liquidity, lowers the return to investing and moves
the investment decisions of firms closer to the output maximizing level. The time inconsistency
problem arises since once the crisis occurs the investment decision is predetermined and the
exchange rate depreciation just raises inflation which is costly to the government, so ex-post
the government prefers to limit exchange rate flexibility.
The objective function of the government is given by W (Y, 17rl), where 17rI is the expected
absolute inflation rate which prevails in period 1, Y is the expected output of the economy
in period 2, ;Vy > 0 and WI7rl < 0.4 The output that is produced in period 2 depends on
whether or not there was a crisis. The states of the world in which no crisis occurs and a crisis
occurs will be denoted B and G with probabilities of these states of nature are p and 1 -p
respectively. If no crisis has occurred the economy produces yG (K), and if a crisis occurs
yR (K), where K is the investment level of the private sector in period 0. During the crisis
there is a production shock which requires further investment, and although the productivity of
the capital stock is restored the country ends up investing more to produce each unit of output,
,so yG (K) > YB (K)
The inflation rate depends on the monetary policy of the government via the exchange
rate. We formalize monetary policy as a choice over the flexibility of the exchange rate, F,
which in general can differ across the G-state and B-state, FG and FB . If the exchange rate
is flexible during the potential crisis the exchange rate depreciates and inflation increases. If
the government chooses an inflexible exchange rate then depreciation and inflation is limited.
Likewise if no crisis occurs we assume that excess exchange rate volatility would be passed
into the price level if a flexible exchange rate is adopted. 5 We define the exchange rate e as
4 This objective implies that the government is equally averse to inflation and deflation. Holding output Y
constant, the optimal inflation rate is zero.
5There is an asymmetry in the shocks in the two states of nature. In the B-state a shortage of international
capital tends to depreciate the exchange rate if the government allows it to, so that is positive and increasing in
exchange rate flexibility F. In the G-state external shocks can lead to appreciation or depreciation. increases
with F but the sign depends on the shock in the G-state.
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the domestic price of one of international liquidity (dollars) so that larger values represent
depreciations.
-= (e), > 0 (2.1)
e = e(F), leGIF > 0, e > (2.2)
I IF > 0, in reduced form (2.3)
The investment decision, K (eB), depends on the (rationally expected) exchange rate which
prevails in period 1, eB, but only in the event that the crisis occurs. If the crisis does not occur
then firms do not require any further foreign capital and so the exchange rate in the good state
does not affect the objective function of the firm. Investment is not under the direct control
of the government, although it determines welfare through output, Y, and for this reason the
government must pursue its monetary policies taking into account the incentive effect that the
exchange rate has on decentralized private sector investment decisions.
Monetary policy affects the investment decision of firms, and under the assumptions of Ca-
ballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) firms over-invest (relative to the maximizing time 2 output)
unless the exchange rate is allowed to depreciate during crises. If the exchange rate is flexible in
the crisis, investment decreases towards the output maximizing level. yB increases, since more
international capital is available during the crisis for reinvestment, and due to an externality
(see Caballero and Krishamurthy (2004) for details) firms do not take decisions which maximize
output. At the same time yG declines since if there is no crisis it would have been optimal to
invest all available international capital in the domestic economy. Nevertheless, the assumption
that there is an over-investment problem implies by definition that the gain in state B out-
weighs the loss in state G so that expected output Y increases with exchange rate flexibility in
the bad state, FB.
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K = K(e), Ke < O (2.4)
YK (K) > 0, Y (K) <ObutYK(K) < 0 (2.5)
In reduced form we can write yG (FB) and yB (FB) where FB is exchange rate flexibility
in the B-state with
YFB < 0, YB > 0 and YFB > O (2.6)
Finally we can write the problem of the government as:
max W (Y, 1r) = W {(1_p) y G +pyB, (1 p) |' p B (2.7)
FG ,FB
The analysis above demonstrates that the government faces a tradeoff in choosing exchange
rate flexibility since YFB > 0, which is beneficial while 1r IFB > 0 and 17rlFG > 0 which is unde-
sirable. We will characterize the solution to this problem under the following three assumptions:
the time-consistent discretionary policy, the optimal non-contingent policy with commitment
and the optimal state-contingent policy with commitment.
Trie Discretionary Policy, No Commitment
The time consistent policy is chosen in period 1 taking investment decisions and the occurrence,
or not, of the crisis as given. The fact that policy is chosen ex-post implies that the government
has the option of carrying out a state-contingent policy. We denote the exchange rate flexibility
chosen in each state as FB and F G.
If the crisis occurs then the government solves
max W (Y, 17r 1) (2.8)
F
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Once the crisis has occurred monetary policy has no effect on aggregate output, which
is predetermined by the aggregate capital stock and the remaining international liquidity, so
YFB -= 0 and the first order condition which determines the optimal FB is given in terms of the
marginal costs (MCB) and marginal benefits (MB) of exchange rate flexibility as, where D
denotes discretionary:
MCD
MBD
= pW (Y 1)I7 T IFB
= 0
. 0=W (Y, 11) 1BIFB
(2.9)
(2.10)
(2.11)
The government tightens monetary policy until either W= (Y, 17r) = 0, in which case there
are no further benefits to lower inflation, or 7rBIF - 0, in which case inflation cannot be
lowered any further.
If the crisis does not occur then the government solves
max W (Y, I7l )
F (2.12)
The same reasoning implies that the optimal F G satisfies
MCD
MBD
- (1 -p) WX (Y, 1j7) FG
= 0
= 0 = W (Y, 171) 17IFG
(2.13)
(2.14)
(2.15)
We obtain identical first order conditions for the optimal flexibility F in both states, and
under the simplifying assumption that the relationship between absolute inflation [1ri and flex-
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ibility is the same in both states, the discretionary policy exhibits no state-contingency even
though this is an a priori possibility.
The Non-Contingent Policy with Commitment
Under this assumption the government must commit to the same degree of exchange rate
flexibility whether or not the crisis occurs. We denote the non-contingent optimal policy by F.
The first order conditions in terms of the marginal costs and benefits of flexibility are:
MCNc (1 - ) W (Y 11)17 F + PW' (Y IT) ]~B[F = W (Y 171) I IF (2.16)
MBNc (1 -p) WY (Y, w) YF + PWY (Y, [) YF= W (Y, 1X) YF (2.17)
Wy (Y, Li) YF = W (Y 11) IF (2.18)
In contrast to the discretionary case there are both costs and benefits to exchange rate
flexibility since the decision is made ex-ante when the incentive effects of exchange rate policy
on expectations and output can be taken into account. At the margin the optimal policy will
trade off the insurance benefits of exchange rate flexibility ex-ante (which operate through
output) against the inflation costs ex-post.
The State-Contingent Policy with Commitment
Under this assumption the degree of flexibility is unconstrained across states of nature and the
government can choose separately FG and FB. The first order conditions for this problem are:
In the B-state
MCN = PW7r (Y. Ir)) 7T FB (2.19)
MBC = pWY (Y, 17) B (2.20)
Wy (Y. 171) YFB = W- (Y 171) 17rIFB (2.21)
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In the G-state
MC=0- (l-p)W (YIrrI~hr0~FG (2.22)MCNC = (1-P) W_"r (Y 1X) G(.2
MBC = 0 (2.23)
0 = W7 (Y, 7r) IFGc (2.24)
In particular, during a potential crisis, it is optimal to trade off the insurance benefits of
exchange rate flexibility against the cost of inflation. During other times there are no benefits
(at the margin) to exchange rate flexibility so the optimal policy only takes into account the
costs of inflation. This implies that the fully optimal policy is indeed state contingent, with
more flexibility during potential crises.
2.2.3 Comparing the policy regimes
The section above solved the model under several different assumptions about the policy options
of the government. It remains to rank these choices. We can establish the following ranking:
the State-Contingent Policy dominates the Non-Contingent Policy, which dominates the Dis-
cretionary Policy. The reason is simply that set of feasible policies expands with credibility.
The Contingent Policy sets a separate and fully optimal exchange rate policy for each state of
nature, taking into account the ex-ante insurance properties of exchange rate flexibility, and as
such must a fortiori dominate any other policy option since every non-contingent policy is also a
contingent policy, and it is always feasible, if superfluous to commit to the discretionary policy.
Likewise the discretionary policy implies the same exchange rate flexibility in both states of
nature, so it is a feasible non-contingent policy, and the same argument applies.
Figure 2-1 illustrates the intuition. For each state of nature the figure plots the marginal
benefit and marginal cost of exchange rate flexibility as derived above, and the optimal degree
of flexibility at the intersection of these schedules. For the non-contingent and discretionary
regimes, losses in each state of nature relative to the fully optimal state-contingent policy with
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commitment are shaded. In particular the non-contingent policy involves losses in both states
of nature as in the G-state, it entails too much flexibility and in the B-state, too little. The
discretionary policy is actually identical to the state-contingent policy in the G-state, since it
limits exchange rate flexibility, but in the G-state it leads to sub-optimal "fear of floating" since
a flexible exchange rate would be preferable.
In the next section we turn to examine the data on exchange rate flexibility through the
model developed above and categorize exchange rate regimes. We look for evidence of state-
contingent flexibility which would mitigate the welfare implications of the "fear of floating" that
the literature has previously discussed. At the same time we examine the outliers relative to
the "fear of floating" category, countries which although not operating state-contingent regimes
are distinguished by their uniformly high level of flexibility.
2.3 "Fear of Floating", Non-Contingent Floating and State-
Contingent Flexibility
2.3.1 Methodology
The methodological approach that we adopt to characterizing exchange rate flexibility follows
Calvo and Reinhart (2002). However, unlike their paper, which sought to characterize dif-
ferences in unconditional exchange rate, flexibility across countries, in comparison with the
benchmark floaters of Australia and the members of the G-3 our purpose is to extend this
analysis to investigate whether exchange rate flexibility of emerging market floaters varies over
states of nature. 6 We do not dispute that "fear of floating" characterizes the unconditional
exchange rate regime across emerging markets, but we seek to determine whether this uncondi-
tional measure conceals flexibility with respect to shocks that are important from an insurance
perspective.
6 0f course, Germany has a fixed exchange rate as a member of the Euro and previously limited flexibility in
the Exchange Rate Mechanism, but Calvo and Reinhart's point was that the currencies of the G-3 floated freely
against each other.
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The literature on the de facto classification of exchange rate regimes has burgeoned re-
cently. Extending the analysis of Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) have
developed a de facto classification of exchange rate regimes which shows substantial numbers
of deviations from the declared de jure regimes. The fear of floating manifests itself in the
misclassification of regimes that de jure float, but de facto are less flexible. At the same time,
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2004) developed a similar index, albeit based on a different
classification methodology with the same finding of extensive misclassification. An alternative
classification scheme is constructed in Stambaugh (2004). We follow the approach of Calvo
and Reinhart (2002) for two reasons. First, the methodologies in the other papers cited above
are more suited to the broad classification question of distinguishing between fixed and flexible
arrangements but our investigation is focused on the differences within the group of de jure
flexible regimes. Second, we want our results to be comparable with those reported in Calvo
and Reinhart's paper which started the "fear of floating" debate. 7
To measure flexibility we compare movements in exchange rates with movements in mone-
tary policy instruments that affect the exchange rate. Examining the exchange rate in isolation
is not informative about exchange rate policy, as it does not take into account the shocks that
monetary policy had to face. If the exchange rate is stable we do not know whether it was due
to policy choices despite shocks or to a lack of shocks. To deal with this problem we define a
flexible exchange rate as an exchange rate that is volatile relative to the instruments that could
stabilize it. The implicit idea is that the policy maker faces a choice about where to allocate a
given external shock. It can be allowed to affect the exchange rate if policy is inactive, or the
exchange rate can be insulated if policy is active. Exchange rate flexibility is about the relative
volatilities of the exchange rate and instruments and not about the absolute volatility of either
in isolation.
We follow Calvo and Reinhart (2002) in using changes in reserves and interest rates as
7Furthermore the question of the correct classification methodology is far from settled. Different methodologies
appear to be suitable for different purposes and as Frankel (2003) notes the correlation among different de facto
measures is actually quite low so we choose that which is most suitable for the questions we wish to address. For
example the correlation between the Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) classification and the Levy-Yeyati-Sturzenegger is
0.41 which is not much larger than the 0.33 correlation of the Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) with the much maligned
de jure classification.
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measures of the monetary policy instruments available to the authorities, and hence as measures
of the degree of intervention. However, using these variables is not without its problems and
we will review here some of the issues.8 We risk errors of omission and commission in using
changes in reserves or interest rates as measures of intervention and furthermore these potential
biases might be more or less relevant depending on whether the question is to determine the
within-country state contingency of exchange rate flexibility or compare exchange rate regimes
across countries. Nevertheless, despite the many qualifications or issues of interpretation we
use these measures, as they are the best data that we have available and have been used by the
authors of previous studies with which we would like to be able to compare our results.
Reserves can change for reasons unrelated to intervention, in particular accrual of interest
and management of foreign currency debt. However, as will become clearer below, since we focus
on large movements in reserves it is unlikely that we will misclassify an accounting change
of reserves as an intervention due to the magnitude of the changes on which we focus, thus
we are unlikely to be biased towards measuring too much intervention. On the other hand
there can be "hidden" movements of reserves for example related to credit lines or derivative
transactions which are not reported on the balance sheet. It is possible that we miss some of
these interventions, and as such we misclassify regimes as not intervening when in fact they are.
This would not be a problem were it our intention to establish "fear of floating" as it would bias
our results towards finding flexibility and make the hypothesis harder to establish. However,
since a major goal is to investigate the circumstances in which the exchange rate regime becomes
more flexible it is possible that our findings could be explained by a change in the method of
intervention towards "hidden" transactions. This can be a problem both within a country in
establishing state-contingency if the change in the means of intervention is correlated with the
shocks we use to measure state-contingency and across countries if countries with apparently
flexible regimes are more likely to use "hidden" transactions.
Regarding interest rates as measures of foreign exchange intervention we also face several
issues. The first is the extent to which the interest rate is genuinely an instrument of exchange
rate management. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) present much anecdotal evidence that interest
8Calvo and Reinhart (2002) also discuss some of the same issues.
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rates in emerging markets are active instruments of exchange rate management, but Shambaugh
(2004) presents more systematic evidence that interest rate policy is not uniform across emerg-
ing markets and countries with more flexible exchange rates have more autonomy in setting
their interest rates. If interest rates are not just tools of exchange rate management we risk
misclassifying episodes as interventions when they are not. With regard to the within-country
results this would present a problem only to the extent that the shocks that we use to measure
external crises had a direct effect on the domestic economy, separate from the exchange rate
channel, and interest rate policy responded directly to these effects. This does not seem a very
plausible assumption. With regard to cross-country comparisons the issues are more serious
since the empirical measures of interest rates that are available across countries are far from
uniform, and policy interest rates, which are the most natural counterpart to the theoretical
analysis, are not always available. In addition to the possibility that the extent to which in-
terest rate policy is directed towards exchange rate management varies across countries it is
possible that we introduce biases related to systematic differences in the interest rate series we
use across countries. If the extent of misclassification varies systematically with exchange rate
flexibility, for example if more flexible exchange rates give more monetary policy autonomy so
that the interest rate can be directed to domestic macroeconomic objectives, then there would
be a bias towards finding "fear of floating". This issue is actually relevant for the results in
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) although they do not discuss it, but it makes it more difficult for us
to establish circumstances in which exchange rates are flexible.
As in Calvo and Reinhart (2002) we first adopt a relatively atheoretical approach to ex-
ploring the data. To measure exchange rate volatility we compute the probability that the
monthly percentage change in the nominal exchange rate is within a given band. To measure
instrument volatility we examine the movement of foreign exchange reserves and interest rates.
We will denote the absolute value of the percent change and the absolute value of the change
in variable x by x^ and Ixl, respectively and xc a critical threshold. We are interested in the
probability that the variables or x are less than x. We follow Calvo and Reinhart (2002)
in considering percent changes for nominal exchange rates and international reserves (setting
xc equal to 2.5%), and absolute changes for nominal and real interest rates (setting xc equal to
400 basis points). We use bands as measures of volatility as they are less dependent on outliers
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than variances and also are less likely to miss-identify changes in instruments as interventions
because they focus in big policy changes, although we carry out a more formal analysis that
uses variances in the next section.
To examine whether flexibility varies when the country faces a potential sudden stop, we use
a measure of high yield spreads (defined as the difference between Moody's Seasoned AAA and
BAA Corporate Bond Yields) to capture a source of exogenous financial pressure. Shocks are
measured as the difference between the logarithm of the actual series and its trend as measured
with the Hodrick-Prescott filter. In particular, we define a period of external pressure as an
episode when either the shock is one standard deviation above its average, or the change in
the actual series is one standard deviation above its average. These two dimensions imply
that we are defining potential crises as periods when the level or the change in high yield
spreads were particularly high. As a consequence, the periods entering within this definition
are 1990.10-1991.04, 1998.10-1999.03, 2001.01, 2001.12-2002.12, and 2003.06.
It is important to emphasize that this variable is intended as an exogenous source of potential
financial pressure. Since we are interested in the preventive properties of exchange rate regimes
it would not be correct to look at actual crises. Our goal is to examine exchange rate choices
during episodes in which countries had a choice about whether to pursue a tight monetary
policy or let the exchange rate depreciate. For this reason we will pay careful attention when
interpreting the results to whether we have excluded all false positives related to actual crises,
when even fixed exchange rates can pass through periods of turbulence. Furthermore, although
we will pay more careful attention to this issue in discussing the results it is worth emphasizing
that such "false positives" concerning exchange rate flexibility are more likely to occur in
situations of low levels of reserves and financial crises that we already partially excluding with
the sample selection (see below). The index of high yield spreads and the periods identified as
potential sudden stops are illustrated in Figure 2-2.
Figure 2-3 shows the relationship between potential and actual sudden stops. The index
of actual sudden stops in emerging markets is based on the definition of Calvo et al (2004)
and will be discussed more fully in Section 2.5. However as this figure makes clear while many
actual sudden stops occurred during the period of turmoil in emerging markets in 1998-1999,
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fewer occurred in 2001-2002 when the index of potential crises indicates a high level of external
pressure. This less than perfect correlation between actual and potential sudden stops is not
a problem for the analysis that follows. First, to classify exchange rate regimes it is more
important to identify a plausible exogenous shock than explain all sudden stops. Second, we
will be interested in explaining when the common high yield spread shock becomes a country-
specific sudden stop. The fact that there is some variation in the relationship between high
yield spreads and sudden stops allows us to investigate which factors can account for this. In
particular it will be argued in Section 2.5 that the increased adoption of flexible exchange rates
has been associated with increased insurance against (potential) external crises.
2.3.2 Data
We use monthly data taken from the International Financial Statistics for all our analysis. The
nominal exchange rate is the monthly end-of-period bilateral dollar exchange rate (Source: IFS
line ae). Reserves are measured using gross foreign exchange reserves minus gold (Source: IFS
line L.d). Regarding nominal interest rates we follow Calvo and Reinhart (2002) in trying to
use policy interest rates whenever possible. As these vary by country, we use interbank rates (for
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Singapore, South
Africa, and Thailand. Source: IFS line 60B), deposit rates (for Chile. Source: IFS line 60L),
discount rates (for Colombia and Peru. Source: IFS line 60) and T-bill rates (For Israel and
Philippines. Source: IFS line 60C).
The sample was chosen to include emerging economies that are sufficiently developed so as
to have access to capital flows, so that they face the open economy policy dilemmas described
above. In particular we only incorporate countries that are included in Morgan Stanley Capital
International (MSCI) index.9 In contrast to Calvo and Reinhart (2002) we consider only the
period starting in 1990 because only during this phase did voluntary capital flows to these
economies become substantial. We exclude the transition economies because they experienced
shocks and reforms of a very different nature during the 1990s and we limit our analyses to
9 The EMBI which is the probably better known index for emerging markets has frequently changed the sample
definitions, so we focused on the MSCI to define the sample used here.
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exchange rate regimes with some de jure exchange rate flexibility so that we include only regimes
classified as managed floating or independent floating as reported to the IMF. Finally we exclude
regimes with severe macroeconomic instability since the macroeconomic issues are very different
for economies with high levels of inflation,1 0 and for each episode we exclude the three months
before and after any explicit change of exchange rate regime to avoid contaminating the results
with transition effects.
2.3.3 The Stylized Facts
WAe first use the measure of exchange rate flexibility described above to discuss the unconditional
"fear of floating" result that has been described in the literature. We compute the relative
frequencies of large exchange rate movements and large policy changes and plot them in figure
2-4. In particular we plot on the horizontal axis the sample probability that the nominal
exchange rate remains within the band, which is measure of exchange rate stability, and on the
vertical axis the sample probability that the instruments remain within the band as a measure of
instrument volatility. The volatility of policy instruments is a weighted average of the volatility
of the nominal interest rate and the volatility of reserves, using as weights the variance of the
volatility of each instrument.
To interpret the diagram, it is useful to consider the slope of the line connecting each point
to the origin as a measure of exchange rate flexibility. The steeper the slope the more volatile
the exchange rate relative to the policy instruments. Movements along a ray towards the origin
represent more volatility in both the exchange rate and instruments, without changing the
relative volatility of either, and hence can be interpreted as a measure of the shocks with which
exchange policy had to contend during the sample period. The diagram also includes Australia,
which was used by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) as a benchmark floating economy. 1
'°Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) assign these regimes to a separate category of "freely falling" in their de facto
analysis arguing that floating exchange rates are qualitatively different under very high inflation.
1 They argue that unlike the G-3, which are not useful comparators for emerging markets due to the fact that
their currencies are held as international reserves, Australia has a freely floating policy and is subject to similar
external shocks to many emerging markets.
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"Fear of floating" can be clearly observed in this figure although interestingly it is far from
uniform as a de facto characterization of emerging market floating exchange rates. According to
this crude measure of exchange rate flexibility, few emerging markets have exchange rate regimes
which are more flexible than Australia. Only Brazil and the newly independent floating regimes
of Chile, Indonesia and Thailand appear to have more flexibility. Mexico and South Africa while
having a similar policy stance to Australia appear to face more volatile external conditions. At
the other extreme Pakistan and India behave very similarly to pegs.
However, as discussed above it is difficult to draw policy implications from this diagram,
as it is not possible to determine the circumstances which have led to these policy choices.
To address this question we need to compare exchange rate flexibility across periods with and
without external pressure. Table 2.1 presents the evidence on the flexibility of the exchange rate
and instruments controlling for whether the country is faced by external pressure. The effects
are estimated by running a regression of a binary variable taking a value of 1 if the variable
is within the band and 0 otherwise and our indicator of periods of external pressure. This
procedure is equivalent to comparing the probability that each variable is within the relevant
band in periods with and without external pressure. We will use this evidence to address two
questions. To what extent are there emerging markets which are not characterized by "fear of
floating" and among those which are, is there any evidence of state-contingent flexibility when
faced with external pressure?
Figure 2-5 presents this data in a diagram, with a combined measure of instrument volatility
as used in Figure 2-1. Again the slope of the line connecting each point to the origin can be
interpreted as exchange rate flexibility. The two panels compare exchange rate flexibility under
the base case with that when the country faces external pressure. Two findings stand out
from this diagram. First, this analysis appears to confirm that Brazil, Chile, Indonesia and
Thailand are characterized by more exchange rate flexibility under the normal circumstances
of the base case. These countries are not accurately characterized by "fear of floating". Second
there appears to be evidence of state-contingent flexibility for some countries. In particular
both South Africa and Mexico, while exhibiting similar flexibility to Australia during normal
times seem to have a higher degree of flexibility during periods of external pressure. Figure 2-6
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will develop a more transparent representation of this state-contingent flexibility.
Under the interpretation of the Figures 2-4 and 2-5 above the flexibility of the exchange rate
changes in periods of external pressure if and only if the slope of line connecting each point to
the origin changes. Figure 2-6 develops a simple way of testing this hypothesis. In particular
define the exchange rate flexibility during normal times and under external pressure as F G and
F B as the ratio of the conditional probalities of finding the policy measure and the nominal
exchange rate inside the band, conditional on the state of nature, G or B.
FG = P (Pol in bandlno_shock)/P (NERinband no_shock) (2.25)
F B = P (Pol in bandlshock)/P (NER_in_band shock) (2.26)
The exchange rate regime is more flexible under external pressure if and only if F B > FG
which can be written, after taking logarithms and rearranging:
log P (Polinbandlno_shock) - log P (Pol_in_band shock)
> log P (NER_in_bandlshock) - log P (NERinbandlno_shock)
-==> A log (Policies) > A log (NER) (2.27)
Thus Figure 2-6 plots the change (in logs) of the policy response against the change in the
nominal exchange rate response. Points above the diagonal represent countries that are more
flexible during: periods of external pressure while points below the diagonal exhibit the opposite
behavior. As is apparent, many countries are located on or around the diagonal suggesting that
these countries do not exhibit much state contingency. Some of these countries as Chile present
high levels of flexibility in both normal and shocks periods, while other as Pakistan present low
levels of flexibility in both situations. However, Argentina, Brazil, the more recent Colombian
regime, South Africa, Israel, and Mexico do appear to exhibit some state-contingency. At the
other extreme a few countries, such as India, Indonesia, and Thailand lie below the diagonal
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suggesting that these countries are pursuing more flexible policies during normal times that
during periods of external pressure. However, although this is a potentially a further form of
"fear of floating", Thailand and Indonesia are being compared to a relatively high base level
of flexibility so this interpretation is not necessarily appropriate. Finally, Australia is also
included in this figure as a falsification exercise. HYS shocks should not have a significant effect
on Australia and so we would not expect to observe any difference in flexibility during periods
of external pressure. This is exactly what we observe.
In summary the figures suggest two basic findings. First, in the unconditional data there
are several countries which are exhibiting less "fear of floating" than the Australia benchmark.
Second it is possible to identify a few countries that while exhibiting "fear of floating", do on
average allow more exchange rate flexibility during periods of external pressure. South Africa
in particular stands out in this regard, although contingent flexibility seems to be an aspect of
exchange rate behavior for Brazil, Colombia and Mexico as well. Argentina also appears to fall
in this category, although it is not clear whether the increased flexibility is a result of choice
or necessity.1 2 The next section will investigate these findings in more detail by carrying out
a more formal time series analysis of exchange rate flexibility which will allow us to attribute
statistical significance to the findings.
2.4 Exchange Rate Flexibility Index: Time Series Analysis
To provide further support to the claims developed above we undertook a more formal analysis
of exchange rate flexibility. For this purpose we constructed a time series index of flexibility
analogous to that presented in Calvo and Reinhart (2002). The exchange rate flexibility index
is defined as:
042
F= E (2.28)
cr2 + 2
(R n il
'
2Furthernore the analysis in 2.4 finds that the apparent state-contingency is not statistically significant.
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where c 2 denotes the variance of the nominal exchange rate, Cr the variance of reservesE R
and o2i the variance of the interest rate. To implement the measure we construct at each pointIii
in time t a 13-month rolling window centered on t and compute the sample variance of each
component variable. In this manner we derive a time series measure of exchange rate flexibility.
The interpretation of this indicator is similar to the analysis above. To evaluate the degree
of flexibility of an exchange rate regime we incorporate information about flexibility of both
the exchange rate and instruments. In more flexible regimes we should observe a high degree
of volatility of the exchange rate vis-A-vis instruments, and hence a high value of F, while in
less flexible regimes the flexibility index should be close to 0. We use a symmetric window
incorporating both leads and lags of each variable since we want to evaluate the effect of shock
comparing the exchange rate and policies before and after.
Before implementing the analysis the index was corrected for two sources of bias in cross-
country comparisons. The unconditional average of the index for each country was regressed
against dummy variables for the index rate series used to control for the fact that in some
countries more volatile market interest rates were used, while in other countries more stable
policy interest rate series are available. A further potential source of bias arises from the fact
that the floating exchange rate might be more volatile for some countries than others due to
different terms of trade shocks. A variable measuring the volatility of terms of trade shocks was
also added to the regression. The index of exchange rate flexibility was then corrected with the
coefficients from this cross-country regression.
For each episode (i.e. regime included in the analysis) we run the following regression on
the corrected flexibility index:
M N
Ft = a + E ,mHYSt-m + E y,t-n + et (2.29)
m=0 n=1
Thus we identify _Ec as the long-run basis regime effect (i.e. when there is no external
pressure from the HYS and after incorporating the dynamics of F), =vo as the long-run
1e nN
difference in the flexibility index between normal and (potential) crises times. In order to
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choose the optimal lag structure of the model we use the Schwarz information criterion. Table
2.2 presents a summary of the results of these regressions.
The results of this analysis mostly confirm the less formal stylized facts presented in Section
2.3, although some important differences will be discussed below. Regimes are classified as Con-
tingent (C), Non-Contingent (NC) and Discretionary (D) according to the following algorithm.
The coefficients for the long-run base effect, and contingent flexibility are calculated from the
time series analysis. The contingent regimes are identified as those for which the coefficient
Ea=0 /,m, is significantly different from zero at 5% significance according to a Wald test. The
-1n=l Yn
other two regimes are distinguished according to a comparison of the base level of flexibility
with two benchmark floating regimes, Singapore and Australia. If the coefficient N
1-zn= 1 'yn
for a regime is significantly less than that of Australia or Singapore for the same time period,
on the basis of a one-tailed Wald test, then the regime is classified as discretionary ("fear of
floating").13 Otherwise it is classified as non-contingent floating.
This algorithm produces a classification similar to the picture obtained in Figure 2-4. Ta-
ble 2.2 suggests that only four countries, Brazil, Colombia (1999-), South Africa, and Mexico
exhibit contingent flexibility.14 South Africa, apparently exhibits a high degree of base-line
flexibility that is not statistically different to either Australia or Singapore, suggesting its con-
tingent flexible is in addition to a flexible exchange rate. The other three contingent regimes
do exhibit significantly less flexibility than the benchmarks in the base case, suggesting that
there are indeed circumstances in which exchange rate rigidity is desirable provided that it does
not undermine insurance. The other regimes do not exhibit contingency, but they do exhibit
significant differences in flexibility. The regimes classified as discretionary exhibit "fear of float-
ing" in all states of nature. These countries show an apparent inability to commit to floating
exchange rates. The countries in the sample classified as discretionary are Argentina, Chile
(-1999), Colombia (-1999),15 India, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines. Finally the non-contingent,
13Note that although the base level coefficient for Australia is less than that for Singapore, the sample for each
significance test differences according to the dates of each regime. Thus it is necessary to carry out both tests in
each case.
14 It should be noted that the statistical analysis does not identify Argentina as a member of this group despite
appearances to the contrary in Figure 2-5.
15Although the statistical analysis did not select Colombia (-1999) as significantly less flexible than either
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flexible regimes are Chile (1999-), Indonesia, Israel and Thailand. Australia and Singapore
would also be considered members of this category, although they were defined as such for the
purposes of categorizing the other regimes.
2.5 The Benefits of a Commitment to Floating
The above discussion classified regimes with state contingent policies. However to interpret
the classification it is important to understand the extent to which the choice of exchange rate
regime is associated with insurance against external shocks This question can be addressed on
two separate levels. The interpretation of exchange rate behavior is complicated by the fact
that as discussed in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) alternative insurance mechanisms
are available that can substitute for exchange rate flexibility, such as capital controls, reserve
requirements, and sterilization of capital inflows. We first examine the extent to which our
classification of discretionary regimes can actually be characterized more generally as "uninsured
regimes", by investigating these substitutes. However examining policies alone is not sufficient
to determine that the choice of exchange rate regime is important. Thus, we proceed to examine
the extent to which floating exchange rates are associated with improved insurance against
external shocks in terms of outcomes. We examine two pieces of evidence: the relationship
between sudden stops and the exchange rate regime, and the dynamics of private holdings of
foreign exchange reserves.
Table 2.3 accounts for other substitute insurance policies. Controlling capital inflows di-
rectly can prevent the under-insurance arising but at the cost of limiting integration with
international capital markets. Capital controls are measured according to the index in Kamin-
sky and Schmrukler (2003). It is clear that capital controls are more prevalent in countries
with discretionary regimes, suggesting that this policy substitutes for exchange rate flexibil-
ity. Nevertheless capital controls must be considered an extremely sub-optimal response to the
Australia or Singapore, the regime was qualitatively very similar to Chile (-1999) and was classified accordingly
as discretionary.
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under-insurance problem. Capital controls provide insurance only at the expense of isolation
from international capital markets.
The second policy option suggested by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) is sterilization
of capital inflows. Although the efficacy of such a policy has been questioned our goal here
is simply to examine the facts. In order to evaluate how important sterilized interventions
are we utilize the methodology of Bofinger and Wollmershaeuser (2001). We run the following
regression for each country using monthly data for the relevant period for each regime:
A (NDA)t = + A (NFA)t + 7yA (NDA)t_1 + Et (2.30)
where NDA is net domestic assets of the monetary authority and NFA is net foreign assets.
With full sterilization we expect to be equal to -1 and with partial sterilization : should be
less than 0 but greater than -1. This regression is a very crude measure of sterilization that
may suffer from biases related to omitted variables and potential endogeneity, so we are going
to focus in comparing the estimates across groups, more than focusing on the estimated levels.
Column (2) of Table 2.3 presents estimates of A for each regime. This evidence is less clear.
The results suggest that while discretionary regimes do use sterilization, suggesting a further
substitute insurance mechanism, non-contingent floating regimes do so even more. It appears
that as credibility for the floating exchange rate is gained, sterilization is a complementary
rather than a substitute policy. State contingent regimes, which as it will be shown later can be
associated with higher levels of credibility, sterilize least of all, suggesting that when credibility
has been gained, it is no longer necessary to complement floating with additional policies.
Finally we present measures of financial regulation from Abiad and Mody (2003) and Barth
et al. (2003). Better supervision and prudential regulation can monitor balance sheet mis-
matches and help prevent the build up of excessive dollar liabilities. At the same time better
functioning and well-developed financial markets increase the stock of assets that can be pre-
sented as collateral. Table 2.3 shows that financial development does not substitute for flexible
exchange rates, in fact it is the opposite. The least liberalized financial markets are found in
countries with discretionary regimes. Although the differences are small, the most liberalized
108
financial markets are found among the state contingent regimes. In summary there is some
weak evidence that discretionary regimes undertake alternative policies to insure themselves
against external shocks. However policies such as capital controls can be very costly and are
unlikely to be superior to a well-managed open economy with flexible exchange rates.
The next results examine the extent to which the choice of exchange rate regime, and in
particular flexibility during potential crises is associated with better insurance outcomes. The
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) model argues that better insurance occurs through the
mechanism of altering private sector incentives to conserve international liquidity. Although
such a proposition is difficult to test directly, some evidence in this direction is provided in Table
2.4. In this table, regression results are presented that link the exchange rate regime to the
international liquidity held by domestic residents in banks. Two specifications are estimated,
with and without lags of the dependent variable for absolute and relative measures of private
reserves.
log (PR)it = a + / (GDP)it + xFjt + SHYSit + qHYSt * Fit (2.31)
+r77 log (PR)i t-l + /.i + sit
(PR PR ' = a + 3 (GDP)it + xFit + 6HYSit + qHYSt * Fit (2.32)PR + PuR it
PR 
+71 PR + PR ) i,t- 
In these equations, i represents the country, t represents the month, PR represents private
reserves, as measured by international liquid assets in banks (IFS), PuR represents the interna-
tional reserves held by the Central Bank, as utilized in previous sections (IFS), GDP represents
GDI)P in dollars (IFS), F is the (corrected) flexibility index used above, and HYS is the index of
(potential) crises developed above. Also included are country dummies. As can be observed in
Table 2.4, there is a robust relationship between private reserves and exchange rate flexibility,
both in absolute level and as a share of the total reserves of the country. As flexibility increases,
the private sector hoards more dollar reserves. The interaction term is not significant, so it is
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exchange rate flexibility per se that is important and not only flexibility during crises.
The second set of regressions investigates the link between exchange rate flexibility and
sudden stops. The hypothesis underlying these regressions is that the high yield spread series
that we have used for classifying exchange rate regimes is a common external shock. However,
whether such a shock develops into a sudden stop depends on how insured the country is, and
in particular the dollar reserves on which it can draw during such an episode. To investigate
this hypothesis it is necessary to define sudden stops. The series constructed is based on Calvo
et al (2004), with the series updated to 2003. Calvo et al (2004) defines a sudden stop as a
phase that meets the following conditions: (i) it contains at least one observation where the
year-on-year fall in capital flows lies at least two standard deviations below its sample mean,
and (ii) the phase ends once the annual change in capital flows exceeds one standard deviation
below its sample mean. The beginning of a sudden stop is determined by the first time the
annual change in capital flows falls one standard deviation below the mean. Table 2.8 presents
a complete list of the sudden stops identified by this methodology. The following equation is
estimated:
Suddenit = + 3HYSt + xFit + 6HYSt * Fit + li + sit (2.33)
where Sudden is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if there is an (actual) sudden stop
and 0 otherwise. F is the (corrected) flexibility index described above and the HYS is the
dummy taking the value 1 if there is a (potential) external crisis, as defined above. (Random
or fixed) country-specific effects are included in some specifications.
Table 2.5 shows the results of estimating the equation described above with a probit model, a
linear probability model and a logit model (without country effects, with country fixed effects,
and with country random effects).16 In all the cases the coefficient of the interaction term
is negative and significant. Exchange rate flexibility during a (potential) crisis significantly
reduces the probability that the shock will develop into a sudden stop. In the three models the
16 Recall that fixed effect estimates using the probit model with panel data are severely biased due to the
"incidental parameters problem" (Wooldrige, 2002), therefore we do not present them.
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marginal effect of increasing flexibility from 0 to 1 during a crisis is to reduce the probability
of a sudden stop by between 7.9% and 12.2%, which is quantitatively large in comparison to
the average sample probability of a sudden stop during a (potential) crisis of 12.4%.17 It is
important to stress that it is the interaction, not the main effect which is significantly negative,
thus from the point of view of insurance against sudden stops, it is only the commitment to
floating during periods of external financial pressure which leads to better protection.
We can link this analysis with the earlier discrete classifications of exchange rate regimes.
The crisis dummy is intended to pick up only one plausible source of exogenous external pressure,
to enable the classification of exchange rate regimes. Likewise the results in Table 2.5 measure
the extent to which that same source of external pressure (which is a common shock) converts
into a sudden stop (which is a country-specific outcome). However, if the classification is valid
there should be a significant relationship between the regime classification and the likelihood of
being subject to a sudden stop, even if that sudden stop were not associated with a high yield
spread shock on which we have focused. Table 2.6 addresses this question and illustrates the
sudden stops that occurred during the sample period and the exchange rate regime according
to the classification in Table 2.2. The link between exchange rate regimes and sudden stops
appears to hold more generally. In particular sudden stops only occurred in countries with
discretionary regimes.
2.6 Determinants of State Contingent Regimes
It has been demonstrated that there is considerable variation in emerging market exchange rate
regimes and that this variation is associated with important differences in the extent to which
countries are insured against external shocks. However, what determines the choice of exchange
rate regime? If the benefits to floating and in particular state contingent regimes are so clear
why is "fear of floating" so pervasive? The analysis suggests that an important obstacle to
17In the case of the logit model with fixed effects, 5 countries (710 observations) were dropped due to all
negative outcomes (these countries did not have sudden stops during the period). In this case the marginal effect
of moving the flexibility index from 0 to 1 is -27.9%, which is an effect of large magnitude considering that the
probability these countries have a sudden stop during a crisis is 16.8%.
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floating is the need to develop credibility for the exchange rate regime. With this in mind we
examine two hypotheses, that the exchange rate regime is related systematically to the overall
credibility of the monetary policy framework, and that credibility takes time to acquire so that
among floating exchange rates, contingent floating is more likely to be found among countries
with longer experience with a floating exchange rate regime.
Table 2.7 tests these hypotheses. Monetary policy credibility is measured by the commit-
ment to inflation targeting. We measure inflation targeting using the classification developed by
Carare and Stone (2003) which identifies countries that have implemented full-fledged inflation
targeting (FFIT) regimes. They characterize FFIT countries as those having a medium to high
level of credibility, a clear commitment to their inflation target, and an institutionalization of
this commitment in the form of a transparent monetary framework that fosters accountability
of the central bank. This measure fits particularly well our notion of inflation credibility. The
table shows that this measure of credibility lines up with the theoretical analysis in section
2.2. State-contingent regimes are more likely to have high levels of monetary policy credibility,
non-contingent floating regimes are intermediate, and the regimes with the lowest degree of
credibility exhibit, in general, discretionary "fear of floating".
Regarding the time to acquire credibility for floating, the table does not exhibit very clear
results. Among the floating regimes, the unconditional average age of non-contingent regimes
is only slightly less than that for contingent regimes. However regime misclassifications might
be weakening these results. In particular both Brazil and Colombia (1999-) switched to more
flexible regimes in the aftermath of a sudden stop, and are classified as involuntary transitions
according to the index developed by the IMF (2004), and although they have avoided suffering
additional external crises, it is perhaps too early to tell whether they are floating more out of
choice or necessity. Furthermore, Israel was a borderline case in the classification as it exhibited
a quantitatively large coefficient in the measure of state contingency which was nevertheless
statistically insignificant. More in line with this hypothesis, it can be noted that Chile and
Indonesia are more recent entrants to the group of floating exchange rates. On the other hand
the state-contingent regimes contain some of the most experienced emerging market floaters,
including Mexico and South Africa. Nevertheless such analysis must be considered an ex post
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rationalization, and hence the hypothesis remain only weakly proven.
Also included in this table is a measure of derivatives market development, based on data
from the Bank for International Settlements. It has been argued that the development of deriv-
atives markets fosters the development of exchange rate flexibility, by enabling the allocation
of exchange rate risk to those most able to bear it, and by fostering a more sophisticated ap-
proach to financial risk management. Such instruments might also substitute for contingency
in policies and hence aid the transition to floating exchange rates. The data loosely support
this hypothesis, and derivatives market development is most stunted in those countries with
discretionary exchange rate regimes. Comparisons between the contingent and non-contingent
floating regimes are harder to make as there are few data points, and several significant outliers.
Furthermore it is impossible to ascertain whether derivatives markets foster flexible exchange
irate, flexible exchange rates foster derivatives markets, or both developments are jointly deter-
mined by some underlying fundamental cause. As such this remains a correlation.
2.7 Conclusions
We have reexamined the "fear of floating" phenomenon from the perspective that policymakers
in emerging markets face a tradeoff when determining exchange rate policy between limiting
exchange rate volatility and allowing the exchange rate to float. "Fear of floating" during normal
times might indeed be the optimal policy for these economies, excess exchange rate volatility
is legitimately feared for its effects on inflation, or firm balance sheets. However, there are also
occasions when "fear of floating" is not the optimal policy since a commitment to floating would
improve insurance against potential sudden stops. We have attempted to categorize exchange
rate regimes in the light of this framework. Policy makers with little commitment will only
be able to implement discretionary policies with little exchange rate flexibility, and "fear of
floating" will be the result. With intermediate levels of commitment, floating during crises will
be feasible, but to demonstrate the commitment to floating, non-contingent policies must be
used. Finally with full commitment, the optimal regime is state-contingent, floating during
(potential) crises, but retaining the option to intervene, if necessary, on other occasions.
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With this framework in mind we have explored the empirical evidence on exchange rate
flexibility in emerging markets. We have covered some of the same ground as Calvo and Reinhart
(2002) in their original paper on "fear of floating" although we have found much evidence that
the picture is significantly more complicated than this one dimensional characterization. There
is indeed a lot of "fear of floating" in emerging markets as they found, but our analysis of
state-contingent flexibility allows us to be more certain both in attributing this to an inefficient
discretionary equilibrium and to argue that more commitment to exchange rate flexibility would
be beneficial for the insurance of these economies against sudden stops. These economies seem
to choose to control capital flows rather than undertake any substitute insurance policies in the
context of open capital markets, and the overall credibility of their monetary policy frameworks
tends to be low.
At the same time we have found several emerging markets that are not characterized by "fear
of floating" at all. Chile and Indonesia, recent converts to floating, appear to be serious about
developing a reputation for floating and are forgoing exchange rate intervention to demonstrate
this. In accordance with the theoretical analysis these economies can be characterized as having
intermediate levels of credibility. Other analyses have also highlighted the exchange rate flexi-
bility of these economies. Hernandez and Montiel (2001) identify Indonesia as the only Asian
country to move to free floating following the crisis and Frankel (2003) discusses Indonesia as
one of the examples which is commonly cited as a successful floating exchange rate, due to its
subsequent recovery despite being hit with the worst of the Asian crisis.
Finally we have found that several of the more mature floating exchange rates exhibit
precisely the state-contingent flexibility that our theoretical analysis suggests would be optimal
in this environment. They appear to be able to intervene under certain circumstances without
compromising their commitment to floating during potential sudden stops, when floating is
really important. Such economies exhibit high levels of monetary policy credibility. The clearest
examples of such countries that emerge from our analysis are South Africa and Mexico.18 These
"
8South Africa is perhaps a more appropriate benchmark that Australia, with which emerging market exchange
rate regimes are commonly compared. The particular financial market shocks on which we have focused clearly
have an impact on South Africa, while they have no impact on the Australian exchange rate regime, and for
which it is probably safe to say they do not represent external shocks at all.
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two countries have been more or less able to isolate their economies from the periods of extreme
external turbulence during the late 1990s. For instance, while allowing big movements in the
nominal exchange rate in the late 1990s, neither of them have had sudden stops during the same
period (Calvo et al. 2004) and their decline in growth rates have been quite mild in comparison
with other countries.
The South African case presents a particularly interesting study for emerging market floating
regimes. It is an open middle income country that between the end of the Bretton-Woods system
arid 1985 experienced seven currency crises (Bordo and Eichengreen (2002)), which is high even
by current standards of emerging market volatility. Nevertheless, since 1985 South Africa has a
history of floating and its commitment to this regime does not appear to be in doubt. The South
African Reserve Bank has explicitly stated that it does not target the level of the exchange rate,
although it has a policy of interventions aimed to "smooth out large short-term fluctuations in
the exchange rate" according to Mboweni (2004). The commitment to floating has clearly been
tested on several recent occasions; however during the period starting in 1998 South Africa did
not experience a sudden stop despite the turmoil in emerging markets (Calvo et. al 2004). It
appears that a floating exchange rate is not only a feasible policy for emerging markets; it is a
policy that can be successfully used to insure the economy against external volatility without
forgoing the option to occasionally intervene in turbulent markets. For more recent floaters
such as Chile, this experience should prove an invaluable guide.
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Table 2.1: Volatility of Exchange Rates, Reserves and Interest Rates
Nominal Reserves Interest Rates
Exchange Rate
IMF Basis HYS Basis HYS Basis HYSCountry C Start EndCount lassification Start End case shock case shock case shock
Argentina Managed Float 200201 200412 0.667 0.300* 0.333 0.200* 1.000 0.200*
Australia Ind. Float 198901 200412 0.681 0.786 0.500 0.536 1.000 1.000
Brazil Ind. Float 199901 200412 0.543 0.267* 0.478 0.400 0.935 1.000*
Chile Managed Float 198901 199908 0.870 0.692 0.620 0.539 0.520 0.385
Chile Ind. Float 199909 200412 0.526 0.667 0.895 0.933 0.973 1.000
Colombia Managed Float 198901 199909 0.802 0.846 0.663 0.846* 0.970 0.846
Colombia Ind. Float 199910 200412 0.892 0.667* 0.838 0.733 1.000 1.000
India Managed Float 198901 200412 0.916 0.769 0.430 0.385 0.713 0.429
Indonesia Ind. Float 199708 200412 0.368 0.524 0.719 0.667 0.750 0.762
Israel Managed Float 199112 199912 0.909 0.833 0.432 0.833* 1.000 1.000
Mexi c Ind. Float 199501 200412 0.693 0.667 0.480 0.706* 0.841 0.905
Pakistan Managed Float 198901 200412 0.924 0.964 0.160 0.179 0.785 0.857
Peru Ind. Float 199008 200412 0.822 0.741 0.619 0.407 0.778 0.778
Philippines Ind. Float 198901 200412 0.715 0.857* 0.420 0.464 0.806 0.857
Singapore Managed Float 198901 200412 0.917 0.893 0.762 0.786 1.000 1.000
S. Africa Ind. Float 198901 200412 0.722 0.464* 0.347 0.714* 0.993 1.000*
Thailand Ind. Float 199707 200412 0.621 0.905* 0.724 0.762 0.931 1.000*
Source: Authors' calculations based on International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund
N\ otes:
1 - Nonminal Exchange Rate Volatility - Probability that the monthly change is within a +/-2.5% band
2- Reserves - Probability that the monthly change is within a +/-2.5% band
3 -- interest Rates - Probability that the monthly change is within a +/-400 b.p. band
_ identifies a situation when the value in the basis case and the HYS shock are significantly different at the 5% level.
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Table 2.2: Exchange rate flexibility index
M
a Y9
N ___171=0 Dynamic
Country IMF Classification Start End - N structure Category
1 ZE y (M,N)
n=l
Argentina Managed Floating 200201 200412 0.2486# 0.2186 (0,1) D
Australia Independent Floating 199001 199912 0.4204 0.1733 (1,1) Benchmark
Brazil Independent Floating 199901 200412 0.2559# 0.4711* (1,1) C
Chile (-1999) Managed Floating 198901 199908 0.0720# -0.0195 (0,1) D
Chile (1999-) Independent Floating 199909 200412 0.6504 0.2778 (1,2) NC
Colombia (-1999) Managed Floating 198901 199909 0.1512 0.3797 (0,1) D
Colombia (1999-) Independent Floating 199910 200412 0.2882# 1.2369* (0,1) C
India Managed Floating 198901 200412 -0.0078#t 0.0516 (0,1) D
Indonesia Independent Floating 199708 200412 1.2486 -1.1495 (0,1) NC
Israel Managed Floating 199112 199912 0.6078 4.7612 (2,5) NC
Mexico Independent Floating 199501 200412 0.3028# 0.4450* (0,1) C
Pakistan Managed Floating 198901 200412 -0.0713#t -0.0271 (1,4) D
Peru Independent Floating 199008 200412 0.1034# t -0.1455 (1,1) D
Philippines Independent Floating 198901 200412 0.2826# 0.2299 (0,1) D
Singapore Managed Floating 198901 200412 0.6044 0.1291 (0,1) Benchmark
South Africa Independent Floating 198901 200412 0.2820 0.2079* (0,3) C
Thailand Independent Floating 199707 200412 0.7609 -0.2832 (0,1) NC
Source: Authors' calculations based on International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund.
* indicates a regime with significant contingency at the 5% level using a Wald test.
# indicates base case significantly lower than Singapore 5% level using a Wald test for the same period of time.
t indicates base case significantly lower than Australia 5% level using a Wald test for the same period of time.
Covariance matrix computed with Newey-West standard errors.
Lag structure determined by Schwarz information criterion.
Flexibility index is corrected by differences in the variance of terms of trade and difference in the variance of the
interest rate used to compute the index.
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Table 2.3: Substitute Insurance Mechanisms
Quality of
Bank Reserve
Capital Sterilization Supervision Requirements
Country Controls (1) (2) (3) (4)
Contingent regimes
Brazil 1.8 0.11 3 16.4
Colombia (1999-) 1.0 -1.15 2 12.7
Mexico 1.0 -0.67 2 15.7
South Africa 2.1 0.18 3 11.4
Average 1.5 -0.38 2.5 14.1
Median 1.4 -0.28 2.5 14.2
Non-contingent (floating)
Chile (1999-) 1.0 -0.53 3 12.7
Indonesia 3.0 -0.91 n.a. n.a
Israel 1.5 -1.14 2.5 9.5
Singapore 1.5 -0.83 3.5 18.4
Thailand 1.1 -0.84 3 11.4
Average 1.6 -0.85 3.0 13.1
Aledian 1.5 -0.84 3.0 12.1
Discretionary ("fear of floating")
Argentina 3.0 -0.60 2 8.8
Colombia (-1999) 2.2 -0.78 2 12.7
Chile (-1999) 2.0 -0.23 3 12.7
India 3.0 -0.26 2 11.9
Pakistan 3.0 -1.14 1 8.8
Peru 1.1 -0.57 3 12.8
Philippines 2.5 0.21 2.5 14.5
,Average 2.4 -0.48 2.2 11.7
Median 2.5 -0.57 2.0 12.7
Definitions:
(1) from Kaminsky-Schmukler (2003), 3=high controls,1 =low/no controls;
(2) update of the results from Bofinger and Wollmershaeuser (2001); the estimate
corresponds to the coefficient of the change in net foreign assets in a regression of
the change in net domestic assets on net foreign assets and lagged net domestic
assets, monthly data from IFS, lines 11 to 17;
(3) Computed using the definition in Abiad and Mody (2003) using data from
Barth et al. (2003); 4=best quality, 0=worst quality. The index incorporates
information on banks' adoption of a capital adequacy regulation in line with
standards developed by the Bank for International Settlements; (2) the
independence of the supervisory agency from the executive's influence and
whether it has sufficient legal power and (material) supervisory power; (3) the
absence of exemptions to mandatory actions if an infraction is observed and (4) the
extent to which supervision covers all financial institutions.
(4) From Barth et al. (2003); the actual risk-adjusted capital ratio in banks as of
year-end 2001, using the 1988 Basle Accord definitions.
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Table 2.4: Private Reserve Accumulation and the Exchange Rate Regime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Private Reserves
Log(GDP) 1.4258** 1.398*** 0.050*** 0.051***
(.7039) (0.294) (0.016) (0.016)
F 0.3748*** 0.449*** 0.013*** 0.010
(0.0435) (0.075) (0.005) (0.008)
HYS 0.182* -0.002
(0.114) (0.007)
F *HYS -0.097 0.006
(0.079) (0.009)
Log(PR)l1 0.967*** 0.967***
(0.010) (0.011)
Dependent Variable: Share of Private Reserves in Total Reserves
Log(GDP) 0.046 0.049 -0.040*** -0.042***
(0.123) (0.121) (0.014) (0.013)
F 0.022** 0.020 0.011*** 0.009***
(0.010) (0.018) (0.002) (0.003)
HYS 0.019 0.009
(0.030) (0.007)
F *HYS -0.001 0.002
(0.020) (0.004)
(PR/ (PR+PuR)),, 0.413*** 0.411 ***
(0.057) (0.057)
Observations 14 countries 14 countries 14 countries 14 countries
(1280 obs.) (1280 obs.) (1274 obs.) (1274 obs.)
Source: Authors' calculations based on International Financial Statistics, International Monetary
Fund.
Fixed effect estimates. Standard errors robust to clusters at the country level. Standard errors
in parentheses
*,**,*** denote a variable is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Exchange Rate Regimes and Sudden Stops
Model Panel-Probit Model Panel-Linear Probability Model Panel-Logit Model
tF 0.327*** 0.656*** 0.069*** 0.145*** 0.140*** 0.609*** 1.223*** 1.181***
(0.094) (0.104) (0.022) (0.026) (0.021) (0.170) (0.202) (0.177)
[0.061] [0.114] [0.059] [0.304] [0.099]
I-YIS 0.172 0.113 0.033 0.020 0.021 0.327 0.231 0.230
(0.116) (0.138) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.222) (0.250) (0.245)
[0.034] [0.021] [0.0321 [0.056] [0.016]
sF *HYS -0.442** -0.627*** -0.091** -0.122*** -0.120*** -0.822** -1.127** -1.078**
(0.199) (0.240) (0.040) (0.037) (0.037) (0.391) (0.441) (0.430)
[-0.082] [-0.109] [-0.0791 [-0.2791 [-0.090]
Coanty effects No Random No Fixed Random No Fixed Random
effects effects effects Effects effects
Number of 2279 2279 2279 2279 2279 2279 1569 2279
observations
Number of 14 14 14 14 14 14 9 14
countries
Standard errors in parentheses, marginal effects in brackets.
*,*,*** denote a variable is significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 2.6: Country Episodes and Sudden Stops
Sudden Stop No Sudden Stop
Country Regime Country Regime
Colombia (-1999) Discretionary Argentina Discretionary
Chile (-1999) Discretionary Brazil Contingent
Peru Discretionary Chile (1999-) Non-contingent
Philippines Discretionary Colombia(1999-) Contingent
India Discretionary
Indonesia Non-contingent
Israel Non-contingent
Mexico Contingent
Pakistan Discretionary
Singapore Non-contingent
South Africa Contingent
Thailand Non-contingent
Source: Authors' calculations.
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Table 2.7: Determinants of Exchange Rate Regimes
Derivatives
Inflation Voluntary Regime market
Targeting Change Age development
Country (1) (2) (3) (4)
Contingent regimes
Brazil 0.9 0.0 62 0.9
Colombia (1999-) 1.0 0.0 61 0.3
Mexico 0.6 0.0 103 1.5
South Africa 0.3 1.0 180 13.5
Average 0.7 0.3 101.5 4.1
AlMedian 0.8 0.0 82.5 1.2
Non-contingent (floating)
Chile (1999-) 1.0 1.0 62 2.2
Indonesia 0.0 0.0 67 n.a.
Israel 0.6 1.0 96 0.9
Singapore 0.0 1.0 180 258.6
Thailand 0.5 0.0 83 3.9
A4verage 0.4 0.6 97.6 66.4
Meadian 0.5 1.0 83.0 3.1
Discretionary ("fear of floating")
Argentina 0.0 0.0 29 0.1
Chile (-1999) 0.1 1.0 110 1.7
Colombia (-1999) 0.0 1.0 111 0.0
India 0.0 1.0 180 n.a.
Pakistan 0.0 1.0 180 n.a.
Peni 0.0 0.0 132 n.a.
Philippines 0.0 0.0 112 n.a.
A4verage 0.0 0.6 122.0 0.6
Median 0.0 1.0 112.0 0.1
Definitions:
(1) from Carare and Stone (2003). The number in column (1) corresponds to
the percentage of time in each regime with a full-fledged inflation targeting
regime in operation.
(2) From IMF (2004). A voluntary transition is a transition which is not driven
by a crisis. Crisis-driven transitions are defined as those that are associated
with a depreciation vis-A-vis the U.S. dollar of more than 20 percent, at least
a doubling in the depreciation rate compared with the previous year, and
depreciation in the previous year of less than 40 percent.
(3) Age: is defined as the number of months that the country has been under
the regime until the end of the regime defined in Table 2 and the regime is
not classified as a defacto free- falling regime by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
(4) Forex Derivatives Transactions to GDP from BIS (1998, 2001)
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Table 2.8: Sudden stops by country-period
Country Period
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
India
Indonesia
Israel
Mexico
Pakistan
Peri
Philippines
1994.09-1995.12
1999.02-1999.12
2001.01-2002.09
1997.10-1999.06
1998.06-1999.06
1998.07-2000.06
1997.06-1998.09
1994.01-1995.03
1997.09-1998.12
1991.09-1992.06
1997.06-1999.06
Singapore
South Africa
Thailand 1996.07-1998.09
Source: Authors' calculations
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Figure 2.1: Contingent, Non-contingent and Discretionary Exchange Rate Flexibility
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Figure 2.3: Actual (line) and Potential (gray) Sudden Stops
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Figure 2.5: Contingent Flexibility
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Chapter 3
Far From Home: Do Foreign
Investors Import Higher Standards
of Governance in the Transition
Economies?
(joint work with Joel Hellman and Daniel Kaufmann)
3.1 Introduction
It is now widely accepted that corruption poses substantial costs for economic development.
There is strong empirical evidence that higher levels of corruption are associated with lower
growth and lower per capita income across the globe. One of the channels through which
corruption hinders growth is its impact on foreign direct investment (FDI). A number of recent
studies have shown that corruption inhibits FDI.1 Nowhere does this seem more relevant than
in the meager flows of FDI to the transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union. More than a decade since the collapse of communism across the region, the hopes that
'See Abed and Davoodi (2000), Alesina and Weder (1999), Smarzynska and Wei (2000) and Wei (1997).
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the creation of market economies would attract substantial flows of FDI have not materialized,
especially in the Balkans and the former Soviet countries. It is common to lay the blame on
poor standards of governance and in particular high levels of corruption in the region.2 But
though most of the focus has been on the extent of foreign investors who have stayed away from
the transition countries, comparatively little attention has been given to the behavior of those
who have invested in these countries. Do foreign investors in transition countries import better
standards of corporate conduct and governance or do they contribute to the problem? A recent
wave of no bribery pledges, ethics codes, enhanced compliance procedures and transnational
legal restrictions have been targeted to encourage foreign investors to meet higher standards of
governance than those of the local environment. Yet we have no systematic evidence on how
foreign investors behave when they are far from home.
Most existing studies of corruption and FDI are based on indices of corruption perceptions
at the country level and bilateral aggregate investment flows. There has also been a considerable
collection of anecdotal evidence and case studies on the practices of foreign investors. But to
assess the behavioral standards of foreign firms that actually invest in transition economies, we
need firm-level data that would allow comparisons of the propensity to engage in corruption
of both foreign firms and domestic firms. The recent Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey (BEEPS), a comprehensive survey of over 4000 firms in 22 transition
countries, provides such data. 3 The BEEPS data unbundles the concept of corruption to
distinguish and measure different types of corrupt transactions, as well as providing detailed
information on the characteristics and performance of firms. This allows us to develop a detailed
and nuanced picture of the types of corruption that different sorts of firms engage in and the
impact of such corruption on firm performance.
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows:
2Recent measures of corruption place the region among the most corrupt in the world. For measures of
corruption and a discussion of the problems inherent in making such cross-country comparisons, see Kaufmann,
Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). The World Bank (2000) report: Anti-Corruption in Transition presents
regional comparisons of the level of corruption based on Kaufmann et al (1999). Section 3.4 discusses the link
between corruption and aggregate FDI flows.
'This survey was financed by the EBRD and the World Bank Institute. A description of this survey is given
in Appendix A, (Section 3.10). Details on the survey and its methodological approach to measuring governance
can be found in Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann and Schankerman (2000).
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1. While corruption reduces the quantity of FDI flows into the transition economies, it also
appears on average to attract lower quality investors with regard to some important
governance standards. In particular, in countries where the state is highly susceptible to
capture by economic vested interests, FDI firms are significantly more likely than their
domestic counterparts to engage in corrupt forms of political influence, a phenomenon
that we have referred to as state capture. (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2003; Hellman
and Kaufmann 2001)
2. Different types of foreign investors engage in particular types of corruption tailored to
their comparative advantages. FDI firms with local partners are more likely to engage
in state capture. Larger multinational firms with headquarters overseas rely much less
on state capture, yet are much more likely to resort to kickbacks in their dealings with
foreign states.
3. Though often foreign investors might claim that they are specifically targeted for bribes
by "grabbing hand" governments4 , we find no evidence that FDI firms pay higher overall
bribes than their domestic counterparts, even though they are more likely to engage in
specific forms of corruption. In addition, the direct performance gains to foreign investors
from these forms of corruption are shown to be considerable, strengthening the view that
FDI firms enjoy a substantial share of the rents from corruption The evidence therefore
does not support the view of coercion of foreign investors to pay bribes.
4. On the basis of this survey evidence collected in 1999-2000, transnational legal restrictions
to prevent bribery, such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the much more
recent C)ECD Convention on Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, have not led to higher
standards of corporate conduct among foreign investors bound by their provisions, though
the OECD Convention is still in the very early stages of implementation.
The rest of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 describes the dataset and the different
types of corruption that are investigated. Section 3.3 provides a model of the link between
FDI and corruption to organize the empirical work. Section 3.4 examines the cross-country
4For the notion of government as a grabbing hand, see Shleifer and Vishny (1998).
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relationship between corruption and aggregate FDI flows. Section 3.5 uses the survey data to
investigate the behavior of foreign investors and compare them with their domestic counter-
parts finding evidence of substantial gains to FDI engaging in corruption. Section 3.6 provides
further evidence on the active participation of FDI in state capture documenting a relationship
between the organization of the firm and the type of corruption in which it engages. Section 3.7
examines policy measures that have been proposed to reduce corruption among FDI. Section
3.8 concludes. Two Appendices describe the data in more detail.
3.2 Data and Concepts
The data set on which this research is based is the 1999-2000 Business Environment and En-
terprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). The BEEPS survey was designed to assess the quality
of the business environment, including governance and corruption on the basis of the experi-
ences and practices of firms.5 The survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews with
firm managers or owners in site visits during the period June through August 1999 in the 22
transition countries. 6 In each country, between 125 and 150 firms were interviewed with the
exception of three countries where larger samples were used: Poland (246), Russia (552) and
Ukraine (247). The sample was structured to be representative of the domestic economies with
specific quotas placed on size, sector, location, and export orientation. The sample was heavily
weighted towards privately owned firms, though there were quotas for state-owned firms.
The sample also included a significant number of firms with foreign direct investment,
defined as any firm in which a foreign-registered firm has an ownership stake. The survey
5As many of the forms of corruption examined in the survey are illegal in most countries, firms must be
expected to be reluctant to admit that they engage in such activity. In implementing the survey, the problems
associated with collecting reliable data were kept constantly in mind, and every effort was made to assure
respondents that their answers would be treated confidentially. Questions were phrased indirectly about the
corruption faced by "firms in your line of business" and respondents were assured that responses would be
aggregated and not attributable to themselves or their firms. The survey questions examine corruption from a
number of different angles providing consistency checks on each firm's responses. Moreover, tests were conducted
to detect any systematic positive or negative bias among the firms in any given country.
6 The countries included: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, the Russian
Federation, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
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also enables us to identify the percentage of capital owned by the foreign firm to determine
whether the firm is majority foreign-owned. We can also distinguish between FDI firms with
headquarters overseas that are generally establishments of multinational firms and FDI firms
with local headquarters that are more likely to be joint ventures with local partners. This
will enable us to examine whether different types of FDI firms maintain different standards of
governance within the transition countries. Table 3.1 presents a cross-country summary of the
sample composition of the BEEPS in terms of the number of domestic firms and foreign firms
of different types.
3.2.1 Unbundling and measuring corruption in the transition economies
Most existing studies of the link between corruption and FDI use country-level measures of
corruption based primarily on the perceptions of external actors. We rely on firm-level data
that measures the experience of firms engaging in corrupt practices. Moreover, the BEEPS
survey was designed to unbundle the concept of corruption to identify distinct types of corrupt
transactions that we have shown elsewhere to have distinct causes and consequences (Hellman,
Jones and Kaufmann 2000). Consequently, we can compare both the extent and type of cor-
ruption experienced by foreign versus domestic firms, as well as among different types of foreign
firms.
We focus on two forms of corruption:
* State capture: defined as the extent to which firms make illicit private payments to
public officials in order to influence the formation of laws, rules, regulations or decrees by state
institutions, and
* Public procurement kickbacks: defined as illicit private payments to public offi-
cials to secure public procurement contracts.
These forms of corruption are distinguished from what international legislation refers to
as "facilitation payments", which are private payments to public officials in order to facilitate
implementation of administrative regulations placed by the state on the firm's activities. Fa-
cilitation payments are generally not covered by international anti-bribery conventions. More
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importantly, facilitation payments are more likely to be extracted from firms by the "grabbing
hand" of the state with the resulting rents predominantly going to bureaucrats that have the
power and discretion to intervene in the market. State capture and public procurement kick-
backs are more likely to be initiated by firms to gain advantages in legislative and procurement
decisions. They tend to be tools of influence rather than forms of predation with the result-
ing rents shared by both firms and bureaucrats. Focusing on state capture and procurement
kickbacks allows us to disentangle the various forms of corruption experienced by firms and
examine those forms that might provide better insights into the firm's incentives and behavior.
The BEEPS survey provides the first empirical measures of state capture. Firms were asked
to disaggregate the types of bribery in which "firms like yours" have been engaged. Those that
report having made private payments to public officials for the purpose of influencing the content
of laws, decrees or regulations are designated as captor firms. Similarly, firms were asked if they
had made private payments to public officials to obtain public procurement contracts, though
this question was only asked of the subset of firms that already identified themselves as having
trade with the state. Thus, a group of kickback firms can be identified from the larger sample.
Table 3.2 presents the data on the share of captor firms and kickback firms in each country.
In addition, Table 3.2 provides a measure of the average share of bribe payments by firms as a
share of their annual revenue.7 This is an indicator of the extent of total bribe payments for all
forms of corruption, including facilitation payments, by the firm in each country. The data in
Table 3.2 allow us to examine both the types of corruption engaged in by firms and the extent
of corruption payments.
3.3 A Model of FDI and Corruption
Before proceeding to examine the data on the relationship between FDI and corruption, this
section proposes a model to organize the empirical work. The first section focuses on examining
7 The question was posed in terms of firm revenues rather than profits since estimates of revenues are more
reliable. In addition the question was posed indirectly in terms of "firms like yours" to reassure respondents
that their responses would not be attributable directly to their firm. We take total payments as a proxy for
administrative corruption since evidence from the BEEPS suggests that the majority of bribe payments are for
this purpose.
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the consequences of corruption for aggregate FDI flows, in a model where corruption manifests
itself through state capture and public procurement kickbacks. Both state capture and public
procurement kickbacks are determined jointly endogenously with the FDI decision, on the basis
of fundamental country level characteristics. The model for state capture builds on the model
of endogenous policy choice under corruption developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994).8
Public procurement corruption is modeled as the theft of public funds. A similar model based
on Grossman-Helpman (ibid) that analyzes FDI in the context of endogenously determined
policy can be found in Fredriksson et al (2003).
3.3.1 Basic Model
There are H small open economies, h {1, 2,....H}. There is an exogenous set of I eco-
nomic sectors in each country h, each of which contains an exogenous number of firms Nih for
C {1, 2, ..., Il }, so that firms in country h are indexed by sector i and number n. Each good
is produced with the same constant returns to scale technology Q = F(K,L, S, E) and the
international price of goods in sector i is pi. The factors of production are capital, K, labor,
L, infrastructure, S, and a factor that generates an externality E in its use. Capital is interna-
tionally mobile across countries and each country is endowed with a labor force Lh = 1 which
is immobile. Infrastructure is financed by public spending in a manner that will be described
in more detail subsequently, and is a public good that is available to all firms in a country.
All capital is assumed to be foreign, and hence FDI is equivalent to the international allo-
cation of capital. 9 Since markets are competitive, the after-tax return on capital is r in each
country. Dropping the dependence on h and focusing on a particular country, infrastructure is
financed by a country specific tax on capital t and the externality Ein is firm-specific since it
can be negotiated with the officials implementing regulation. Taking S and Ein as exogenous,10°
8The Grossman-Helpman (1994) model is itself an application of the theoretical work of Bernheim and Whin-
ston (1986) on menu-auctions.
9An extension will be discussed with non-identical firms to model a distinction between domestic and inter-
national firms that is used in the empirical work.
l°It is assumed that there is a large number of small capital owners so that each takes both the country-level
S' and the firm-level E as given so that this first order condition will remain valid when S and E are endogenized
as Functions of the total firm-level or country-level investment. A sufficient condition is that ownership of firms
is sufficiently dispersed.
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the international allocation of capital to firm (i, n), the n-th firm in sector i, is determined so
that:
PiFK (kin, lin, S, Ein) = t + r (3.1)
Note that lin is also determined in a competitive labor market within each country so that
PiFL (kin, in, , S, Ein) = and w is eliminated through the assumed resource constraint L = 1,
so that lin can also be eliminated between the two demand curves to give an implicit equation
for the capital allocated to each firm i, the solution to which we can represent generically as:
kin = g (S, Ein, t, r,p) (3.2)
Assuming that FKS > 0 and FKM > 0 we find that
_k_ Oki
" > and JEi> 0 (3.3)
Further, defining aggregate FDI in country h as k = Ein kin, it is clear that the total
--+ ---
FDI received by a country is increasing in both S and E = (Ein), where E is the vector of
externalities across sectors and firms and two such vectors are ordered if and only if all their
elements are identically ordered.
3.3.2 Endogenous S and E and link with corruption
Given the above model of international capital allocation the next step is to endogenize S and
-- +
E, in terms of a model of government and corruption. In this extended model, the international
investment process will take the form of a 2-stage game. In the first stage capital owners will
decide where to invest based on expectations of government behavior Se and E e, and in the
--4
second stage, taking investment as given, the government will determine S and E. In the
---
subgame perfect equilibrium, expectations and outcomes are equal. S and E are determined
by the interaction between firms and potentially corrupt public officials. It is assumed that the
government consists of a unit measure of bureaucrats, an exogenous fraction -y of which are
corrupt. Corrupt and honest officials carry out their duties differently as described below.
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3.3.3 Provision of infrastructure S and public procurement corruption
Assume that each official taxes capital at rate t, which is exogenous, to finance the provision
of public infrastructure. Honest officials transform taxes into public spending, but dishonest
officials simply steal the taxes for private consumption.
S = tk (1 - ) (3.4)
where k is the aggregate capital stock of the country. This theft of public funds conceptual-
izes in a stark fashion the concept of public procurement corruption used in the empirical work.
With such corruption a fraction of public expenditure that is intended to provide public goods
is returned to the official in the form of a kickback. The net effect is that the firm colludes
with the public official in the theft of public money. As it is modeled here the firm derives
no benefit from such activity except that it is permitted to operate since the government can
make take-it-or-leave-it offers that appropriate the entire surplus. With a competitive market
of firms, the firm has no power to prevent the politician demanding kickbacks, and so cannot
benefit from participation in corruption.
3.3.4 Determination of permitted externalities E and state capture
Unlike the provision of infrastructure which is a public good, the interaction between a firm and
the state is firmn-specific. Particular firms may benefit from regulations that assist the operation
of their business, while for other firms the regulatory environment can be distorted against
them. This form of interaction between the state and firms in which certain firms succeed in
distorting the business environment to their advantage is denoted state capture. State capture
and the regulatory environment are modeled through the externality E. It is assumed that this
externality functions as a free input to the production process which enhances the output of a
firm, but imposes social costs on the rest of society. The particular externality is assumed to
be industry-specific, and its overall level as well as its distribution of benefits across firms in
the industry is determined through a bargaining process between the state and firms.
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994) who analyzed the endogenous determination of
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trade policy in a similar environment, state capture is modeled as a menu auction. Firms
compete to bid for (i.e. bribe) beneficial regulation, i.e. a high value of Ein. Depending on
the industry structure and the participation of other firms in the industry in state capture the
benefits of such lax regulation are shared between public officials and the firms. The objective
of the firms is simply to maximize profits. The objectives of public officials differ. While honest
officials seek to maximize social welfare, W (E), corrupt officials seek to maximize their private
income from bribes and the theft of public funds. Absent corruption, social welfare would be
maximized at E°.11 Social welfare is assumed to be a function only of the aggregate externality
produced in each industry and does not depend on its distribution across firms in a given
industry. Define the externality in industry i as:
Ei = ZEin (3.5)
n
w(E = w /E,, n 3.6)
By assumption the social welfare function is additively separable and can be written 12
W (El, ..E = Z Wi (E, ) (3.7)
with i (Ei) < 0 for i E {1,...,I} (3.8)
Since policy is the outcome of decisions made by both corrupt and honest officials we can
write the objective function, G, of the representative government decision maker as a function
"lThis reduced form welfare function could be given micro-foundations if the social welfare is assumed to be
a function of the real wage of domestic workers together with a negative effect of the externality. The real wage
is increasing in the marginal product of labor, which depends positively on E, while as consumers welfare is
decreasing in E, so the optimal level of E will be positive. In principle the real wage will also be increasing
in S, so this would also enter the social welfare function. However, since S is not determined strategically by
government officials and depends only on aggregate not firm level investment independent of the actions of any
individual firm, it will be treated as determined passively and not made an explicit argument of W. General
equilibrium effects of E that act through investment k and hence S will be subsumed into the given reduced
form.
12Since the political equilibrium will never lead to a less than socially optimal level of E, it can be assumed
without loss of generality that each component of W is decreasing in E at the margin.
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of social welfare, with weight 1 - -y corresponding to the honest officials, proceeds from the theft
of public funds -ytk and total bribes collected Bin (E):
G = (1 - ) W () + ytk + EBin (E) (3.9)
i,n
In what follows, the term -ytk will be neglected since as a constant it does not affect any
equilibrium decisions, nor any comparisons of government welfare across different outcomes
(taking k as given).
Firms maximize profits:
in - Bin = piF (kin, lin, S, Ein)- (r + t) kin -wlin -Bin (3.10)
where win are gross profits and the total bribes paid by the firm are Bin. Note that this
expression for in implicitly underlies the first order condition for FDI that was derived above.
Taking k and S as given, in is increasing at the margin in Ein. Note that despite the fact that
in equilibrium bribes will depend on the total investment in the firm kin, bribes do not enter
the first order condition for investment given above since each individual investor is assumed
to be small relative to the size of the firm and so the firm strategy can be taken as exogenous
for an individual investor.
Policy E is determined as the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the following 2-stage
game between the set of firms and the government:1 3l
i) Stage 1, firm (i, n) offers to government the bribe schedule Bin (E) where is a proposed
policy vector to be implemented by the government and the schedule describes the bribe of the
firm under every possible policy. The firms behave non-cooperatively, and bribes are contingent
on the entire policy vector, not just the policy that directly applies to the firm.
ii) Stage 2, taking as given the bribe schedules, to which it is assumed the firms are com-
rnitted, the government determines optimal production of the externality E.
13For the purpose of determining corruption the firm is treated as a single strategic decision-maker, despite
the fact that firm ownership is highly dispersed.
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As described by Grossman and Helpman (ibid) the equilibrium of the policy game is char-
acterized by the following conditions:
Condition 1: Given the bribe schedules Bin (E), the government chooses the policy that
maximizes G. This determines the optimal policy E*
Condition 2: Given the optimal policy E*, the bribe schedules are such that for each firm
(i, n)the optimal policy maximizes the joint welfare of the firm and the official G+rin-B (E*)
where 7tin denotes the profits of firm (i, n) before paying any bribes. This determines the shape
of the bribe schedules up to an additive constant.
Condition 3: The bribe schedules are pinned down by a government indifference condition
for each firm (,n):
( - ) W (E*) + E Bm (E*) = (1 - ) W E- (itn) + E Bj, E (ion)) (3.11)
j,m ji,Amn
where E-(in)denotes the policy that the government would choose optimally taking as given
the bribe schedules of every firm except (i, n) and an identically zero contribution from firm
(i, n).
These conditions are derived in Grossman-Helpman (ibid). Condition 1 simply states that
the government optimizes given the strategies of the firms and its own objective function.
Condition 2 encapsulates the intuitive idea that if the chosen policy is not privately optimal for
a given firm and the government, taking all the other firms' strategies as given there is some
additional surplus that could be shared between the firm and the government by switching to
the privately optimal policy. Condition 3 states that the firms attempt to pay the smallest
amount in bribes that they can. Firms can always change their bribe schedules by additive
constants without affecting the equilibrium policy choice and in fact the bribe schedules are
fully determined once these additive constants are fixed. The firms attempt to reduce bribes
up to the point where the government becomes indifferent between taking a bribe from the
firm and taking its objectives into consideration or not accepting a bribe from the firm, and
excluding it s bribe schedule from the objective function.
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Applying Conditions and 2 allows the characterization of the optimal bribe policy for each
firm and pins down the bribe schedules up to a constant. Condition implies that the optimal
policies satisfy:
max G = max ( - y) W () + Bin (3.12)
E E i,n
Condition 2 implies that the bribe schedules, at the optimal policy, solve
max {G + 7in-Bin (E)} (3.13)
E
Putting these two conditions together characterizes the optimal policies as the solution to:
max I7rin-B in (E)} (3.14)E ( 4) 1~~~~~~~~~~3.4
However, this equation allows us to determine the optimal bribe schedule in terms of the
underlying policies, since the profit function is a known function of the policies E. In particular
as explained in Grossman-Helpman (ibid), the first order condition of this equation implies that
the bribe schedules are locally truthful at the optimal policy E*, in the sense that the bribe
functions have the same shape as the profit function. They further argue that attention can
be restricted without loss of generality to globally truthful strategies, since every equilibrium
can be supported by such strategies, in which case the global shape of the bribe schedules are
determined:
Bin = max in- Pin, 0] (3.15)
where Pi, is a constant that pins down the level of bribes, and the shape of the bribe schedule
is given by the firm profit function, considered as a function of government intervention E with
the constraint that bribes are non-negative.
Once the shape of the bribe schedules is pinned down, the optimal policies are determined
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independently of equilibrium bribes. In particular, optimal policies are determined as
E* = argmax ( - y) W (E) + in (E)}) (3.16)
E i,n
Thus we derive a simple and intuitive result on the equilibrium structure of E. The gov-
ernment uses the threat of intervention to extract bribes from the firms, but the bribes offered,
which determines the division of surplus between the firm and the official, can be separated
from the optimal policy. The optimal policy depends on a tradeoff between the desire of honest
officials to cut welfare-reducing externalities and the desire of corrupt officials to sell the right
to produce externalities to firms.
3.3.5 Equilibrium with exogenous political structure
--+
Having determined the equilibrium E and S we can solve for the full equilibrium of the model
with FDI. It is observed that the above analysis assumed an exogenous number of firms in each
industry, Ni, all of which participate in state capture. The model can be trivially generalized
to cover the case where an exogenous number of firms Mi < Ni participate in the political
equilibrium. This distinction between the economic and political structures of industry i will
be useful when the model is extended to consider endogenous entry into state capture as an
additional channel of impact of FDI. Furthermore, in what follows, the general interdependence
-4
of each firm on the full policy vector E will be simplified so that firms are only interdependent
within the industry i, so that the profits of firms in sector i depend only the sector-specific
elements of the policy vector Et = (Ei,1, ..., Ei,Nj). In equilibrium this will imply that each
firm's bribe schedule is also only a function of Ei.
The full equilibrium is determined by the following equations:
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ki.,-, = g (Si Ei*n, t, r,pi) (3.17)
, = tk(1-7) (3.18)
E*t = E Em -+ E 7rin(E)} (3.19)
Ei n<_Mi
Since all the firms in industry i are identical in equilibrium we can write E = (Ei*, E*)
where
Ej' = max {(1 - y) Wi (MiEi) + Mri (Ei)} (3.20)
Ei
Thus since a7(Ei) > 0 and W (Ei) < 0 we can derive the comparative static for the effect
of corruption on the externality E, aE > 0. Combining this with the result that, (holding k
fixed), As < 0 we derive the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1: Corruption and FDI flows
In each industry there are two types of firms, politically active and passive, that differ in
their access to E.
1. In cross-section, within a country, politically active firms receive more FDI than politically
passive firms.
2. Across countries, the effect of corruption on aggregate FDI flows is ambiguous since state
capture raises the returns to investment for politically active firms, while imposing costs
on all firms through the loss of productive public spending on infrastructure.
Proof: For the Mi politically active firms Ei = E* while for the Ni -Mi passive firms
Ei = 0 since for any total industry level E corrupt officials will always prefer to reallocate
it towards the politically active firms and extract bribes. Denoting g = g (S,O,t,r,pi) the
investment function conditional on Ein = 0, aggregate investment can be written:
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k g ( M) + go E (Ni -MA/i) (3.21)
dk da (EMi) + d (N -M ) (3.22)
__ = ~~~~~~~ 
0A7 ~  ~ ~ ~~ (3.23)an~~~~ d- dgyd-
da - g - ()(+) s+ (+) (-) (3.23)d-y OEZ O aS Oy
Thus, d is ambiguous and d0 _os s = (+)() < 0. The overall effect of corruption
on FDI is ambiguous. However, since the returns to investment are equalized at the margin,
politically active firms will receive more FDI than passive firms.E
Corruption affects total FDI through 3 channels. First, since --9 > and aEin > 0,
azE~ > y 0nS-->O,
corruption increases the benefits that firms can derive from state capture. Since the costs of
state capture (i.e. bribes) are treated as a fixed cost from the point of view of individual
investors, investment increases. Second, for any given firm, holding aggregate investment fixed
-on which any single firm is too small to exert an influence, 9 > 0 and as >0,so corruption
reduces aggregate spending on infrastructure which reduces the marginal product of capital so
investment falls. Third, there is a general equilibrium effect which acts to multiply the second
effect. If the partial effect of corruption, holding aggregate k fixed is to reduce investment,
then in general equilibrium S decreases even further which magnifies the negative impact of
corruption on investment. Conversely, if the partial effect of corruption, holding aggregate
k fixed is to increase investment, then in general equilibrium S increases even further which
magnifies the positive impact of corruption on investment and might even reverse the effect
of corruption on S. Thus the impact of corruption on FDI depends on whether the perceived
benefits of state capture to individual firms exceeds the costs that corruption imposes in the
form of reduced spending on beneficial public goods. Further light will be shed on which of
these effects could be expected to dominate after extending the model to endogenize the political
structure of each industry, and the nature of the empirical relationship will be discussed below.
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3.3.6 Equilibrium with endogenous political structure
The above analyzed FDI under an exogenous structure of the political participation of firms in
;state capture, but it is important to extend the analysis to understand what political structure
should be expected to emerge in equilibrium, and whether FDI has any special impact on the
equilibrium political structure. To examine the incentives to participate in state capture we will
evaluate the gains to state capture and the distribution of those gains between the state and
the firm, which requires the determination of the constants Pin which pin down the level of the
bribe schedules. It will be seen that the joint surplus of the state and a firm always increases
with participation, so that in a long run equilibrium with free entry into state capture all firms
will participate. The distribution of gains depends on the bargaining power between the state
and the firm, which is determined endogenously in the model. Firms have greater bargaining
power the fewer of them there are.
Suppose that there are Mi firms participating and consider the decision of firm (i, 1) - the
result is symmetric for the other firms. As stated in Condition 3, equilibrium bribes depend
on E - ( i',l) the equilibrium policy if the firm does not participate in state capture. As discussed
above, the government is indifferent in equilibrium to the participation of the firm, and com-
paring welfare with and without the firm, it is only necessary to compare outcomes in sector i,
because equilibrium bribes and policies in other sectors are unaffected:
(1 - y) i (Ei*) + Bm (Ei*) = (1- 7) Wi E-(i'l) + E Bm (E- (i l ) (3.24)
m /~
If the firm does not participate, the policy vector will have E = 0 for that firm since the
corrupt officials derive no benefit from allocating any E to the firm and honest officials prefer
to reduce E. There will be one such equation for each of the firms m < Mi. Since E* and
E - -(i1) are determined independently of the level bribe schedules, these are Mi equations for
the Mi unknown constants Pim.
Consider first the special case in which only one firm participates in sector i. Since no firm
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contributes to the externality in sector i, the component of E -( i ,l) for this sector is the socially
optimal level of E °. In this case we can solve explicitly for the equilibrium bribe of the firm:
Bi (Ei*) = (1 - ) Wi (E) -(1 - ) Wi (Ei*) (3.25)
Bi (Ei*) > 0 since equilibrium E is greater than the welfare maximizing level and the joint
surplus of the state and the firm increases since at the social optimum H z = 0 <
.i Furthermore the change in welfare of the government with and without the partic-Ei E=Eo
ipation of the firm in sector i is
G* - -(i' ) = (1 -7) {Wi (Ei*) - W (Ei°) + Bil (Ei*)} = 0 (3.26)
Thus with only one participating firm the joint surplus of the government and firm increase
with participation, but the government cannot extract any of the surplus from control of the
externality. The single firm has all the bargaining power and is able to extract gains from state
capture. Thus in markets with no state capture, the firm always has an incentive to enter.
Consider next the case where there are Mi > 1 firms. In equilibrium the participating firms
are identical, since each will receive the same investment and offer the same bribe schedule.
Thus
(1- -y) Wi (Ei) + MiB (Ei) = (1- y) Ei- ( '1 + (Mi -1) B (E -i ) (3.27)
This can be rearranged as
B (Et ) = (1- y) Wi(Ei ())(1 - ) Wi (Et) + (Mi -1) B (Ei ()) B (Ei))
(3.28)
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B (E ) > 0 since Wi (Ei(i 1)) > Wi (E ) and B (EJ('l)) > B (E*)l 4 It is immedi-
ate that each firm (weakly) gains from participating in state capture, since non-participation
implies Ei = 0 and so the marginal profit for this firm will exceed that of any of the already
participating firms and the government will find it optimal to reallocate some of the existing
industry-level E away from other firms and towards the entrant. These gains will be shared
between the firm and the state, but the firm cannot be worse off than not participating. En-
try does however impose a negative externality on the politically incumbent firms. The gains
to capture accrue increasingly to the government as the number of firms increases since the
competition between firms implies that the firm's outside option gets worse.
Proposition 3.2: FDI and equilibrium state capture
With free entry into state capture:
1. Each firm has an incentive to enter the political market, so in equilibrium all firms will
enter
2. The bargaining power of the state and hence the gains to state capture that is transferred
in bribes is increasing in the number of firms that participate in the capture market
Proof: See above. 
3.3.7 Extensions
This basic model captures most of the effects we are interested in for the empirical work.
One shortcoming is that all firms have been assumed to be identical and in equilibrium all
investment and behavioral decisions are identical, while much of the empirical work is focused
1 'As the number of firms M increases the externality per firm E falls, while the total externality MiE
increases as can be seen by examining the first order condition for E.: max [W(MiE) + Mi7r(E)] has FOC
Wt(M, E) + rl(E) = 0. Social welfare is a deceasing function of the total externality, and is thus declining, while
the per-firm bribe is an increasing function of E, and is thus also declining.
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on highlighting differences in behavior across types of firms. Within the class of FDI firms,
the paper distinguishes firms with local and international HQ, and shows that this distinction
affects the firm's behavior, particularly with respect to state capture. This could be modeled
formally by enriching the model of participation so that some firms find it less costly to enter
the state capture game. This will generate an equilibrium distribution of entrants into state
capture with more investment in better connected firms - which can be interpreted as the FDI
with a local HQ - as the empirical work finds. FDI firms as a group are also compared with
domestic firms. Since all capital is assumed to be internationally mobile, the model does not
distinguish the concept of a domestic firm. One simple way of modeling this distinction without
introducing immobile capital is simply to assume that FDI brings with it some complementary
"know-how" which increases total factor productivity in the production function. This will
account for most of the effects that the empirical work associates with FDI - in equilibrium
there will be greater investment in higher productivity firms, so it makes sense to identify
these with FDI. Furthermore this specification will also account for the "magnification" effect
that FDI has a higher propensity to engage in state capture -the marginal benefit of doing so
(increasing E) is increasing in productivity.
3.3.8 Welfare and Policy measures
Grossman and Helpman (ibid) derived a Coase-theorem style result that when all agents can
participate in the lobbying process, the equilibrium policy is efficient (even though the share
of gains that go to the state is very different). The model of state capture above does not
share this property because by assumption, consumers are not represented and so the external
costs are never fully internalized. Even when all firms participate, as indeed they will with
free entry, welfare is not maximized from a social perspective. Indeed it can be shown that the
total externality E in each industry is increasing with the number of firms, so that welfare is
monotonically decreasing in the number of firms that participate in state capture. The role of
FDI in this process is ambiguous, and depends in part on whether capital is a substitute or
complement to the factor responsible for the external effects.
As will be discussed in the context of the empirical work, recent legislation has sought to
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criminalize corruption by FDI firms in the home country. The model suggests that such a policy
might have limited effectiveness on the behavior of FDI unless all foreign investors are subject
to it - if not the impact is more likely to be on the quantity of FDI from such countries, rather
than the behavior of FDI condition on investment. Indeed, such legislation can be modeled
as a fixed cost (perhaps times some probability, but this can be ignored in reduced form),
that is associated with corruption. Making the cost high enough will dominate the benefits
of corruption, and such FDI would choose to invest only in the exogenously non-participating
firms. If such legislation is adopted unilaterally there is unlikely to be much effect on the overall
behavior of FDI, and the only effect will be to confine such FDI to the investments with E =- 0.
Since the marginal product of capital falls, FDI from such countries will fall.
3.4 FDI Flows to the Transition Economies
The existing empirical literature on corruption and FDI has focused on whether the volume
of FDI is affected by the level of corruption in the host country. Wei (1997) finds a negative
relationship between corruption and FDI in a data set of bilateral aggregate investment flows.
Alesina and Weder (1999) find that aggregate FDI flows are negatively related to corruption,
although not very strongly. Smarzynska and Wei (2000) find again, although this time with
firmn-level data, that corruption is negatively related to FDI. Regarding the transition economies,
there is no recent survey of the determinants of FDI flows. The only related paper is Abed and
I)avoodi (200(0) who find that corruption is negatively related to FDI flows to the transition
economies, but that structural reforms are more important as a determinant of FDI. 15 The
model suggests that the relationship is theoretically ambiguous. The partial effect of corruption
on public infrastructure is negative which acts to reduce FDI while a corrupt economy with
unexploited potential for state capture can actually attract FDI.
Table 3.3 presents cross-country measures of cumulative net FDI flows to the transition
economies since the onset of transition in absolute and per capita terms. Though FDI flows to
1 The authors proceed to argue that corruption is caused by a lack of progress in structural reforms. However
these results are hampered by a failure to recognize that corruption in the form of state capture can be a cause
of the lack of progress in structural reform. This political economy dynamic is analyzed in Hellman et al (2000).
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the region overall have been relatively small, there is considerable diversity across the region,
in particular between the countries of the CIS and the rest of the region. Most CIS countries
have received little FDI (with the exception of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan which have received
more significant amounts of oil-related investment). In contrast, the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe and the Baltics have received much higher levels of inward investment.
Table 3.4 examines the links between these FDI flows and the country-level aggregate mea-
sures of corruption from the BEEPS survey. There are many difficulties associated with at-
tempting to understand the decisions of foreign investors with a simple cross-section of aggregate
data. As a consequence, the results are intended to be merely suggestive and corroborative of
the more systematic studies discussed above. The table contains OLS regressions in which the
dependent variable is a measure of FDI flows. We present results based on two measures of
FDI flows - cumulative FDI flows 1989-99 and 1989-2000. It is important to highlight that the
FDI variables reflect net flows. However, to the extent that corruption also induces capital to
leave the country, as well as deterring the inflow of foreign capital, this is a useful measure of
the link between FDI and corruption. We include separately the three indices of corruption -
state capture, public procurement kickbacks, and the overall share of bribes in annual revenues.
In addition a measure of natural resource abundance is included, since this is an important
factor in attracting FDI. 16 A dummy for those countries that operate substantially unreformed
communist systems is included, since such countries are likely to be significantly less attractive
to FDI, conditional on the other factors.17
With the above caveats in mind, we find a consistent pattern across the specifications. The
share of revenues paid in bribes is negatively related to FDI flows however they are measured.
State capture also emerges as negatively related to FDI flows. Surprisingly public procurement
corruption is unrelated to FDI flows, although this possibly reflects the fact that not all foreign
investors are engage in businesses that require winning public contracts. Finally, we find that
after controlling for corruption, natural resources are insignificant as an explanation of FDI
16A dummy variable which takes the value for Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and 0 for the other
countries.
17In this sample, Belarus and Uzbekistan are classified as unreformed communist. See the EBRD (2000) for
assessments of the progress in economic and institutional reform of the transition economies.
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flows, and likewise in many cases, perhaps surprisingly, the unreformed communist dummy. In
terms of the model of Section 3.3, the data suggests that the negative effect of reduced public
spending outweighs any private benefits that firms might accrue from investing in regimes in
which they can capture policymakers and on net FDI depends negatively on corruption.
3.5 Corruption by FDI Firms
With firm-level measures of both the propensity to engage in different types of corruption and
the level of overall bribe payments from BEEPS, we can move beyond the analysis of corruption
and aggregate FDI flows to examine the pattern of corrupt behavior across different types of
firms. In particular we ask: are firms with FDI more or less likely than domestic firms to engage
in corruption?
Table 3.5 presents measures of the extent to which different types of firms are engaged in
corruption without controlling for other firm characteristics that affect such payments. For each
form of corruption (state capture, public procurement kickbacks, and total bribe payments) we
compare the average level of corruption for foreign and domestic firms across all countries in
the sample. In addition, we divide the sample into two groups of countries, those for which
the prevalence of that form of corruption is high and those for which it is low, relative to the
average level in the transition economies, based on the cross-country measures of each form of
corruption.1 8s This enables us to examine whether the underlying institutional environment,
i.e. the extent to which certain forms of corruption have become prevalent in the environment,
affect the propensity of different types of firms to engage in corruption.
The results in Table 3.5 reveal an interesting pattern. In terms of the level of corruption,
F1)I firms and domestic firms pay, on average, a very similar share of their annual revenues in
bribes. Yet it is in the propensity to engage in different forms of corruption where differences
start to emerge. FDI firms are somewhat more likely than domestic firms to pay kickbacks for
l"See Appendix A, (Section 3.10) for a table detailing how the sample was divided into low and high groups
for each form of corruption, and for an explanation of the indicators upon which this division was is based.
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public procurement contracts, though the gap increases in countries where the payment of such
kickbacks is on average less prevalent. In transition countries where procurement kickbacks are
common in dealing with the state, both FDI and domestic firms are equally likely to pay them;
while in countries where kickbacks are less common, FDI firms are more likely to engage in this
form of corruption. Though in the case of kickbacks these differences between FDI and domestic
firms may not be very substantial, it is interesting to see that despite recent developments in
ethics codes, compliance procedures and transnational anti-bribery conventions, FDI firms do
not demonstrate any higher standards of behavior than domestic firms. Indeed, nearly a third
of all FDI firms surveyed report paying kickbacks to public officials when dealing with state
procurement contracts. Although the modeling of public procurement corruption in Section 3.3
was very rudimentary, the data support this simple approach in which all firms are targeted
equally.
With respect to state capture, the differences between domestic firms and FDI firms appear
more pronounced in certain contexts. In countries with a significant state capture problem,
FDI firms are almost twice as likely as domestic firms to be engaged in efforts to capture the
state. Where state capture has been more effectively contained, FDI firms are much less likely
than domestic firms to engage in it.
Although suggestive, these results need to be substantiated with a more thorough economet-
ric analysis of the data, in which the variation in other characteristics of the FDI and domestic
firms that might account for these results can be controlled. Table 3.6 presents the results of
such an analysis, controlling for size of the firm, origin of the firm (state-owned, privatized or
de novo) and country fixed effects.19 With the inclusion of the control variables, FDI firms are
no better or worse than domestic firms in their propensity to pay kickbacks. They also show
no significant difference in the overall levels of bribes paid. Where FDI firms do differ from
their domestic counterparts is their greater propensity to engage in state capture in countries
where the problem of state capture is prevalent, as suggested by the interaction between the
FDI dummy variable and the dummy variable for high capture states.
9 We ran alternative specifications of the model with sector dummy variables and replacing the FDI dummy
variable with a continuous measure of the share of foreign ownership. The results were substantially the same.
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Foreign investors might respond that the higher level of state capture observed by FDI firms
results from discriminatory targeting of foreign investors for corrupt payments on the part of
public officials in the host countries. Indeed, it could be argued that in corrupt environments,
FDI firms are the "sitting ducks" for rapacious politicians to extract rents. The regression
results could reflect identification problems and possible biases.20 The results themselves need
not suggest that the association of higher state capture among FDI firms reflects deliberate
choices on the part of those firms to engage in corruption. However, we reject this hypothesis
:for a number of reasons. First, if FDI firms were subject to discriminatory targeting by rent-
seeking public officials, then their total bribe payments would be expected to exceed those of
domestic firms. We find no significant differences in total bribes paid between FDI firms and
domestic firms, as suggested by the analysis in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. Second, FDI firms should
have easier exit options than domestic firms, preventing them from systematically becoming
'sitting ducks" for the extraction of bribes.
The third argument against this hypothesis is the most revealing: engaging in state capture
is associated with substantial benefits for the corrupt FDI firm. 21 To measure firm performance,
we use data from the BEEPS survey on real sales growth over the past 3 years.2 2 Table 3.7
presents uncontrolled means of sales growth for FDI firms in different environments. In all the
transition countries, FDI firms that engage in state capture, i.e. captor FDI firms, grow at a
substantially faster pace than other FDI firms. In high capture environments, in particular,
captor FDI firms, grow at more than twice the rate as other FDI firms.
These results can be confirmed in regressions that control for other factors that affect firm
20A potential endogeneity bias arises because the policy environment variable that measures the level of
corruption in the country of investment is constructed from the same firm level data that measure individual
propensity to engage in corruption. In fact, with respect to state capture, the extent of state capture measure
and the individual behavioral measure are constructed from different questions in the BEEPS questionnaire (see
Appendix A, Section 3.10 for the details) so the endogeneity issue does not arise with these firm level equations.
Secondly, even in the cases of total bribes paid and public procurement kickbacks in which the cross-country
measures are constructed as the aggregate of the same question that the micro-level equations are based on,
it can be shown that cross-country measure is almost orthogonal to the error term in any particular equation,
resulting in little actual bias.
2 lHellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000) analyze the private gains to state capture more broadly.
22Real sales growth is preferable to other potential performance indicators, given the strong incentives for
misreporting profits in transition countries and wide variation in accounting standards across the region. However
this is closer to El measure of the gross gains to state capture, than the private gains to the firm, since it does
not account for the amount of surplus transferred to state officials with bribes.
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performance. Table 3.8 presents the regression results controlling for firm size, sector, origin
and country fixed effects. The results show that firms with FDI firms generally grow faster than
all other firms, as do all firms that engage in state capture in high capture countries. But FDI
firms that engage in state capture get additional gains in terms of sales growth performance
above and beyond those advantages, as suggested by the positive and significant coefficient on
the interaction term between FDI and captor firms.
If FDI firms are being targeted by public officials for bribes to influence the content of laws,
regulations and decrees, they are apparently well compensated for all the attention. Yet the fact
that FDI firms do not face a higher overall bribe burden than domestic firms, that they enjoy
substantial private gains as a result of engaging in state capture, and that they can more easily
exit host markets if they suffered from discriminatory predation suggests that state capture
reflects a strategic choice by such firms to secure advantages in these markets. Consequently,
FDI would appear to magnify the risks of state capture in environments where the state is
already susceptible to such corrupt forms of influence. This is consistent with the model of
Section 3.3 in which FDI as the more productive sector of the economy has a more power
incentive to demand state capture. The fact that FDI appears to capture a significant portion
of the surplus is consistent with FDI operating in markets with little political competition.
3.6 Corruption and the Characteristics of FDI Firms
Having investigated the comparison between foreign investors and domestic firms, we examine
differences among the FDI firms. The group of FDI firms in the BEEPS sample can be divided
between those with local headquarters - mainly joint ventures with local partners - and those
with headquarters abroad - mainly establishments of multi-national firms. Differences might
be expected in the propensity of these types of firms to engage in corruption. Multi-nationals
tend to have greater resources for ethics training and compliance procedures, more serious rep-
utational concerns and somewhat higher risks of detection given their prominence. In contrast,
foreign investors often seek out local joint venture partners who "understand how to get things
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done" in their countries and have more extensive personal networks to facilitate business. Such
differences should affect their propensities to engage in corruption
As previously, we analyze the uncontrolled results before proceeding to econometric speci-
fications. Table 3.9 presents data on the propensity of FDI firms with local headquarters and
FDI firms with foreign headquarters to engage in state capture and pay public procurement
kickbacks, as well as the total bribes paid. For comparison, the last row repeats the results for
domestic firms from Table 3.5.
Again the data reveal an interesting pattern. FDI firms with local HQ are much more likely
to engage in state capture than those with foreign HQ, especially in high capture countries.
The FDI firms with local HQ also pay considerably higher levels of bribes. Yet they do not
outperform the multi-national firms on all forms of corruption. FDI firms with foreign HQ are
more likely to pay procurement kickbacks in dealing with the state in highly corrupt environ-
ments. Indeed, over 50 per cent of the FDI firms with foreign HQ working in highly corrupt
countries said they had paid such kickbacks.
These results suggest that foreign investors might choose the type of corruption to engage
in on the basis of their comparative advantages. "Local" FDI firms with strong contacts in the
host country's political and economic decision-making corridors might be better equipped to
seek advantages through state capture, i.e. through influencing the formation of various laws,
rules and decrees. FDI firms with foreign HQ would have fewer ties to such structures and might
be more inclined to focus private payments to those granting specific contracts in working with
the state. If so, this would again reflect a more strategic approach to corruption on the part of
firms than has been generally recognized. Such an interpretation is consistent with the model.
Proposition 1 demonstrated that FDI would be actively targeted towards firms engaging in
state capture. Assuming that foreign investors need a local partner to provide contacts to
government officials, we can identify such FDI with local HQ with the participating firms in
the model. Non-participating firms can be identified with FDI with foreign HQ.
We investigate below whether these bivariate relationships continue to hold once we condi-
tion for all other relevant firm characteristics simultaneously. The results examining the impact
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of firm characteristics on the propensity to engage in state capture, to pay kickbacks and the
overall bribes paid are presented in Table 3.10. We examine the propensity of FDI firms with
foreign headquarters to engage in different forms of corruption in more highly corrupt countries
by interacting the FDI dummy variable with the aggregate measures of the different forms of
corruption at the country level. The regression results confirm that FDI firms with foreign HQ
do pay less in overall bribes than other FDI firms, but at the same time are more likely to pay
procurement kickbacks than "local" FDI firms in highly corrupt environments. Differences in
their propensity to engage in state capture are not significant.
3.7 Does Regulation Control the Conduct of Foreign Investors?
The risks posed by the corrupt practices of foreign investors have not escaped the attention
of policy makers, and in principle many foreign investors are governed by legislation explicitly
prohibiting corruption. Early unilateral action in this direction was taken by the United States
in 1977, the result of which was the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).23 More recently,
multilateral negotiations at the OECD resulted in a Convention on Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials, signed at the end of 1997. However, little attention has yet been paid to the efficacy
of these measures in achieving their stated objective of reducing corruption.2 4
As Table 3.11 shows, there appears to be significant variation in the conduct of foreign
investors from different countries with respect to corruption. These differences might be related
to differences in the regulatory environments, but if so, those firms from countries with less
23The Act prohibits US firms from using bribes to "maintain or secure business in foreign countries".
24Indeed, the little research that has been directed at the FCPA has simply taken it for granted that US firms
are constrained in their ability to make corrupt payments and has addressed the question of how this affects
the level of US FDI and the ability of US firms to compete with other foreign investors. Opponents argued
that the Act, by effectively raising the cost of overseas business for US firms, would simply undermine their
ability to compete with firms from other countries (not similarly constrained), with no compensating reduction
in corruption. More sympathetic observers argued that the act could represent a useful commitment device to
avoid bribery if US firms compete primarily with each other, or supply goods for which there is no effective
substitute. The empirical evidence is mixed. Hines (1995) finds, in a dataset consisting only of aggregate data,
that the growth rate of US FDI became more sensitive to corruption after 1977, which he interprets as due
to the FCPA. However, by failing to control for the aversion of all FDI to corruption, this result is hard to
interpret. In a more systematic study, Wei (1997) finds in a dataset of bilateral investment that the relationship
between corruption and aggregate FDI is no different for US investors. In other words, US investors are averse
to corruption in host countries, but no more so than investors from other countries.
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exacting standards of corporate conduct might be responsible for most of the earlier findings
that foreign investors were engaging in various forms of corruption. This would have significant
implications for the role and effective governance of FDI in transition economies.
To investigate the impact of anti-corruption legislation more systematically, we define three
groups of source countries of foreign investment from which firms are in principle increasingly
constrained by the OECD Convention or the FCPA. 25 The unregulated countries are those
which have no legislation constraining the behavior of their firms in foreign countries. Since
all OECD members (and 5 non-members) signed the Convention, the unregulated countries
all come from outside the OECD. A second group consists of both those countries that have
ratified the OECD Convention and those that have signed, but not yet ratified it at the time of
the survey (but excluding the US).2 6 US firms constitute a separate group since they have been
subject to the FCPA for many years prior to signing and ratifying the OECD Convention.
To the extent that legislation leads to changes in behavior, we would hypothesize that the
effect is likely to be most strong for the US firms, followed by the OECD convention countries.27
Table 3.12 examines the conduct of foreign investors and the relationship with anticorruption
legislation, together with the corresponding results for the whole group of foreign investors and
the domestic firms for comparison.28 Given the smaller sample, we do not divide the countries
25 For the few firms in the BEEPS with multiple foreign investors from different countries, the firms were
classified in the category corresponding to the most constrained of the foreign investors. Thus any firm with a
US share was grouped with the US firms; any firm with a ratifier, but no US firm was classified as a ratifier, and
so on.
26 The precise rules concerning the coming into force of the Convention can be found at http://www.oecd.org.
Fo:r our purposes it is sufficient to note that the Convention entered into force for the first group of countries
on February 15th 1999 and for other countries subsequently as it was ratified domestically. Since the BEEPS
was implemented during the summer of 1999, we identify only this first group of countries as governed by the
Convention during the survey.
2'' We treat the existence of legislation governing firms from a particular country as exogenous to the behavior
foreign investors from that country. More problematic is the fact that the OECD Convention only came into
force recently for the first group of implementing countries. As a result, since our data were collected in 1999,
it could be objected that it is simply too soon to detect the ultimate impact it will have. In response we offer
two arguments. Firstly, although this is undoubtedly true, one would still expect to observe some impact, even
if significantly less than the eventual maximum. Secondly, in addition to examining the impact of the OECD
Convention, we also identify the impact of the FCPA, which has been in force for over twenty years and is surely
as effective now as it is ever likely to be.
2 8 It should be noted that the FCPA and the OECD Convention which was modeled on the FCPA contain an
exception for "facilitation payments". Since these payments are very similar to our definition of administrative
corruption, there is less theoretical reason to suppose that either US Investors or OECD Ratifiers should be more
constrained with respect to this form of corruption.
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according to the extent of corruption as in previous tables.
The hypothesis that legislation constrains the behavior of foreign investors would be sup-
ported by evidence showing increasing levels of corruption when reading across table 3.12 from
the column depicting the results for US firms under the FCPA to the last column showing the
results for domestic firms. Yet no such pattern emerges and, in fact, the US investors, a priori
the most constrained, do not exhibit lower levels of corruption than either OECD Convention
countries or the unregulated countries, and in some cases appear to be significantly higher.
Table 3.13 makes these claims more statistically precise, by computing pair wise significance
tests for the difference between the level of corruption among the various groups.These pair wise
tests confirm that neither US firms nor firms from the OECD Convention countries exhibit a
lower propensity than firms from unregulated countries to engage in these common forms of
corruption, though total bribe payments made firms from OECD Convention countries are
generally lower. US firms do not exhibit significantly lower levels of corruption, and, based
from this dataset in some cases, exhibit systematically higher levels.
Tables 3.14 examines these findings econometrically, controlling simultaneously for other
factors that determine the propensity to engage in corruption, including firm characteristics
and country dummies for the location of the investment.2 9 We include dummy variables for
the regulatory variables - (FCPA, OECD Ratification Country, OECD Signatory Country), in
which the base category includes the unregulated firms and all those not covered by the other
dummies. In general we find the same pattern of results. Given that two of the dependent
variables (likelihood to capture and to kickback) are probabilistic, probit specifications were
used, while OLS was performed in the specification where total bribes paid was used as the
dependent variable.
2 9Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria and Lithuania were excluded from the probit analysis since the outcome did not
vary among foreign investors in these countries and the estimates are not identified.
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3.8 Conclusion
Though the mechanisms by which corruption hinders FDI are by now well known, compara-
tively little is known about the behavior of FDI firms in corrupt environments. The results
are sobering. Corruption not only reduces FDI inflows but attracts lower quality investment
in terms of governance standards . In misgoverned settings, rather than importing higher
standards of governance, FDI firms would appear to magnify the problems of state capture,
while paying a lower overall bribe burden than domestic firms. FDI firms undertake forms of
corruption that are suited to their comparative advantages, as "local" FDI with joint venture
partners tend towards state capture, while "multi-national" FDI is more likely to rely on more
focused procurement kickbacks. It is critical to recognize, from a political economy perspective,
that these formns of corruption generate substantial gains to FDI firms, thereby challenging the
premise that these firms are coerced and making it that much more difficult to develop effective
constraints on such behavior.
Preliminary evidence on transnational legal restrictions to prevent bribery, such as the
US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the much more recent OECD Convention on Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials, suggests that they have not led to higher standards of corporate
conduct among foreign investors bound by their provisions. Though it is clearly too early to
expect results from the OECD Convention, the experience of the FCPA, in effect for over 20
years, does not appear to be encouraging on the basis of the evidence provided by this sample of
investors in transition economies. This suggests that the OECD Convention will need to focus
much more attention on effective implementation of its transnational restrictions on bribing
public officials.
These findings should not be read as a case against foreign investment. Indeed, as we have
argued elsewhere, state capture is created and maintained through restrictions on competition
and entry in strategic sectors. Encouraging greater competition in the economy is essential in
creating a more competitive market for influence, which should place constraints on the ability
of any small group of actors to capture the state. Our findings confirm that FDI firms can
contribute to this monopolization of influence through corruption, as much as, if not more so,
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than domestic firms. Efforts to enhance competition by attracting a wider and more diverse
set of FDI firms is a critical component in a broader strategic framework to fight state capture
and corruption. However the theoretical analysis suggests that such an approach can also be
flawed if it fails to include representation from all sections of society in policymaking.
Policy measures to tackle corruption among foreign investors must address the powerful
incentives these firms have to engage in rent-seeking corruption, while providing incentives and
venues for channeling their legitimate demands to have some influence over public decisions
that affect them. Transnational restrictions will play a role in establishing norms of behavior
among foreign investors, but there are strong limitations to their effective implementation.
More important will be to address the lack of accountability, transparency and competition in
the domestic market for political influence that enables such forms of corruption.
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3.10 Appendix A - Measuring Forms of Corruption and Clas-
sifying Countries
Methods of measuring and comparing levels of total bribes paid across countries are already
well-established. The BEEPS survey follows the convention of previous surveys around the
world which ask firm managers to estimate the proportion of annual revenues typically paid by
"firms like yours" in unofficial payments to public officials.30 Table 3.15 records the average
level of such payments in each country.
30The question was posed in terms of firm revenues rather than profits since estimates of revenues are more
reliable. In addition the question was posed indirectly in terms of "firms like yours" to reassure respondents
that their responses would not be attributable directly to their firm. We take total payments as a proxy for
administrative corruption since evidence from the BEEPS suggests that the majority of bribe payments are for
this purpose.
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Measuring state capture as a form of corruption distinct from the above is more complex as
there are few existing indicators in the empirical literature on corruption. One key measurement
problem is that the extent to which a set of state institutions is captured is not necessarily a
function of the number of firms that engage in state capture. In an extreme case, a single
powerful monopoly could generate a much higher level of state capture than a larger number of
less powerful firms competing to buy off state officials. To compare state capture across firms
and across countries, we therefore need both to identify the number of firms that engage in it
and to measure the extent of the impact on all firms from the capture of the state by a subset
of those firms. Consequently, we use two measures of state capture: 1) an impact measure of
the extent of the capture economy defined as the share of firms in each country which report
a direct impact on their business from the purchase of laws, decrees and regulations by firms
through private payments to public officials, and 2) a behavioral measure that identifies captor
firms, i.e. those that report having made private payments to public officials for the purpose
of influencing the contents of laws, decrees or regulations. 3 1 The impact measure is used to
construct the cross country index presented in Table 3.15. The behavioral measure was reported
is reported in Table 3.2 and was used to investigate differences in the propensity to engage in
state capture at the firm level.
To construct the index of the capture economy, firms were asked to assess the extent to
which the following six types of activities have had a direct impact on their business:32
* the sale of Parliamentary votes on laws to private interests;
1Of course, the impact measure of state capture is based on the speculation of firms that other firms are
engaging in improper behavior and thus less reliable than the behavioral measure. The empirical analysis of the
effects of state capture on firm-level performance below will be based on the more reliable behavioral measure.
Hlowever, we believe that the impact measure still provides a useful relative indicator of perceptions of the impact
of state capture across countries.
:2The inclusion of the sale of court decisions to private interests and the mishandling of Central Bank funds
as elements of state capture requires some explanation. Courts are generally seen as institutions that implement
existing laws as opposed to making them, though the precedent-setting function of courts can blur these bound-
aries. In the transition countries, where legal systems are still in the nascent stages of development, courts can
be seen as playing a more formative role in the development of the legal framework. As regards the Central
Bank, the institution's role in setting monetary policy and creating the regulatory framework for the developing
financial system also blurs the distinction between the formation and implementation of rules. While recognizing
the difficulty of drawing concrete boundaries within any particular institution, we have chosen to incorporate
these institutions within the category of state capture as a result of the unique nature of the transition period.
Yet it is important to note that removing these components from the index of state capture does not change
substantially the ranking of countries on state capture presented in table 3.2.
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the sale of Presidential decrees to private interests;
Central Bank mishandling of funds;
the sale of court decisions in criminal cases;
the sale of court decisions in commercial cases;
* illicit contributions paid by private interests to political parties and election campaigns.
The percentage of firms in each country which responded that the respective form of state
capture has had a significant impact on their business are classified as affected by state capture.
By averaging across all of the categories an aggregate index of the extent of the capture economy
is presented in Table 3.15. The measure of the extent of public procurement kickbacks is, in the
terminology above, a direct behavioral measure, based on the assessment of the frequency with
which a firm that does business with the government is required to make unofficial payments to
gain government contracts. The index in Table 3.15 is constructed as the proportion of firms
in each country that trade with the state and were required to make unofficial payments to
win business. Table 3.15 also groups the transition economies into two categories according
to whether the level of corruption is high or medium. This is not intended to imply that there
are no interesting or relevant differences between countries in each group, but only represent
the broad tendency. These binary measures of the extent of corruption will be used in some
sections of the paper.
3.11 Appendix B - The BEEPS Data by the Legislative Status
of the Source Country
Table 3.16 summarizes the BEEPS sample of foreign investors. For completeness the table lists
all the signatory countries, whether or not the BEEPS sampled foreign investors from these
countries, together with the number of data points in the BEEPS from each country . The
signatories are further classified as OECD Member countries and according to their ratification
status at the time of the collection of the BEEPS data. summarizes the BEEPS sample of
foreign investors. For completeness the table lists all the signatory countries, whether or not
the BEEPS sampled foreign investors from these countries, together with the number of data
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points in the BEEPS from each country.33 The signatories are further classified as OECD
Member countries and according to their ratification status at the time of the collection of the
BEEPS data.34
33 This consists of all 29 OECD member countries together with Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile and the
Slovak Republic. The BEEPS contains firms from all 34 Signatory countries except Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Chile, Luxembourg, Mexico and New Zealand.
34 This data can be found at (http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/bribery_2000_rpt.pdf)
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Table 3.1: Domestic and Foreign Firms in the BEEPS Sample
Country
Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Georgia
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Overall
Total
firms
160
125
137
132
130
127
149
132
129
146
147
132
166
112
138
245
125
552
137
125
247
126
Domestic
firms
139
123
124
117
113
110
116
106
111
119
120
117
125
106
122
205
105
515
122
108
217
108
3619 3148
FDI FDI(%) Local
HQ
21 71.6 12
2 85.0 0
13 80.1 12
15 47.7 14
17 56.1 17
17 46.1 17
33 83.5 24
26 54.7 23
18 50.5 15
27 78.2 26
27 82.9 11
15 36.3 14
41 63.5 40
6 51.3 6
16 66.9 14
40 56.0 37
20 56.9 19
37 54.6 31
15 52.9 13
17 66.9 17
30 45.3 28
18 49.3 17
471 60.9 407 64
Source: BEEPS
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FDI HQ
Foreign
HQ
9
2
1
1
0
0
9
3
3
1
16
1
1
0
2
3
1
6
2
0
2
1
-
Table 3.2: Measuring the Types and Level of Corruption in Transition Economies
Country Share of Captor Share of Kickback Average Share of Annual Firm
Firms' Firms2 Revenues Paid in Bribes3
Albania 11 51 4.0
Armenia 7 26 4.6
Azerbaijan 24 52 5.7
Belarus 2 5 1.3
Bulgaria 11 13 2.1
Croatia 10 26 1.1
Czech Republic 7 43 2.5
Estonia 5 28 1.6
Georgia 8 18 4.3
Hungary 4 15 1.7
Kazakhstan 6 21 3.1
Kyrgyzstan 7 19 5.3
Latvia 14 22 1.4
Lithuania 14 15 2.8
Moldova 12 9 4.0
Poland 9 32 1.6
Romania 13 39 3.2
Russia 9 22 2.8
Slovakia 12 35 2.5
S]ovenia 10 27 1.4
Ukraine 12 33 4.4
Uzbekistan 2 24 4.4
Overall 9.5 26 3.0
Source: Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000) based on BEEPS.
Notes:
1 - Firms were asked whether state capture in each of the following dimensions (parliamentary legislation,
presidential decrees, central bank, criminal courts, commercial courts, political parties) had no impact; minor
impact; significant impact or very significant impact on their business. Those firms that reported a
significant or very significant impact were classified as afected by state capture in that dimension. The state
capture index is calculated at the unweighted average of the proportion of firms in each country affected by
each of the six components of state capture.
2 - Those firms that traded with the government were asked: how often do firms like yours nowadays need
to make extra unofficial payments to public officials gain government contracts? The responses ranged
across always; usually; frequently; sometimes; seldom and never. Those responding sometimes or more
frequently were classified as kickback firms.
3 - Firms were asked: What percentage of revenues do firms like yours pay per annum in unofficial
payments to public officials? The responses ranged across 0%; less than 1%; 1 to 2%; 2-10%; 10 to 12%; 12
to 25%; over 25/o. The variable was interpolated at 0%, 1%, 2%, 6%, 11%, 19% and 25%.
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Table 3.3: Recent and Cumulative FDI Flows to the Transition Economies
Cumulative FDI inflows Recent FDI inflows
(US$ per
(Million US$) capita) (US$ per capita) (% of GDP)
1989-2000 1989-2000* 1999 2000 1999 2000
Albania 597 176 15 42 1.4 3.5
Bulgaria 307 71 21 27 2.1 2.8
Bosnia and
Herzegovina 3,307 407 98 120 6.5 8.1
Croatia 4,085 907 304 167 6.8 3.9
Czech Republic 21,673 2,102 605 434 11.7 9.1
Estonia 1,926 1,337 154 168 4.3 4.9
FRYugoslavia 1,015 118 13 6 1.1 0.5
FYR Macedonia 437 219 14 85 0.8 5.0
Hungary 18,926 1,885 140 115 2.9 2.5
Latvia 2,499 1,056 139 169 5.0 5.6
Lithuania 2,387 648 129 102 4.5 3.3
Poland 29,052 751 164 240 4.1 5.9
Romania 6,768 303 48 45 3.1 2.8
Slovak Republic 3,611 669 130 278 3.6 7.4
Slovenia 1,534 768 72 67 0.7 0.7
Central and Eastern
Europe and the Baltic
States 98,124 772 136 138 3.9 4.4
Armenia 605 159 34 39 7.1 7.8
Azerbaijan 4,092 502 64 61 12.8 12.1
Belarus 776 78 22 9 1.9 1.0
Georgia 687 128 11 19 2.2 3.4
Kazakhstan 8,499 571 106 77 9.4 6.3
Kyrgyzstan 458 97 9 9 3.6 3.1
Moldova 438 102 8 23 2.6 7.1
Russia 9,998 69 5 -2 0.4 -0.1
Tajikistan 144 23 3 4 1.9 2.2
Turkmenistan 882 165 18 19 4.8 4.5
Ukraine 3,345 67 10 12 1.6 1.9
Uzbekistan 697 28 5 3 1.5 1.2
Commonwealth of
Independent States 30,621 166 25 23 4.1 4.2
Total 128,745 504 88 88 4.1 4.4
Sources: IMF; Central Banks and EBRD.
Notes: FDI is measured as the net inflow recorded in the balance of payments. For most countries, figures
cover only investment in equity capital and in some cases contributions-in-kind. For those countries (e.g.
Estonia, Slovak Republic) where net investment into equity capital was not easily available, more recent data
include reinvested earnings as well as inter-company debt transactions. Gross inflows of FDI are in some cases
considerably higher than net inflows on account of increasing intra-regional investment flows.
*Population for the cumulative per capita FDI flow is measured as at 2000.
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Table 3.4: Corruption and Aggregate FDI Flows
Cumulative FDI flows 1989-1999 (US$ per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bribe Share -190.8** -190.9**
(-2.64) (-2.74)
State Capture -15.1 -22.8**
(-1.46) (-2.26)
Public 5.9 2.6
Procurement
Kickbacks
(0.63) (0.27)
Natural -16.4 -205.5 25.5 -22.7 -235.0 -28.3
Resources
(-0.05) (-0.62) (0.09) (-0.08) (-0.72) (-0.10)
Unreformed -798.4** -481.1 -512.3
Communist
(-2.20) (-1.20) (-1.58)
N 22 22 22 22 22 22
R2 0.11 0.04 0.28 0.30 0.11 0.37
Cumulative FDI flows 1989-2000 (US$ per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bribe Share -226.7** -226.8**
(-2.73) (-2.87)
State Capture -16.3 -25.5**
(-1.35) (-2.18)
Public 8.9 5.1
Procurement
Kickbacks
(0.84) (0.46)
Natural -69.2 -290.9 -3.7 -76.8 -325.6 -69.8
Resources
(-0.18) (-0.77) (-0.01) (-0.22) (-0.87) (-0.22)
Unreformed -948.2 -566.6 -628.1*
Communist
(-2.25) (-1.23) (-1.71)
N 22 22 22 22 22 22
R2 0.11 0.05 0.29 0.30 0.13 0.39
Source: BEEPS' IMF, Central Banks, EBRD
**significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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Table 3.5: The Links Between FDI and Corruption
Share of Captor Firms1 Share of Kickback Firms 2 Total Bribes Paid
(as a share of annual revenues) 3
Countries With: Countries With: Countries With:
All High Low All High Low All High Low
Coun- Capture Capture Coun- Kick- Kick- Coun- Bribes Bribes
tries tries backs backs tries
.41/Firms 9.3 11.4 6.8 25.7 34.2 18.1 3.0 3.8 1.7
Domestic 9.0 10.4 7.3 25.2 34.0 17.5 3.0 3.8 1.8
Firms
FDI Fims 11.5 18.7 4.0 29.2 36.1 22.4 2.8 4.3 1.4
Source: BEEPS
Notes:
The cross-country measures of corruption presented in table 2 are used to divide the sample into those in
which the level of each dimension of corruption is high or low. However, to compare the differences
between FDI and domestic firms, the behavioral measures of actual involvement in each dimension of
corruption are used:
- Firms were asked: How often do firms like yours need to make extra unofficial payments to public officials
to influence the content of new laws, decrees or regulations. The responses ranged across always; usually;
frequently; sometimes; seldom and never. Those responding sometimes or more frequently were classified as
engaging in state capture.
2 - Those firms that traded with the government were asked: How often do firms like yours nowadays need to
make extra unofficial payments to public officials gain government contracts? The responses ranged across
always; usually; frequently; sometimes; seldom and never. Those responding sometimes or more frequently
were classified as engaging in public procurement corruption.
3 -Firms were asked: What percentage of revenues do firms like yours pay per annum in unofficial payments
to public officials? The responses ranged across 0%; less than 1%; 1 to 2%; 2-10%; 10 to 12%; 12 to 25%;
over 25%. The variable was interpolated at 0%, 1%, 2%, 6%, 11%, 19% and 25%.
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Table 3.6: Domestic Firms, FDI and Corrupt Behavior
Captor Firms Kickback Firms Total Bribes Paid
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Size Small 0.00 -0.15 0.73** 0.73** 0.018** 0.018**
(0.01) (-0.10) (4.22) (4.24) (4.56) (4.55)
Medium 0.11 0.10 0.58** 0.58** 0.007* 0.007*
(0.77) (0.69) (3.72) (3.72) (1.92) (1.92)
(Large)
C)rigin De Novo 0.27** 0.28** 0.71** 0.71** 0.013** 0.013**
(2.26) (2.36) (5.53) (5.53) (4.02) (4.02)
Privatized 0.03 0.04 0.40** 0.40** 0.007** 0.007**
(0.30) (0.39) (3.28) (3.31) (2.51) (2.54)
(State)
FDI FDI Firm 0.13 -0.23 -0.01 0.11 -0.000 -0.002
(1.30) (-1.33) (-0.06) (0.63) (-0.09) (-0.43)
(FDI Firm) x (High 0.56** -0.20 0.003
Corruption) (2.66) (-0.91) (0.52)
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies
N 2786 2786 1493 1493 2615 2615
Model Probit Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS
R2 /Pseudo R2 0.04 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11
Source: BEEPS
**significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 3.7: State Capture and the Performance of FDI Firms
Real Sales Growth
(last 3 years)
All Transition Countries
Captor firms 53.5
Other firms 29.4
Overall 32.1
High Capture Economies
Captor FDI firms 54.8
Other FDI firms 20.5
Overall 24.4
Low Capture Economies
Captor FDI firms 47.4
Other FDI firms 36.6
Overall 40.2
Source: BEEPS
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Table 3.8: FDI, State Capture and Firm Performance (OLS Regressions)
Independent Variables Sub-Category Dependent Variable:
(Dumvny variable base categoy in Real Sales Growthgog  
parentheses) (previous 3years)
Sector Mining -3.5
Services
(Manufacturing)
De Novo
Privatizad
(State owned)
Small
Medium
(Large)
FDI Firm
Interaction with Captor Firm
Captor Firm
Interaction with
high capture economy
N = 2685
R2 = 0.08
Source: BEEPS
Country dummies included, but not reported
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. t-statistics in parentheses.
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Origin
(-0.24)
2.6
(0.89)
Size
26.0**
(5.79)
0.5*
(0.11)
FDI
-24.4**
(-4.30)
-12.6**
(-2.58)
State Capture
7.2*
(1.72)
23.3*
(1.84)
-12.9
(-1.14)
83.0**
(1.95)
Table 3.9: Characteristics of FDI and Corrupt Behavior
Share of Captor Firms1 Share of Kickback Firms2 Total Bribes Paid (as a share
of annual revenues) 3
Countnries vilh: Countries ith: Countries lVith:
All Coun- High Low All Coun- High Low All Coun- High Low
tries Capture Capture tries Kick- Kick- tries Bribes Bribes
backs backs
Domestic 9.0 10.4 7.3 25.2 34.0 17.5 3.0 3.8 1.8
Firms
FDI Firms
Local HQ 12.5 19.9 4.5 28.2 33.3 23.3 3.0 4.8 1.4
FDI Firms
Foreign HQ 5.3 6.3 4.9 36.0 53.8 16.7 1.3 1.6 0.9
Source: BEEPS
1 - Firms were asked: How often do firms like yours nowadays need to make extra unofficial payments to public
officials to influence the content of new laws, decrees or regulations. The responses ranged across always; usually;
frequently; sometimes; seldom and never. Those responding sometimes or more frequently were classified as
engaging in state capture.
2 - Those firms that traded with the government were asked: How often do firms like yours nowadays need to
make extra unofficial payments to public officials gain government contracts? The responses ranged across
always; usually; frequently; sometimes; seldom and never. Those responding sometimes or more frequently were
classified as engaging in public procurement corruption.
3 - Firms were asked: What percentage of revenues do firms like yours pay per annum in unofficial payments to
public officials? The responses ranged across 0%; less than 1%; 1 to 2%; 2-10%; 10 to 12%; 12 to 25%; over 25%.
The variable was interpolated at 0%, 1%, 2%, 6%, 11%, 19% and 25%.
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Table 3.10: Characteristics of FDI and Corrupt Behavior
Dependent Variables
Captor Firms Kickback Firms Total Bribes Paid
Independent Variables (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Size Small 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.021** 0.021**
(0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.20) (2.52) (2.52)
Medium 0.36 0.35 0.53 0.56 0.020** 0.020**
(1.07) (1.04) (1.31) (1.39) (2.85) (2.85)
(Large)
Origin De Novo 0.16 0.18 0.80* 0.86* -0.008 -0.008
(0.40) (0.45) (1.65) (1.77) (-0.96) (-0.96)
Privatized 0.32 0.33 0.00 -0.02 -0.003 -0.003
(0.76) (0.78) (0.01) (0.05) (-0.35) (-0.35)
(State)
FDI F'DI Foreign -0.23 0.07 0.26 -0.83 -0.021** -0.021**
HQ (-0.69) (0.16) (0.73) (-1.21) (-3.05) (-3.05)
x interaction with -0.67 1.61**
high corruption (-0.97) (2.01)
(FDI local HQ)
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies
Model Probit Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS
N 318 318 191 191 325 325
R: / Pseudo R2 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.27 0.27
Source: BEEPS
Country dummies included but not reported.
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 3.11: Corrupt Behavior Among FDI from Different Countries
Country of Origin Share of Captor Firms Share of Kickback Total Bribes Paid3
Firms2 (% of annual revenues)
Austria 15.8 42.9 0.5
Finland 0 0 1.8
France 21.1 40.0 3.3
Germany 11.3 20.6 2.5
Greece 18.2 60.0 3.8
Italy 20.0 N/A 5.0
Netherlands 0 33.3 1.0
Russia 23.1 37.5 6.1
Sweden 5.9 40.0 1.3
Switzerland 8.3 0 1.5
Turkey 0 N/A 3.0
UK 0 11.1 1.1
USA 16.7 42.9 3.6
Domestic Firms 9.0 25.2 3.0
FDI Firms 11.5 29.2 2.8
Source: BEEPS
Notes:
The cross-country measures of corruption presented in table 2 are used to divide the sample into those in
which the level of each dimension of corruption is high or low. However, to compare the differences
between FDI and domestic firms, the behavioral measures of actual involvement in each dimension of
corruption are used:
1 - Firms were asked: How often do firms like yours need to make extra unofficial payments to public
officials to influence the content of new laws, decrees or regulations. The responses ranged across always;
usually; frequently; sometimes; seldom and never. Those responding sometimes or more frequently were
classified as engaging in state capture.
2 _ Those firms that traded with the government were asked: How often do firms like yours nowadays need
to make extra unofficial payments to public officials gain government contracts? The responses ranged
across always; usually; frequently; sometimes; seldom and never. Those responding sometimes or more
frequently were classified as engaging in public procurement corruption.
3 -Firms were asked: What percentage of revenues do firms like yours pay per annum in unofficial payments
to public officials? The responses ranged across 0%; less than 1%; 1 to 2%; 2-10%; 10 to 12%; 12 to 25%;
over 25%. The variable was interpolated at 0%, 1%, 2%, 6%, 11%, 19% and 25%.
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Table 3.12: Legislation in the Source Country and Corrupt Behavior
FDI Source Country Unregulated OECD FCPA All FDI Domestic
(by anti-corruption Countries Convention (US) Firmst Firms
legislation) Countries*
Total Bribes Paid 4.7 2.3 3.6 2.8 3.0
Share of Captor Firms 16.7 9.8 16.7 11.5 9.0
Share of Kickback Firms 31.8 27.3 42.9 29.2 25.2
Number of Observations 60 310 63 471 3148
*excludes US firms
Source: BEEPS
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Table 3.13: Legislation in the Source Country and Corrupt Behavior
(Pair-wise Comparisons)
Share of Captor Firms Share of Kickback Total Bribes Paid
Firms (% of annual
revenues)
Unregulated Countries 16.7 31.8 4.7**
OECD Convention Countries 9.8 27.3 2.3
Unregulated Countries 16.7 31.8 4.7
FCPA (US) 16.7 42.9 3.6
OECD Convention Countries 9.8 27.3 2.3
FCPA (US) 16.7 42.9 3.6**
Source: BEEPS
**pair-wise t-test significant at 5% level; * pair-wise t-test significant at 10%
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Table 3.14: Legislation in the Source Country and Corrupt Behavior
(Econometric Results)
Dependent Variables:
Share of Share of Total Bribes
Captor Firms Kickback Paid
Firms (% of annual
revenues)
Size Small -0.062 -0.07 0.021**
Medium
(Large)
Origin De Novo
Privatized
(State)
FDI
Source
FCPA (US)
Country OECD Ratifier
OECD Signatory
(Unregulated)
Number of observations
Empirical Model
Pseudo R2
(-0.19)
0.234
(0.81)
0.402
(1.19)
0.300
(0.82)
0.207
(0.69)
-0.107
(-0.41)
-0.015
(-0.05)
314
Ordered
Probit
0.07
(-0.18)
0.32
(0.86)
0.77
(1.49)
-0.02
(-0.04)
0.53
(1.27)
0.01
(0.02)
0.34
(0.78)
(2.39)
0.022**
(2.82)
-0.009
(-0.96)
-0.004
(-0.39)
0.002
(0.26)
-0.010
(-1.32)
-0.005
(0.50)
160
Ordered
Probit
0.12
299
OLS
0.27
Country dummies (for country receiving the investment) were included but not
reported.
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 3.15: Measuring the Extent of Corruption in the Transition Economies
Country Extent of
State Capture'
Albania
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Georgia
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
16 Medium
7 Medium
41 High
8 Medium
28 High
27 High
11 Medium
10 Medium
24 High
7 Medium
12 Medium
29 High
30 High
11 Medium
37 High
12 Medium
21 High
32 High
24 High
7 Medium
32 High
6 Medium
Extent of Public
Procurement Corruption 2
51 High
26 High
52 High
5 Medium
13 Medium
26 High
43 High
28 High
18 Medium
15 Medium
21 Medium
19 Medium
22 Medium
15 Medium
9 Medium
32 High
39 High
22 Medium
35 High
27 High
33 High
24 Medium
Total Bribes Paid
(as a % of annual revenue)3
4.0 High
4.6 High
5.7 High
1.3 Medium
2.1 Medium
1.1 Medium
2.5 Medium
1.6 Medium
4.3 High
1.7 Medium
3.1 High
5.3 High
1.4 Medium
2.8 High
4.0 High
1.6 Medium
3.2 High
2.8 High
2.5 Medium
1.4 Medium
4.4 High
4.4 High
Overall 20 26 3.0
Source: Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000) based on BEEPS.
Notes:
1 - Firms were asked whether state capture in each of the following dimensions (parliamentary legislation,
presidential decrees, central bank, criminal courts, commercial courts, political parties) had no impact; minor
impact; significant impact or very significant impact on their business. Those firms that reported a significant or
very significant impact were classified as affected by state capture in that dimension. The state capture index is
calculated at the unweighted average of the proportion of firms in each country affected by each of the six
components of state capture.
2 - Those firms that traded with the government were asked: how often do firms like yours nowadays need to
make extra unofficial payments to public officials gain government contracts? The responses ranged across
always; usually; frequently; sometimes; seldom and never. Those responding sometimes or more frequently
were classified as engaging in public procurement corruption.
3 - Firms were asked: What percentage of revenues do firms like yours pay per annum in unofficial payments to
public officials? The responses ranged across 0%; less than 1%; 1 to 2%; 2-10%; 10 to 12%; 12 to 25%; over
25%. The variable was interpolated at 0%, 1%, 2%,6%,11%,19% and 25%.
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Table 3.16: Signatories of the OECD Convention and the BEEPS
Country
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Republic
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
UK
USA
OECD Member Ratification of Convention
No No
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
No No
No Yes
Yes Yes
No No
Yes No
Yes No
Yes Yes
Yes No
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes No
Yes No
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
Yes Yes
Yes No
Yes No
No No
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Firms in the BEEPSt
0
0
22
5
0
1
2
0
8
4
15
21
87
13
1
1
6
13
5
1
0
0
19
0
4
5
0
1
1
20
13
12
30
63
Ratification Country
Signatory Country
Unregulated Country
Yes
Yes/No
No
Yes
No
No
Source: OECD, United States Department of State
tThe country of origin was not identified for 38 firms and these are not included.
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60
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